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ABSTRACT
Designing, verifying, and implementing highly reliable distributed systems is at present a
hard and very labor-intensive task. Cloud-based systems have further increased this com-
plexity due to the desired consistency, availability, scalability, and disaster tolerance. This
dissertation addresses this challenge in the context of distributed transaction systems (DTSs)
from two complementary perspectives: (i) designing DTSs with high assurance such that
they satisfy desired correctness and performance requirements; and (ii) transforming verified
system designs into correct-by-construction distributed implementations.
Regarding correctness requirements, we provide an object-based framework for formally
modeling DTSs in Maude, explain how such models can be automatically instrumented to
record relevant events during a run, formally define a wide range of consistency properties on
such histories of events, and implement a tool which fully automates the entire specification
instrumentation and model checking process.
Regarding performance requirements, we propose a general, though not yet automated,
method that transforms the untimed, non-probabilistic, and nondeterministic formal Maude
models of DTSs into probabilistic rewrite theories, explain how we can monitor the system
executions of such probabilistic theories, and shows how we can evaluate the performance
of the DTS designs based on the recorded log for different performance parameters and
workloads by statistical model checking.
To bridge the formality gap between verified designs and distributed implementations
we present a correct-by-construction automatic transformation mapping a verified formal
specification of an actor-based distributed system design in Maude to a distributed imple-
mentation enjoying the same safety and liveness properties as the original formal design.
Two case studies, applying this automatic transformation to state-of-the-art DTSs analyzed
within the same formal framework for both logical and performance properties, show that
high-quality implementations with acceptable performance and meeting performance pre-
dictions can be automatically generated in this way.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing relies on software systems that store large amounts of data correctly
and efficiently. These cloud systems are expected to achieve high performance, defined as
high availability and throughput, and low latency. Such performance needs to be assured
even in the presence of congestion in parts of the network, system or network faults, and
scheduled hardware and software upgrades. To achieve this, the data must be replicated
across both servers within a site, and across geo-distributed sites. Providing strong consis-
tency guarantees, even in the failure-free case, would require a lot of communication which
would seriously impact the system’s performance. Different storage systems therefore offer
different tradeoffs between the levels of availability and of consistency that they provide.
For example, weak notions of consistency, such as read atomicity, are acceptable for appli-
cations, such as social networks, where availability and efficiency are key requirements, but
where one can tolerate “stale” data. Other cloud applications, including online banking and
medical information systems, require stronger consistency guarantees such as serializability.
Designing and implementing highly reliable high-performance distributed systems is at
present a hard and very labor-intensive task. Cloud-based systems have further increased
this complexity due to the desired consistency, availability, scalability, and disaster tolerance.
For example, the communication needed to maintain strong consistency across sites may
incur unacceptable latencies, so that designers must balance consistency and performance.
Both performance and functional correctness are therefore critical system requirements.
This dissertation aims at addressing this challenge. Specifically, this dissertation answers
the following two major questions:
1. How can cloud storage systems be designed with high assurance that they satisfy
desired correctness and performance requirements?
2. How can a verified system design be transformed into a correct-by-construction dis-
tributed implementation?
1.1 STATE OF THE ART
Standard system development and validation techniques are not well suited for address-
ing the above challenge. Designing cloud storage systems is hard, as the design must take
into account wide-area asynchronous communication, concurrency, and fault tolerance. Ex-
perimentation with modifications and extensions of an existing system is often made very
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difficult by the lack of a precise description at a suitable level of abstraction and by the need
to understand and modify large code bases (if available) to test the new design ideas. Fur-
thermore, test-driven system development [72] where a suite of tests for the planned features
are written before development starts, and is used both to give the developer quick feedback
during development, and as a set of regression tests when new features are added has tradi-
tionally been considered to be unfeasible for ensuring compliance with a design in complex
distributed systems due to the lack of tool support for testing large numbers of different sce-
narios. It is also very difficult or impossible to obtain high assurance that the cloud storage
system satisfies given correctness and performance requirements using traditional validation
methods. Real implementations are costly and error-prone to develop and modify for exper-
imentation purposes. Simulation tools require building an additional artifact that cannot
be used for much else. Although system executions and simulations can give an idea of the
performance of a design, they cannot give any (quantified) assurance on the performance
measures. Furthermore, such implementations cannot verify consistency guarantees: even
if we executed the system and analyzed the read/write operations log for consistency vio-
lations, that would only cover certain scenarios and cannot guarantee the absence of subtle
bugs. In addition, nontrivial fault-tolerant storage systems are too complex for hand proofs
of key properties based on an informal system description. Even if attempted, such proofs
can be error-prone, informal, and usually rely on implicit assumptions. The inadequacy of
current design and verification methods for cloud storage systems in industry has also been
pointed out by engineers at Amazon in [73]. For example, they conclude that “the standard
verification techniques in industry are necessary but not sufficient. We routinely use deep
design reviews, code reviews, static code analysis, stress testing, and fault-injection testing
but still find that subtle bugs can hide in complex concurrent fault-tolerant systems.”
1.2 DESIGN AND VERIFICATION OF DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS IN MAUDE
Formal methods have been advocated to develop and analyze high-level models of dis-
tributed system designs. In a formally-based system design and analysis methodology, a
mathematical model M describes the system design at the appropriate level of abstraction.
This system specification M should be complemented by a formal property specification P
that describes mathematically (and therefore precisely) the requirements that the system M
should satisfy. Being a mathematical object, the model M can be subjected to mathemat-
ical reasoning (preferably fully automated or at least machine-assisted) to guarantee that
the design satisfies the properties P .
However, today’s distributed systems present a number of challenges to formal methods:
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(i) the sheer complexity and heterogeneity of such systems requires a flexible and expressive
formal framework, which nevertheless must be simple and intuitive to be usable by system
developers [73]; (ii) the correctness properties that these systems must satisfy can be quite
complex, and there is a desire in industry for automatic verification techniques [73]; and (iii)
both correctness and performance are, as mentioned, crucial requirements; a correct design
that performs worse than similar designs is usually worthless.
One formal framework that has shown promise in meeting these challenges is Maude [32],
a high-performance language and formal framework for executable specification, verifica-
tion and programming of concurrent systems based on rewriting logic [67, 24, 69]. Maude
meets challenge (i) by being based on a simple and intuitive formalism (algebraic equa-
tional specifications define data types and rewrite rules define dynamic behaviors) that is at
the same time general and expressive. Maude also provides a natural model of concurrent
objects, which is ideal for modeling distributed systems. Regarding challenge (ii), Maude
provides a range of automatic model checking methods, including reachability analysis and
LTL and LTLR temporal logic model checking [32, 13], which allows us to express and ana-
lyze complex properties (see, e.g., [62]). The Maude tool environment also provides theorem
proving verification of invariants in the InvA tool [77], and of reachability logic properties
in Maude’s reachability logic prover [84]. For challenge (iii), the Maude tool environment
includes the PVeStA [7] statistical model checker, which can be used to statistically predict
the performance of a design.
These features have made possible the use of Maude to model and analyze both the
correctness and performance of high-level designs of a wide range of state-of-the art systems
(see the survey [69]). To cite just one example area, Maude has been used to formally
model and analyze, often for the first time, state-of-the-art industrial and academic cloud-
based transaction systems such as Cassandra [2], ZooKeeper [49], Google’s Megastore [16],
P-Store [79], RAMP [14], and Walter [85]; and to design the entirely new system ROLA [59]
(see the survey [22]). Furthermore, model-based performance predictions using PVeStA
have shown good correspondence with experimental evaluation of implementations of systems
such as Cassandra, RAMP, and Walter [55, 57, 61].
Despite of the above promising methodology, there is very little work on its automation.
There is therefore a need for algorithmic methods for automatically verifying consistency
properties, and quantifying performance properties based on executable specifications of
both the systems and their properties. Chapter 3 takes the first step towards this goal by
presenting a general framework for automatic analysis of consistency properties of DTSs in
Maude, followed by three case studies on RAMP, Walter and ROLA in Chapter 4, 5 and 6,
respectively.
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1.3 FROM DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM DESIGNS TO IMPLEMENTATIONS
We can develop mature designs satisfying given correctness criteria and having good pre-
dicted performance in the above way. However, this still leaves open the problem of how to
pass from a verified system design to a correct-by-construction distributed implementation.
Maude provides TCP/IP sockets as Maude external objects so that they can interact with
standard Maude objects by message passing [32], and a Maude concurrent object system
can be deployed as a distributed system across several machines. Message passing within a
single machine is executed by rewriting; but message-passing across machines is achieved by
Maude TCP/IP socket objects.
Since many different distributed deployments can be chosen for the same concurrent object
system design expressed as a Maude program M , various distributed implementations can be
programmed within Maude by manually transforming the design M into a distributed Maude
program D(M) by importing the SOCKET module [32] and programming the remote message
passing communication through such sockets. This, however, leaves open a formality gap.
Suppose that a given property ϕ has been verified for the system design M . Does ϕ still
hold true for D(M)? Up to now, this formality gap has been filled by developing a formal
model D′(M) of D(M) in Maude and verifying that D′(M) verifies ϕ. For example, the
correctness of both the distributed implementations of the Mobile Maude language, and of
the Orc orchestration language have been verified this way by model checking in, respectively,
[32] and [6].
This situation is unsatisfactory because: (i) one has to manually hand program D(M), and
has to do so for each particular choice of deployment; and (ii) checking the preservation of
formal properties when passing from M to D(M) is required for each M , which defeats the
purpose of carrying out the verification on the simpler model M . One major contribution of
this dissertation (Chapter 7) is to fully automate the passage from M to D(M) and to prove
that M and an abstract model D0(M), which hides the details of D(M)’s TCP/IP-based
network communication, are stuttering bisimilar [71, 66] and therefore satisfy the exact
same CTL∗ temporal logic properties for any formulas not using the “next” operator ©.
Therefore, both safety and liveness properties are preserved by the bisimulation. What a
Maude user provides as input to the automatic M 7→ D(M) transformation is a three-tuple
(M, init , di), where M is the Maude module specifying the given system’s design, init is
an initial state in such a design, and di is a distribution function, indicating the specific IP
address and Maude session1 where each object in init will be located.
1Several concurrent Maude sessions can be executed on the same machine.
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1.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The work presented in this dissertation can be mainly classified in three categories: (i) a
general framework for formally specifying a distributed transaction system (DTS), and for
automatically analyzing its consistency properties; (ii) case studies of state-of-the-art DTSs
in this framework; and (iii) automatic transformation of a formal Maude design of a DTS
into a correct-by-construction distributed implementation.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: This chapter gives preliminaries on rewriting logic and Maude, the statistical
model checking of probabilistic rewrite theories using PVeStA, stuttering bisimulations,
and the consistency properties in DTSs.
Chapter 3: This chapter presents a general framework for formally specifying a DTS in
Maude, and formalizes in Maude nine common consistency properties for DTSs so defined.
Furthermore, it provides a fully automated method for analyzing whether a DTS design
satisfies the desired consistency properties for all initial states up to user-given bounds on
system parameters.
This chapter is based on the joint work [62] with Jose´ Meseguer, Peter Csaba O¨lveczky,
Qi Wang, and Min Zhang.
Chapter 4: This chapter shows a case study of using framework on formal modeling of
the RAMP transaction system, its variants and new RAMP-like designs of my own, and
on model checking eight such RAMP designs against the desired consistency properties.
Moreover, statistical model checking is used to explore and extend the design space of RAMP
by showing that our results: (i) are consistent with the experimental evaluations of the
implemented designs; (ii) are also consistent with conjectures made by the RAMP developers
for other unimplemented designs; and (iii) uncover some promising new designs that seem
attractive for some applications.
This chapter is based on the joint work [58, 57, 62] with Jatin Ganhotra, Indranil Gupta,
Jose´ Meseguer, Peter Csaba O¨lveczky, Muntasir Raihan Rahman, Qi Wang, and Min Zhang.
Chapter 5: This chapter describes the second case study of using the framework on formal
modeling of Walter, and on formal verification of various consistency properties by model
checking. To also analyze Walter’s performance we extend the Maude specification of Walter
to a probabilistic rewrite theory and perform statistical model checking analysis to evaluate
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Walter’s throughput for a wide range of workloads. Our performance results are consistent
with a previous experimental evaluation and throw new light on Walter’s performance for
different workloads not evaluated before.
This chapter is based on the joint work [61, 62] with Jose´ Meseguer, Peter Csaba O¨lveczky,
Qi Wang, and Min Zhang.
Chapter 6: This chapter presents (i) the design of a new transaction protocol, ROLA, hav-
ing useful applications and guaranteeing a new consistency model, update atomicity, meeting
read atomicity and prevention of lost updates consistency properties with competitive per-
formance; (ii) formal specification and model checking analysis of ROLA; (iii) a detailed
performance comparison by statistical model checking between ROLA and the Walter and
Jessy protocols showing that ROLA outperforms both Walter and Jessy in all such com-
parisons, including higher throughput and lower average latency; and (iv) a demonstration
that, by a suitable use of formal methods, a completely new distributed transaction protocol
can be designed and thoroughly analyzed, as well as be compared with other designs, very
early on, before its implementation.
This chapter is based on the joint work [59, 60, 62] with Indranil Gupta, Jose´ Meseguer,
Peter Csaba O¨lveczky, Keshav Santhanam, Qi Wang, and Min Zhang.
Chapter 7: This chapter shows (i) the formal definition of the M 7→ D(M) transforma-
tion mapping a Maude concurrent system formal design M to its distributed implementation
D(M); (ii) the proof that for any actor-like Maude specification M the system D0(M) mod-
eling D(M) and the system design M are stuttering bisimilar and satisfy the same safety
and liveness properties; (iii) a Maude prototype automation of the M 7→ D(M) transforma-
tion allowing us to generate, deploy and evaluate correct-by-construction implementations
of state-of-the art system designs, and allowing interaction of such implementations with
workload generators such as YCSB [36]; (iv) two case studies using state-of-the-art DTSs
(including ROLA) evaluating the implementations obtained by the M 7→ D(M) transforma-
tion with respect to: (a) the statistical-model-checking-based performance predictions for M ;
and (b) a conventional implementation. Similar performance trends have been respectively
shown for both case studies.
This chapter is based on the joint work with Jose´ Meseguer, Peter Csaba O¨lveczky, Atul
Sandur, and Qi Wang.
Chapter 8: This chapter ends the dissertation with some concluding remarks and future
research directions.
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CHAPTER 2: PRELIMINARIES
2.1 REWRITING LOGIC AND MAUDE
A membership equational logic (Mel) [68] signature is a triple Σ = (K,Σ, S) with K a
set of kinds, Σ = {Σw,k}(w,k)∈K∗×K a many-kinded signature, and S = {Sk}k∈K a K-kinded
family of disjoint sets of sorts. The kind of a sort s is denoted by [s]. A Σ-algebra A
consists of a set Ak for each kind k, a function Af : Ak1 × · · · ×Akn → Ak for each operator
f ∈ Σk1···kn,k, and a subset inclusion As ⊆ Ak for each sort s ∈ Sk. The set TΣ,k denotes the
set of ground Σ-terms with kind k, and TΣ(X)k denotes the set of Σ-terms with kind k over
the set X of kinded variables.
A Mel theory is a pair (Σ, E) with Σ a Mel-signature and E a finite set of Mel sentences,
which are either conditional equations or conditional memberships of the forms:
(∀X) t = t′ if
∧
i
pi = qi ∧
∧
j
wj : sj, (∀X) t : s if
∧
i
pi = qi ∧
∧
j
wj : sj,
where t, t′ ∈ TΣ(X)k and s ∈ Sk for some kind k ∈ Σ, the latter stating that t is a term
of sort s, provided the condition holds. In Maude, an individual equation in the condi-
tion may also be a matching equation pl := ql, which is mathematically interpreted as an
ordinary equation. However, operationally, the new variables occurring in the term pl be-
come instantiated by matching the canonical form of the instance of ql against the pattern
term pl (see [32] for further explanations). Order-sorted notation s1 < s2 abbreviates the
conditional membership (∀x : [s1]) x : s2 if x : s1. Similarly, an operator declaration
f : s1 · · · sn → s corresponds to declaring f at the kind level and giving the membership
axiom (∀ x1 : [s1], . . . , xn : [sn]) f(x1, . . . , xn) : s if
∧
1≤i≤n xi : si.
A Maude module specifies a rewrite theory [67] of the form (Σ, E ∪B,R), where:
1. (Σ, E ∪B) is a membership equational logic theory specifying the system’s state space
as an algebraic data type with B a set of equational axioms (such as a combination
of associativity, commutativity, and identity axioms), to perform equational deduction
with the equations and memberships in E (the equations are oriented from left to right
for equational simplification) modulo the axioms B, and
2. R is a set of labeled conditional rewrite rules specifying the system’s local transitions,
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each of which has the form:
l : q −→ r if
∧
i
pi = qi ∧
∧
j
wj : sj ∧
∧
m
tm −→ t′m,
where l is a label, and q, r are Σ-terms of the same kind. Intuitively, such a rule
specifies a one-step transition from a substitution instance of q to the corresponding
substitution instance of r, provided the condition holds; that is, that the substitution
instance of each condition in the rule follows from R (where condition tm −→ t′m is
understood as tm −→∗ t′m).
We briefly summarize the syntax of Maude and refer to [32] for more details. Sorts
and subsort relations are declared by the keywords sort and subsort, and operators are
introduced with the op keyword: op f : s1 . . . sn -> s, where s1 . . . sn are the sorts of
its arguments, and s is its (value) sort. Operators can have user-definable syntax, with
underbars ‘_’ marking each of the argument positions, and are declared with the sorts of
their arguments and the sort of their result. Some operators can have equational attributes,
such as assoc, comm, and id, stating, for example, that the operator is associative and
commutative and has a certain identity element. Such attributes are then used by the Maude
engine to match terms modulo the declared axioms. An operator can also be declared to be
a constructor (ctor) that builds up the data elements of its sort.
There are three kinds of logical statements in the Maude language, equations, memberships
(declaring that a term has a certain sort), and rewrite rules, introduced with the following
syntax:
• equations: eq u = v or ceq u = v if condition;
• memberships: mb u : s or cmb u : s if condition;
• rewrite rules: rl [l]: u => v or crl [l]: u => v if condition.
An equation f(t1, . . . , tn) = t with the owise (for “otherwise”) attribute can be applied to a
term f(. . .) only if no other equation with left-hand side f(u1, . . . , un) can be applied. The
mathematical variables in such statements are either explicitly declared with the keywords
var and vars, or can be introduced on the fly in a statement without being declared previ-
ously, in which case they have the form var:sort . Finally, a comment is preceded by ‘***’
or ‘---’ and lasts till the end of the line.
In object-oriented Maude specifications, a class declaration class C | att1 : s1, ...,
attn : sn declares a class C of objects with attributes att1 to attn of sorts s1 to sn. An object
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instance of class C is represented as a term < O : C | att1 : val1, . . . , attn : valn >, where O,
of sort Oid, is the object’s identifier, and where val1 to valn (of respective sorts s1, . . . , sn)
are the current values of the attributes att1 to attn. A message is a term of sort Msg. A
system’s distributed state, called a configuration, is modeled as a term of the sort Config,
and has the structure of a multiset made up of objects and messages built up with an empty
syntax (juxtaposition) multiset union operator __.
The dynamic behavior of a system is axiomatized by specifying each of its concurrent
transition patterns by a rewrite rule. For example, the rule (with label l)
rl [l] : m(O,w)
< O : C | a1 : x, a2 : O’, a3 : z >
=>
< O : C | a1 : x + w, a2 : O’, a3 : z >
m’(O’,x) .
defines the family of concurrent transitions in which a message m, with parameters O and w,
is read and consumed by an object O of class C, the attribute a1 of the object O is changed
to x + w, and a new message m’(O’,x) is generated. Attributes whose values do not change
and do not affect the next state, such as a3, need not be mentioned in a rule; all such
“superfluous” attributes can be replaced by a variable (such as AS) of sort AttributeSet,
so that the above rewrite rule can also be written
rl [l] : m(O,w)
< O : C | a1 : x, a2 : O’, AS >
=>
< O : C | a1 : x + w, a2 : O’, AS >
m’(O’,x) .
Example 2.1. The following example shows parts of a Maude specification of a very simple
partitioned database system, where each client performs a sequence of read operations on
data items1 (or keys). A table assigns to each data item K the DB object that stores the data
item. When a client wants to read the value of a data item K, it sends a read(K) message to
the DB object storing K (rule getValue). This DB object replies with a value(K,V) message
(rule replyRead). When the client reads this response, it stores the pair (K,V) in its log
(rule readValue). We just show snippets of the Maude code, and omit, e.g., the declarations
of the data types and messages involved:
1By a “data item” we mean (as usual in this area) a key used to store values, and by “data” we mean
(as usual in this area) the values stored in such keys.
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class Client | operations : OperationList, log : Log .
class DB | database : Map{Key,Value} .
op table : -> Map{Key,Oid} .
vars O O’ : Oid . var K : Key . var OL : OperationList .
var V : Value . var B : Map{Key,Oid} . var LOG : Log .
rl [getValue] :
< O : Client | operations : read(K) :: OL >
=> < O : Client | operations : OL >
(to table[K] from O : read(K)) .
rl [replyRead] :
(to O from O’ : read(K)) < O : DB | database : B >
=> < O : DB | > (to O’ from O : value(K,B[K])) .
rl [readValue] :
(to O from O’ : value(K,V)) < O : Client | log : LOG >
=> < O : Client | log : LOG ++ (K,V) > .
The following shows an initial configuration with two clients and two database partitions,
each storing two data items:
ops c1 c2 db1 db2 : -> Oid .
ops k1 k2 k3 k4 : -> Key .
op init : -> Configuration .
eq init =
< c1 : Client | operations : read(k3) :: read(k2), log : empty >
< c2 : Client | operations : read(k4) :: read(k3), log : empty >
< db1 : DB | database : k1 |-> 54, k2 |-> 8 >
< db2 : DB | database : k3 |-> 9, k4 |-> 7 > .
eq table = k1 |-> db1, k2 |-> db1, k3 |-> db2, k4 |-> db2 .
Reflection and Metaprogramming in Maude. Rewriting logic is reflective [33, 34], in
the sense that important aspects of its metatheory can be represented at the object level in
a consistent way. One important application of reflection is to support metaprogramming in
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Maude in the sense that a term t in a rewrite theory R is meta-represented as a meta-term t of
sort Term, and a rewrite theory R is meta-represented as a term R of sort Module. A Maude
program (or specification) can then be transformed by means of a module transformation
equationally defined as a Maude function f : Module→ Module.
Example 2.2. To get a feeling for the similarity between the object-level and meta-level
notations, let us consider the metarepresentation of the module on the left as the term (called
a meta-module) displayed on the right:
fmod NAT is fmod ’NAT is
pr BOOL . protecting ’BOOL .
sorts Zero Nat . sorts ’Zero ; ’Nat .
subsort Zero < Nat . subsort ’Zero < ’Nat .
op 0 : -> Zero [ctor] . op ’0 : nil -> Zero [ctor] .
op s : Nat -> Nat [ctor] . op ’s : ’Nat -> ’Nat [ctor] .
op _+_ : Nat Nat -> Nat [ctor] . op ’_+_ : ’Nat ’Nat -> ’Nat [ctor] .
vars N M : Nat .
eq 0 + N = N . eq ’_+_[’0.Nat, ’N:Nat] = ’N:Nat .
eq s(N) + M = s(N + M) . eq ’_+_[’s[’N:Nat], ’M:Nat]
= ’s[’_+_[’N:Nat, ’M:Nat]] .
endfm endfm
where sorts and kinds are metarepresented as terms in subsorts Sort and Kind of the sort Qid
of quoted identifiers. For example, the natural number term s(N) + M shown on the left is
meta-represented as the meta-term ’ + [’s[’N:Nat], ’M:Nat] on the right using the meta-
level operator [ ] : Qid Term -> Term, the meta-representation of the NAT operators +
and s as quoted identifiers ’ + and ’s, and the meta-representation of variables N and M of
sort Nat as ’N:Nat and ’M:Nat.
Reachability Analysis in Maude. Maude provides a number of high-performance au-
tomatic analysis methods, including rewriting for simulation purposes, reachability analysis,
linear temporal logic (LTL) model checking, and statistical model checking. In this disser-
tation we use reachability analysis to model check consistency properties. Given an initial
state init , a state pattern pattern and an (optional) condition cond , Maude’s search com-
mand searches the reachable state space from init in a breadth-first manner for states that
match pattern and are such that cond holds:
search [bound] init =>! pattern such that cond .
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where bound provides an upper bound on the number of solutions to be found (if omitted,
there is no such upper bound). The arrow =>! means that Maude only searches for reachable
final states (i.e., states that cannot be further rewritten) that match pattern and satisfies
cond . If the arrow used is instead =>* then Maude searches for all reachable states matching
the search pattern and satisfying cond .
Sockets in Maude. Maude’s erewrite command supports rewriting with external objects
(that do not reside in the configuration) when the “portal” object <> is present in the config-
uration. Objects in a Maude process, called here a session, can communicate with so-called
external objects in the same session by message passing. In particular, they can communi-
cate with Maude’s built-in socket manager object, with object name socketManager, that
supports establishing communication and communicating through TCP sockets with other
remote Maude objects in other Maude sessions, as well as with remote foreign objects (see
Section 7.1.3) in other processes. Some of the messages defining the interface between a
Maude process and Maude’s socket manager are the following:
A message createServerTcpSocket(socketManager,myOid, port, ...) asks Maude’s
socket manager to create a server socket. If the socket is created successfully, Maude’s socket
manager sends the message createdSocket(myOid,socketManager,socketName), where
socketName is the name of the created socket. The message send(socketName,myOid,string)
asks Maude to send string through the socket socketName. The message receive(socketName,
myOid) solicits data through a socket. When some data (string) is received through a socket,
the socket manager sends the message received(myOid,socketName,string).
2.2 STATISTICAL MODEL CHECKING AND PVESTA
Distributed systems are often probabilistic in nature, e.g., network latency such as message
delay may follow a certain probability distribution, plus some algorithms may be probabilis-
tic. Systems of this kind can be modeled by probabilistic rewrite theories [5] with rules of
the form:
[l] : t(−→x ) −→ t′(−→x ,−→y ) if cond(−→x ) with probability −→y := pi(−→x )
where the term t′ has additional new variables −→y disjoint from the variables −→x in the term
t. Since for a given matching instance of the variables −→x there can be many (often infinite)
ways to instantiate the extra variables −→y , such a rule is nondeterministic. The probabilistic
nature of the rule stems from the probability distribution pi(−→x ), which depends on the
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matching instance of −→x , and governs the probabilistic choice of the instance of −→y in the
result t′(−→x ,−→y ) according to pi(−→x ).
Statistical model checking [80, 94] is an attractive formal approach to analyzing proba-
bilistic systems against quantitative temporal logic properties. Instead of offering a binary
yes/no answer, it provides a quantitative real-valued answer and can verify a property up to
a user-specified level of confidence by running Monte-Carlo simulations of the system model.
The quantitative answer, however, need not be a percentage or a probability: it may instead
be a latency estimation, or a quantitative estimation of some other performance property.
For example, a statistical model checking result may be “86.87% of ROLA transactions
commit successfully with 95% confidence”. Existing statistical model checking verification
techniques assume that the system model is purely probabilistic. Using the methodology in
[5, 41] we can eliminate nondeterminism in the choice of firing rules. We then use PVeStA
[7], an extension and parallelization of the tool VeStA [81], to statistically model check
purely probabilistic systems against properties expressed by QuaTEx quantitative tempo-
ral logic [5]. The expected value of a QuaTEx expression is iteratively evaluated w.r.t. two
parameters α and δ provided as input by sampling until the size of (1-α)100% confidence
interval is bounded by δ, where the result of evaluating a formula is not a Boolean value,
but a real number.
2.3 STUTTERING BISIMULATIONS
For preservation of temporal logic properties between a Maude design of a concurrent
system and its automatic implementation as a distributed system we will use the notion of a
stuttering bisimulation map between Kripke structures. Recall that a Kripke structure A on
a set AP of atomic propositions is a 4-tuple A = (A,→A, a0, LA) where A is a set of states,
→A⊆ A × A is the total transition relation on states (total means that ∀a ∈ A ∃a′ ∈ A
s.t. a →A a′), a0 ∈ A is the initial state, and LA, called the labeling function, is a function
LA : A→ P(AP ) assigning to each state a ∈ A the set of atomic state predicates LA(a) true
in state a. A path pi in A is function pi : N → A such that pi(0) = a0 and ∀n ∈ N pi(n) →A
pi(n+ 1).
Given Kripke structures A and B, intuitively, a bisimulation is a proposition-preserving
correspondence between states of A and states of B such that any action of A can be
replicated by an action of B, and vice versa. In this dissertation, B will be a concurrent
system’s formal design in Maude, and A will be its distributed Maude implementation. The
implementation A will be correct by construction if we can prove that the design B and
its implementation A are bisimilar. Since what is an atomic transition in a design may be
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realized by a sequence of transitions in its implementation, our bisimulation needs to be a
stuttering bisimulation map in the following sense:
Definition 2.1. [71] Given Kripke structures A = (A,→A, a0LA) and B = (B,→B, b0, LB),
a stuttering bisimulation map, denoted h : A → B, is a function h : A → B such that: (1)
given any path pi inA there is a path ρ in B and a strictly monotonic function κ : N→ N such
that: (i) for each n ∈ N and each i, κ(n) ≤ i < κ(n+1), (ii) h(pi(κ(n))) = h(pi(κ(i))) = ρ(n),
and (iii) LA(pi(κ(n))) = LA(pi(i)) = LB(ρ(n)). And (2) given any path ρ in B there is a path
pi in A and a strictly monotonic function κ : N→ N satisfying the above conditions (i)–(iii).
The states pi(i), κ(n) ≤ i < κ(n+1), can be called the “stuttering states” of A bisimulated
by ρ(n) in B. The key property of a stuttering bisimulation map h : A → B is that
all formulas ϕ ∈ CTL∗ \ © satisfied by B are also satisfied by A, and vice versa, where
CTL∗ \© denotes the subset of the CTL∗ temporal logic not involving the “next” operator
© (for more on CTL∗, its LTL sublogic, and the satisfaction relation A |= ϕ between a
Kripke structure and a CTL∗ formula ϕ see [31]). That is, we have:
Theorem 2.1. [71], Thm. 3 (Implementation Correctness). If h : A → B is a stuttering
bisimulation map, for each ϕ ∈ CTL∗ \© we have: B |= ϕ ⇔ A |= ϕ.
Definition 2.1 is conceptually appealing but hard to check directly. As explained in [71],
a more easily checkable characterization by Manolios [66] can be adapted to our setting as
the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2. (Adapted from [66, 71]). If all states in Kripke structures A and B are
reachable from their corresponding initial states a0 and b0, then a function h : A→ B such
that h(a0) = b0 and LA = LB ◦ h is a stuttering bisimulation map h : A → B iff there is a
well-founded order (W,>) and a function µ : A×B → W such that whenever h(a) = b and
a →A a′, then either (i) there is a b′ ∈ B s.t. b →A b′ and h(a′) = b′, or (ii) h(a′) = b and
µ(a, b) > µ(a′, b), and, in addition, whenever h(a) = b and b→B b′, there is a finite sequence
of transitions a →A a1 . . . an →A an+1, with n ≥ 0, such that for 1 ≤ i < n + 1 h(ai) = b,
and h(an+1) = b
′.
A concurrent system design is formally specified in Maude as a rewrite theory. For tem-
poral logic reasoning we can associate to a rewrite theory R = (Σ, E,R) and an initial state
init ∈ TΣ/E a corresponding Kripke structure K(R, init) = (Reach(init),−→•R/E, init , L) as
follows [32]: (i) Reach(init) is the set of all states [u] ∈ TΣ/E reachable from init , i.e., such
that [t] −→∗R/E [u], where −→R/E denotes the relation of rewriting E-equivalence classes
with the rules R modulo E; (ii) −→•R/E is the (totalization of) the one-step rewrite relation
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−→R/E; and (iii) L maps each reachable state [u] to the set L([u]) = {p ∈ AP | u |= p =E
true}, where =E denotes equality modulo E and we assume that Σ contains a sort whose
ground terms are the atomic propositions AP , and E contains equations defining the satis-
faction relation u |= p between states and atomic propositions as a Boolean-valued function
|=.
2.4 TRANSACTION CONSISTENCY
Different applications require different consistency guarantees. There are therefore many
consistency properties for DTSs on partially replicated distributed data stores. This disser-
tation focuses on the following nine, which span a spectrum from weak consistency such as
read committed to strong consistency like serializability:
• Read committed (RC ) [18] disallows a transaction2 from seeing any uncommitted or
aborted data.
• Cursor stability (CS ) [38], widely implemented by commercial SQL systems (e.g., IBM
DB2 [3]) and academic prototypes (e.g., MDCC [50]), guarantees RC and in addition
prevents the lost update anomaly.
• Read atomicity (RA) [14] guarantees that either all or none of a (distributed) transac-
tion’s updates are visible to other transactions. For example, if Alice and Bob become
friends on social media, then Charlie should not see that Alice is a friend of Bob’s, and
that Bob is not a friend of Alice’s.
• Update atomicity (UA) [29, 59] guarantees read atomicity and prevents lost updates.
• Snapshot isolation (SI ) [18] requires a multi-partition transaction to read from a snap-
shot of a distributed data store that reflects a single commit order of transactions across
sites, even if they are independent of each other. Alice sees Charlie’s post before seeing
David’s post if and only if Bob sees the two posts in the same order. Charlie and David
must therefore coordinate the order of committing their posts even if they do not know
each other.
• Parallel snapshot isolation (PSI ) [85] weakens SI by allowing different commit orders
at different sites, while guaranteeing that a transaction reads the most recent version
2A transaction is a user application request, typically consisting of a sequence of read and/or write
operations on data items, that is submitted to a (distributed) database.
16
committed at the transaction execution site, as of the time when the transaction begins.
For example, Alice may see Charlie’s post before seeing David’s post, even though Bob
sees David’s post before Charlie’s post, as long as the two posts are independent of
each other. Charlie and David can therefore commit their posts without waiting for
each other.
• Non-monotonic snapshot isolation (NMSI ) [9] weakens PSI by allowing a transaction
to read a version committed after the transaction begins. Alice may see Bob’s post
that committed after her transaction started executing.
• Serializability (SER) [75] ensures that the execution of concurrent transactions is equiv-
alent to one where the transactions are run one at a time.
• Strict Serializability (SSER) strengthens SER by enforcing the serial order to follow
real time.
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CHAPTER 3: AUTOMATIC ANALYSIS OF CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES
OF DISTRIBUTED TRANSACTION SYSTEMS
In this chapter we present a generic framework for formalizing both DTSs and their con-
sistency properties in Maude. The modeling framework is very general and should allow us
to naturally model most DTSs. We formalize nine popular consistency models in this frame-
work and provide a fully automated method—and a tool which automates this method—for
analyzing whether a DTS specified in our framework satisfies the desired consistency prop-
erty for all initial states with the user-given number of transactions, data items, sites, and
so on.
In particular, we show how one can automatically add a monitoring mechanism which
records relevant history during a run of a DTS specified in our framework, and we define
the consistency properties on such histories so that the DTS can be directly model checked
in Maude. We have implemented a tool that uses Maude’s meta-programming features to
automatically add the monitoring mechanism, that automatically generates all the desired
initial states, and that performs the Maude model checking of the desired consistency prop-
erties. We have applied our tool to model check the consistency properties of state-of-the-art
DTSs such as variants of RAMP [14], P-Store [79], ROLA [59], Walter [85], and Jessy [9]. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that model checking of all these properties
in a unified, systematic manner is investigated and supported.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents our framework for modeling
DTSs in Maude, and Section 3.2 explains how to record the history in such models. Sec-
tion 3.3 formally defines consistency models as Maude functions on such recorded histories.
Section 3.4 introduces our tool which automates the entire process. Finally, Section 3.5
discusses related work and Section 3.6 gives some concluding remarks.
Acknowledgements. This chapter is based on the work [62] partially supported by NRL
contract N00173-17-1-G002, and NSFC Project No. 61872146.
3.1 MODELING DISTRIBUTED TRANSACTION SYSTEMS IN MAUDE
This section presents a framework for modeling in Maude DTSs that satisfy the following
general assumptions:
• We can identify and record “when”1 a transaction starts executing at its server/proxy
1Since we do not necessarily deal with real-time systems, this “when” may not denote the real time, but
means when the event takes place relative to other events.
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and “when” the transaction is committed and aborted at the different sites involved
in its validation.
• The transactions record their read and write sets.
If such a DTS is modeled in this framework, our tool can automatically model check whether
it satisfies the above consistency properties, as long as it can detect the read and write sets
and the above events: start of transaction execution, and abort/commit of a transaction
at a certain site. This section explains how the system should be modeled so that our tool
automatically discovers these events.
We make the following additional assumptions about the DTSs we target:
• The database is distributed across of a number of sites, or servers or replicas, that
communicate by asynchronous message passing. Data are partially replicated across
these sites: a data item may be replicated/stored at more than one site. The sites
replicating a data item are called that item’s replicas.
• Systems evolve by message passing or by local computations. Servers communicate by
asynchronous message passing with arbitrary but finite delays.
• A client forwards a transaction to be executed to some server (called the transaction’s
executing server or proxy), which executes the transaction.
• Transaction execution should terminate in either a commit or an abort.
3.1.1 Modeling DTSs in Maude
A DTS is modeled in an object-oriented style, where the concurrent state consists of a con-
figuration containing number of replica objects, each modeling a local database/server/site,
and a number of messages traveling between the replica objects. A transaction is modeled
as an object which resides inside the replica object executing the transaction.
Basic Data Types. There are user-defined sorts Key for data items (or keys) and Version
for versions of data items, with a partial order < on versions, with v < v′ denoting that v′ is
a later version of v in <. We then define key-version pairs <key,version> and sets of such
pairs, that model a transaction’s read and write sets, as follows:
sorts Key Version KeyVersion .
op <_,_> : Key Version -> KeyVersion .
pr SET{KeyVersion} * (sort Set{KeyVersion} to KeyVersions) .
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To track the status of a transaction (on non-proxies, or remote servers) we define a sort
TxnStatus consisting of a transaction’s identifier and its status; this is used to indicate
whether a remote transaction (one executed on another server) is committed on this server:
op [_,_] : Oid Bool -> TxnStatus [ctor] .
pr SET{TxnStatus} * (sort Set{TxnStatus} to TxnStatusSet) .
Modeling Replicas. A replica (or site) stores parts of the database, executes the trans-
actions for which it is the proxy, helps validating other transactions, and is formalized as an
object instance of a subclass of the following class Replica:
class Replica | executing : Configuration, committed : Configuration,
aborted : Configuration, decided : TxnStatusSet .
The attributes executing, committed, and aborted contain, respectively, transactions that
are being executed, and have been committed or aborted on the executing server; decided
is the status of transactions executed on other servers. Recall that transactions themselves
are modeled as objects internal to the replica storing them. That is why the executing,
committed, and aborted attributes have sort Configuration.
To model a system-specific replica a user should specify it as an object instance of a
subclass of the class Replica, perhaps with new attributes.
Example 3.1. A replica in our Maude model of Walter [61] is specified as an object instance
of the following subclass Walter-Replica of class Replica that adds 14 new attributes (only
4 shown below):
class Walter-Replica | store : Datastore, sqn : Nat,
locked : Locks, votes : Vote, ...
subclass Walter-Replica < Replica .
Modeling Transactions. A transaction should be modeled as an object of a subclass of
the following class Txn:
class Txn | readSet : KeyVersions, writeSet : KeyVersions .
where readSet and writeSet denote the key/version pairs read and written by the trans-
action, respectively.
Example 3.2. Walter transactions can be modeled as object instances of the subclass
Walter-Txn with four new attributes:
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class Walter-Txn | operations : OperationList, localVars : LocalVars,
startVTS : VectorTimestamp, txnSQN : Nat .
subclass Walter-Txn < Txn .
Modeling System Dynamics. We describe how the rewrite rules defining the start of a
transaction execution and aborts and commits at different sites should be defined so that
our tool can detect these events.
• The start of a transaction execution should be modeled by a rewrite rule where the
transaction object appears in the proxy server’s executing attribute in the right-hand
side, but not in the left-hand side, of the rewrite rule.
Example 3.3. A Walter replica starts executing a transaction by moving the trans-
action TID in gotTxns (buffering transactions from clients) to executing:2
rl [start-txn] :
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES, committedVTS : VTS,
gotTxns : < TID : Walter-Txn | startVTS : empty > ;; TXNS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | gotTxns : TXNS,
executing : TRANSES < TID : Walter-Txn | startVTS : VTS > > .
• When a transaction is committed on the executing server, the transaction object must
appear in the committed attribute in the right-hand side—but not in the left-hand
side—of the rewrite rule. Furthermore, the readSet and writeSet attributes must be
explicitly given in the transaction object.
Example 3.4. In Walter, when all operations of an executing read-only transaction
have been performed, the proxy commits the transaction directly:
rl [commit-read-only-txn] :
< RID : Walter-Replica | committed : TRANSES’,
executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : nil, writeSet : empty, readSet : RS > >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | committed : (TRANSES’ < TID : Walter-Txn | > ),
executing : TRANSES > .
2We do not give variable declarations, but follow the convention that variables are written in (all) capital
letters.
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• When a transaction is aborted by the executing server, the transaction object must
appear in the aborted attribute in the right-hand side, but not in the left-hand side,
of a rewrite rule. Again, the transaction should present its attributes writeSet and
readSet (to be able to record relevant history).
Example 3.5. If either of the two conflict checks for fast commit fails, the executing
Walter replica aborts the transaction:
crl [fast-commit-failed] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica |
executing : < TID : Walter-Txn | operations : nil, writeSet : WS,
readSet : RS, startVTS : VTS > TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’, history : DS, locked : LOCKS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’ < TID : Walter-Txn | > >
if WS =/= empty /\ allLocalPreferred(WS, RID, REPLICA-TABLE)
/\ (modified(WS, VTS, DS) or locked(WS, LOCKS)) .
• A rewrite rule that models when a transaction’s status is decided remotely (i.e., not
on the executing server) must contain in the right-hand side (only) the transaction’s
identifier and its status in the replica’s decided attribute.
Example 3.6. Upon receiving the “disaster-safe durable” message, the remote Walter
replica “commits” the transaction TID by setting its status to true:
crl [receive-ds-durable-visible] :
msg ds-durable(TID) from RID’ to RID
< RID : Walter-Replica |
recPropTxns : (propagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS) ; PTXNS),
committedVTS : VTS’, locked : LOCKS, decided : TSS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica |
committedVTS : insert(RID’,SQN,VTS’),
locked : release(TID,LOCKS), decided : (TSS, [TID,true] ) >
msg visible(TID) from RID to RID’
if VTS’ gt VTS /\ s(VTS’[RID’]) == SQN .
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These requirements can be easily met by many systems. The Maude models of the DTSs
RAMP [58], Faster [57], Walter [61], ROLA [59], Jessy [60], and P-Store [74] can all be
seen as instantiations of our modeling framework, with very small syntactic changes, such
as defining transaction and replica objects as subclasses of Txn and Replica, changing the
names of the attributes and sorts, etc. Google’s Megastore [16] is a cloud storage system with
transaction support; its Real-Time Maude model [45] can be adapted into our framework by
removing the nondeterministic communication delays for messages. The Apache Cassandra
[2] NoSQL key-value store can be seen as a transaction system where each transaction is a
single operation; the Maude model of Cassandra in [63] can also be easily modified to fit
within our modeling framework.
3.2 ADDING EXECUTION LOGS AND MONITORS
To formalize and analyze consistency properties of distributed transaction systems we
add an “execution log” that is stored in a monitor and records the history of relevant events
during a system execution. This section explains how this history recording can be added
automatically to a model of a DTS that has been specified according to the requirements
explained in Section 3.1.
3.2.1 Execution Log
To capture the total order of relevant events in a run, we use a “logical global clock”
to order all key events (i.e., transaction starts, commits, and aborts). This logical clock is
incremented by one each time any such event takes place.
A transaction in a replicated DTS is typically committed both locally (at its executing
server) and remotely at different times. To capture this, we define a “time vector” using
Maude’s map data type that maps replica identifiers (of sort Oid) to (typically “logical”)
clock values (of sort Time, which here are the natural numbers: subsort Nat < Time):
pr MAP{Oid,Time} * (sort Map{Oid,Time} to VectorTime) .
where each element in the mapping has the form replica-id |-> time .
An execution log (of sort Log) maps each transaction (identifier) to a record <proxy , issueTime,
finishTime, committed , reads , writes>, with proxy its proxy server, issueTime the start-
ing time at its proxy server, finishTime the commit/abort times at each relevant server,
committed a flag indicating whether the transaction is committed at its proxy, reads the
key-version pairs read by the transaction, and writes the key-version pairs written:
23
sort Record .
op <_,_,_,_,_,_> : Oid Time VectorTime Bool KeyVersions KeyVersions -> Record .
pr MAP{Oid,Record} * (sort Map{Oid,Record} to Log) .
3.2.2 Logging Execution History
We show how the relevant history of an execution can be recorded during a run of our
Maude model by transforming the original Maude model into one which also records this
history.
First, we add to the state a Monitor object that stores the current logical global time in
the clock attribute and the current log in the log attribute:
< M : Monitor | clock : Time, log : Log >.
The log is updated each time an interesting event (see Section 3.1.1) happens. Our tool
identifies those events and automatically transforms their corresponding rewrite rules by
adding and updating the monitor object.
Executing. A transaction starts executing when the transaction object appears in a
Replica’s executing attribute in the right-hand side, but not in the left-hand side, of
a rewrite rule. The monitor then adds a record for this transaction, with the proxy and start
time, to the log, and increments the logical global clock.
Example 3.7. The rewrite rule in Example 3.3 where a Walter replica is served a transaction
is modified by adding and updating the monitor object (in blue):
rl [start-txn] :
< O@M : Monitor | clock : GT@M, log : LOG@M >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES, committedVTS : VTS,
gotTxns : < TID : Walter-Txn | startVTS : empty > ;; TXNS >
=>
< O@M : Monitor | clock : GT@M + 1 , log : LOG@M,
(TID |-> < RID, GT@M, empty, false, empty, empty >) >
< RID : Walter-Replica | gotTxns : TXNS,
executing : TRANSES < TID : Walter-Txn | startVTS : VTS > > .
where the monitor O@M adds a new record for the transaction TID in the log, with starting
time (i.e., the current logical global time) GT@M at its executing server RID, finish time
(empty), flag (false), read set (empty), and write set (empty). The monitor also increments
the global clock by one.
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Commit. A transaction commits at its proxy when the transaction object appears in the
proxy’s committed attribute in the right-hand side, but not in the left-hand side, of a
rewrite rule. The record for that transaction is updated with commit status, versions read
and written, and commit time, and the global logical clock is incremented.
Example 3.8. The monitor object is added to the rewrite rule in Example 3.4 for committing
a read-only transaction:
rl [commit-read-only-txn] :
< O@M : Monitor | clock : GT@M, log : LOG@M ,
(TID |-> < RID, T@M, VTS@M, FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M)) >
< RID : Walter-Replica | committed : TRANSES’,
executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : nil, writeSet : empty, readSet : RS > >
=>
< O@M : Monitor | clock : GT@M + 1 , log : LOG@M ,
(TID |-> < RID, T@M, insert(RID,GT@M,VTS@M), true, RS, empty >)
< RID : Walter-Replica | committed : (TRANSES’ < TID : Walter-Txn | >),
executing : TRANSES > .
The monitor updates the log for the transaction TID by setting its finish time at the executing
server RID to GT@M (insert(RID,GT@M,VTS@M)), setting the committed flag to true, setting
the read set to RS and write set to empty (this is a read-only transaction), and increments
the global clock.
Abort. Abort is treated as commit, but the commit flag remains false.
Example 3.9. The monitor object is added to the rewrite rule in Example 3.5 for aborting
a transaction:
crl [fast-commit-failed] :
< O@M : Monitor | clock : GT@M, log : LOG@M ,
(TID |-> < RID, T@M, VTS@M, FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M)) >
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica |
executing : < TID : Walter-Txn | operations : nil, writeSet : WS,
readSet : RS, startVTS : VTS > TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’, history : DS, locked : LOCKS >
=>
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< O@M : Monitor | clock : GT@M + 1 , log : LOG@M ,
(TID |-> < RID, T@M, insert(RID,GT@M,VTS@M), false, RS, WS >)
< TABLE : Table | >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’ < TID : Walter-Txn | > >
if WS =/= empty /\ allLocalPreferred(WS, RID, REPLICA-TABLE)
/\ (modified(WS, VTS, DS) or locked(WS, LOCKS)) .
Decided. When a transaction’s status is decided remotely, the record for that transaction’s
decision time at the remote replica is updated with the current global time.
Example 3.10. The rewrite rule from Example 3.6 for committing a transaction remotely
is transformed into the following rewrite rule:
crl [receive-ds-durable-visible] :
< O@M : Monitor | clock : GT@M, log : LOG@M ,
TID |-> < VTS1@M, VTS2@M, FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M > >
msg ds-durable(TID) from RID’ to RID
< RID : Walter-Replica |
recPropTxns : (propagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS) ; PTXNS),
committedVTS : VTS’, locked : LOCKS, decided : TSS >
=>
< O@M : Monitor | clock : GT@M + 1 , log : LOG@M ,
TID |-> < VTS1@M, insert(RID,GT@M,VTS2@M) , FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M > >
< RID : Walter-Replica |
committedVTS : insert(RID’,SQN,VTS’),
locked : release(TID,LOCKS), decided : (TSS, [TID,true] ) >
msg visible(TID) from RID to RID’
if VTS’ gt VTS /\ s(VTS’[RID’]) == SQN .
where the monitor O@M only needs to add the commit time for the replica RID, besides
advancing the global time.
3.2.3 Implementing the Monitoring Mechanism
We have formalized and implemented the transformation from a Maude specification of
a DTS into one having a monitor as a meta-level function monitorRules : Module ->
Module in Maude. Specifically, the transformation takes as input Maude object-oriented
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modules satisfying the requirements in Section 3.1 and including the rewrite rules specifying
the system dynamics, instruments the “interesting” rewrites rules at the meta-level according
to the monitoring mechanism, and outputs a new flattened model of the system and the
monitor.
The function monitorRules takes as argument a rewrite rule and returns a new one that
is possibly equipped with the monitor and its behavior. The following two equations are
defined to formalize the monitoring mechanism:
ceq monitorRules(rl T => T’ [ATR] .) = (rl T1 => T2 [ATR] .)
if ’__[T1,T2] := monitorTerms(T,T’,false) .
ceq monitorRules(crl T => T’ if COND [ATR] .) =
(crl T1 => T2 if COND [ATR] .)
if ’__[T1,T2] := monitorTerms(T,T’,false) .
The first equation handles an unconditional rewrite rule, while the second one handles a
conditional one.
The meta-level function monitorTerms takes terms T and T’ from both sides of a rule, and
returns, if monitoring is needed, two new ones T1 and T2, forming the new rule with the mon-
itor’s behavior. The monitor’s behavior depends on the input rewrite rule in terms of either
the execution, local commit, remote commit, or abort of the transaction. In the cases where
the monitor should be added, the term T1 is a concatenation of the term T and the monitor
pattern (e.g., < O@M : Monitor | clock: GT@M, log: (TID |-> < VTS1@M, VTS2@M,
FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M), LOG@M)>), while the term T2 is a concatenation of the term
T’, and the resulting monitor pattern determined by the status change of the transaction
encoded by the input rewrite rule.
Example 3.11. The definition of monitorTerms in the case of Commit is defined by the
following meta-level equation:
--- case 2: locally committed
ceq monitorTerms(T,T’) =
’__[’__[newMonitor(getTID(T1)),T],
’__[resultMonitor(getTID(T), getReplicaID(T),’true.Bool,
getAttr(’readSet‘:_,T1),getAttr(’writeSet‘:_,T1)),T’]]
if isCommitted(T,T’) /\ T1 := getAttr(’executing‘:_,T) .
where the function newMonitor is used to construct a new monitor pattern with a given
transaction’s identifier, and resultMonitor constructs the resulting pattern with the trans-
action’s identifier, replica’s identifier, a Boolean value indicating whether the transaction is
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successfully committed or not, the set of versions read, and the set of versions written by
the transaction. The function isCommitted returns true if the transition from T to T’ is
caused by the local commit of the transition T1, which is determined by whether or not the
transaction appears in the attribute committed in T’, but not in that in T.
3.3 FORMALIZING CONSISTENCY MODELS IN MAUDE
This section formalizes the consistency properties informally described in Section 2.4 as
functions on the “history log” of a completed run.
Read Committed (RC). (A transaction cannot read any writes by uncommitted transac-
tions.) Note that standard definitions for single-version databases disallow reading versions
that are not committed at the time of the read. We follow the definition for multi-versioned
systems by Adya, summarized by Bailis et al. [14], that defines the RC property as follows:
(i) a committed transaction cannot read a version that was written by an aborted transac-
tion; and (ii) a transaction cannot read intermediate values : that is, if T writes two versions
< X,V > and < X,V’ > with V < V’, then no T ′ 6= T can read < X,V >.
The first equation defining the function rc, specifying when RC holds, checks whether
some (committed) transaction TID1 reads version V of key X (i.e., < X,V > is in TID’s read set
< X,V > , RS, where RS matches the rest of TID’s read set), and this version V was written by
some transaction TID2 that was never committed (i.e., TID2’s commit flag is false, and its
write set is < X,V > , WS’). The second equation checks whether there was an intermediate
read of a version < X,V > that was overwritten by the same transaction TID2 that wrote the
version:3
op rc : Log -> Bool .
eq rc(TID1 |-> < O, T, VT, true, (< X,V >, RS), WS >,
TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, false, RS’, (< X,V >, WS’) >, LOG) = false .
eq rc(TID1 |-> < O, T, VT, true, (< X,V >, RS), WS >,
TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, RS’, (< X,V >, < X,V’ >,WS’) >,
LOG) = false if V < V’ .
eq rc(LOG) = true [owise] .
3The configuration union and the union operator ‘,’ for maps and sets are declared associative and
commutative. The first equation therefore matches any log where some committed transaction read a key-
version pair written by some aborted transaction.
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Read Atomicity (RA). A system guarantees RA if it prevents fractured reads and pre-
vents transactions from reading uncommitted or aborted data. A transaction Tj exhibits
fractured reads if transaction Ti writes versions xm and yn, Tj reads version xm and version
yk, and k < n [14]. The function fracRead checks whether there are fractured reads in the
log. There is a fractured read if a transaction TID2 reads X and Y, transaction TID1 writes X
and Y, TID2 reads the version VX of X written by TID1, and reads a version VY’ of Y written
before VY (VY’ < VY):
op fracRead : Log -> Bool .
ceq fracRead(TID1 |-> < O, T, VT, true, (< X,VX > , < Y,VY’ >, RS), WS >,
TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, RS’, (< X,VX > , < Y,VY >, WS’) >, LOG)
= true if VY’ < VY .
eq fracRead(LOG) = false [owise] .
We define RA as the combination of RC and no fractured reads:
op ra : Log -> Bool .
eq ra(LOG) = rc(LOG) and not fracRead(LOG) .
Cursor Stability (CS) [38] strengthens RC by also preventing lost updates (LU). LU
can only happen with multiple conditional writes (i.e., a transaction first fetches some value
of an data item, and then updates it with a new value) fetching the same data. Once
one of those transactions commits its writes, the others must be aborted. The function lu
captures the case when there are two committed transactions TID1 and TID2, both of which
read the same version V of data item X (i.e., < X,V > is in the read sets of both TID1 and
TID2), and commit on the same key (i.e., the two transactions wrote < X,VX > and < X,VX’ >,
respectively):
op lu: Log -> Bool .
eq lu(TID1 |-> < O, T, VT, true, (< X,V > , RS), (< X,VX >, WS) >,
TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, (< X,V > , RS’), (< X,VX’ >, WS’) >,LOG) = true .
eq lu(LOG) = false [owise] .
CS can then be specified as conjunction of RC and no lost updates:
op cs : Log -> Bool .
eq cs(LOG) = rc(LOG) and not lu(LOG) .
29
Update Atomicity (UA) [29, 59] provides read atomicity and prevents lost updates:
op ua : Log -> Bool .
eq ua(LOG) = ra(LOG) and not lu(LOG) .
Snapshot Isolation (SI) is defined by two properties in [85]:
• SI-1 (snapshot read): All operations in a transaction read the most recent committed
version as of time when the transaction began.
• SI-2 (no write-write conflicts): The write sets of each pair of committed concurrent4
transactions must be disjoint.
The function notSnapshotRead holds when SI-1 is violated. The first conditional equation
handles the case when a transaction TID1 reads another transaction TID2’s version written
(< X,V >), while the most recent committed version from TID1’s perspective is < X,V’ > written
by TID3 (TID3’s commit time T’ at its proxy RID3 is between TID2’s commit time T at its
proxy RID2 and TID1’s start time T1). The second conditional equation checks if TID1 read
some version that was committed after it started (T1 < T):
op notSnapshotRead : Log -> Bool .
ceq notSnapshotRead(
TID1 |-> < RID1, T1, VT1, true, (< X,V > , RS1), WS1 >,
TID2 |-> < RID2, T2, (RID2 |-> T, VT2), true, RS2, (< X,V >, WS2) >,
TID3 |-> < RID3, T3, (RID3 |-> T’, VT3), true, RS3, (< X,V’ > , WS3) >,
LOG) = true if V =/= V’ /\ T’ < T1 /\ T’ > T .
ceq notSnapshotRead(
TID1 |-> < RID1, T1, VT1, true, (< X,V > , RS1), WS1 >,
TID2 |-> < RID2, T2, (RID2 |-> T, VT2), true, RS2, (< X,V >, WS2) >,
LOG) = true if T1 < T .
eq notSnapshotRead(LOG) = false [owise] .
The function wwConflict captures write-write conflicts: there are two transactions TID1
and TID2, both writing key X, and TID2 is committed at its proxy at time T, which comes
after the start time T1 of TID1 but before its commit time T2 at its proxy. The committed
(flag true) transactions TID1 and TID2 are therefore concurrent and write the same key,
and hence we have a write-write conflict:
4Two committed transactions are concurrent if one of them has a commit timestamp (at its proxy)
between the start and the commit timestamp of the other.
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op wwConflict: Log -> Bool .
ceq wwConflict(
TID1 |-> < RID, T1, (RID |-> T2 , VT2), true, RS, (< X,V > , WS) >,
TID2 |-> < RID’, T3, (RID’ |-> T , VT4), true, RS’, (< X,V’ > , WS’) >,
LOG) = true if T > T1 /\ T < T2 .
eq wwConflict(LOG) = false [owise] .
SI holds when there is no violation of snapshot read and no write-write conflicts:
op si : Log -> Bool .
eq si(LOG) = not notSnapshotRead(LOG) and not wwConflict(LOG) .
Parallel snapshot isolation (PSI) is given by three properties [85]:
• PSI-1 (site snapshot read): All operations read the most recent committed version at
the transaction’s site as of the time when the transaction began.
• PSI-2 (no write-write conflicts): The write sets of each pair of committed somewhere-
concurrent5 transactions must be disjoint.
• PSI-3 (commit causality across sites): If a transaction T1 commits at a site S before a
transaction T2 starts at site S, then T1 cannot commit after T2 at any site.
The function notSiteSnapshotRead checks whether the system log satisfies PSI-1 by
returning true if there is a transaction that did not read the most recent committed version
at its executing site when it began:
op notSiteSnapshotRead : Log -> Bool .
ceq notSiteSnapshotRead(
TID1 |-> < RID1, T, VT1, true, (< X,V > , RS1), WS1 >,
TID2 |-> < RID2, T’, (RID1 |-> T2 , VT2), true, RS2, (< X,V > , WS2) >,
TID3 |-> < RID3, T’’, (RID1 |-> T3 , VT3), true, RS3,(< X,V’ > , WS3) >,
LOG) = true if V =/= V’ /\ T3 < T /\ T3 > T2 .
ceq notSiteSnapshotRead(
TID1 |-> < RID1, T, VT1, true, (< X,V > , RS1), WS1 >,
TID2 |-> < RID2, T’, (RID1 |-> T2 , VT2), true, RS2, (< X,V > , WS2) >,
LOG) = true if T < T2 .
eq notSiteSnapshotRead(LOG) = false [owise] .
5Two transactions are somewhere-concurrent if they are concurrent at one of their sites.
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In the first equation, the transaction TID1, hosted at site RID1, has in its read set a version
< X,V > written by TID2. Some transaction TID3 wrote version < X,V’ > and was committed
at RID1 after TID2 was committed at RID1 (T3 > T2) and before TID1 started executing (T3
< T). Hence, the version read by TID1 was stale. The second equation checks if TID1 read
some version that was committed at RID1 after TID1 started (T < T2).
The function someWhereConflict checks whether PSI-2 holds by looking for a write-write
conflict between any pair of committed somewhere-concurrent transactions in the system log:
op someWhereConflict : Log -> Bool .
ceq someWhereConflict(
TID1 |-> < RID1, T, (RID1 |-> T1 , VT1), true, RS, (< X,V > , WS) >,
TID2 |-> < RID2, T’, (RID1 |-> T2 , VT2), true, RS’, (< X,V’ > , WS’) >,
LOG) = true if T2 > T /\ T2 < T1 .
eq someWhereConflict(LOG) = false [owise] .
The above function checks whether the transactions with the write conflict are concurrent
at the transaction TID1’s proxy RID1. Here, TID2 commits at RID1 at time T2, which is
between TID1’s start time T and its commit time T1 at RID1.
The function notCausality analyzes PSI-3 by checking whether there was a “bad situa-
tion” in which a transaction TID1 committed at site RID2 before a transaction TID2 started
at site RID2 (T1 < T2), while TID1 committed at site RID after TID2 committed at site RID
(T3 > T4):
op notCausality : Log -> Bool .
ceq notCausality(
TID1 |-> < RID1, T, (RID2 |-> T1 , RID |-> T3 , VT2), true, RS, WS >,
TID2 |-> < RID2, T2, (RID |-> T4 , VT4), true, RS’, WS’ >,
LOG) = true if T1 < T2 /\ T3 > T4 .
eq notCausality(LOG) = false [owise] .
PSI can then be defined by combining the above three properties:
op psi : Log -> Bool .
eq psi(LOG) = not notSiteSnapshotRead(LOG) and
not someWhereConflict(LOG) and not notCausality(LOG) .
Non-monotonic snapshot isolation (NMSI) is the same as PSI except that a transac-
tion may read a version committed even after the transaction begins [8]. NMSI can therefore
be defined as the conjunction of PSI-2 and PSI-3:
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op nmsi : Log -> Bool .
eq nmsi(LOG) = not someWhereConflict(LOG) and not notCausality(LOG) .
Serializability (SER) means that the concurrent execution of transactions is equivalent
to executing them in some (non-overlapping in time) sequence [75].
A formal definition of SER is based on direct serialization graphs (DSGs): an execution is
serializable if and only if the corresponding DSG is acyclic. Each node in a DSG corresponds
to a committed transaction, and directed edges in a DSG correspond to the following types
of direct dependencies [4]:
• Read dependency: Transaction Tj directly read-depends on transaction Ti if Ti writes
some version xi and Tj reads that version xi.
• Write dependency: Transaction Tj directly write-depends on transaction Ti if Ti writes
some version xi and Tj writes x’s next version after xi in the version order.
• Antidependency: Transaction Tj directly antidepends on transaction Ti if Ti reads some
version xk and Tj writes x’s next version after xk.
There is a directed edge from a node Ti to another node Tj if transaction Tj directly read-
/write-/antidepends on transaction Ti.
The dependencies/edges can easily be extracted from our log as follows:
• If there is a key-version pair < X , V > both in T2’s read set and in T1’s write set, then
T2 read-depends on T1.
• If T1 writes < X, V1 > and T2 writes < X, V2 >, and V1 < V2, and there no version < X, V >
with V1 < V < V2, then T2 write-depends on T1.
• T2 antidepends on T1 if < X, V1 > is in T1’s read set, < X, V2 > is in T2’s write set with
V1 < V2 and there is no version < X, V > such that V1 < V < V2.
We have defined in Maude a data type Dsg for DSGs:
sorts Dsg Edge . subsort Edge < Dsg .
op <_;_> : Oid Oid -> Edge [ctor] .
eq E ; E = E .
op emptyDsg : -> Dsg [ctor] .
op _;_ : Dsg Dsg -> Dsg [ctor assoc comm id: emptyDsg] .
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We have defined a function dsg that constructs the DSG from a log by iteratively adding
edges between committed transactions (aborted transactions are dropped from the log):
op dsg : Log -> Dsg .
op dsg : Log Log Dsg -> Dsg .
eq dsg(LOG) = dsg(LOG,LOG,emptyDsg) .
eq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,false,RS,WS >,LOG’),LOG,DSG) = dsg(LOG’,LOG,DSG) .
For each transaction in the log, the construction builds up dependency edges with the read
set and write set in order; within the read/write set, the construction checks dependencies
for each version read/written.
First, we find read dependencies for versions read in the read set:
ceq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,(KVER,RS),WS >,LOG’),
(TID’ |-> < O’,T’,VT’,true,RS’,(KVER,WS’) >,LOG),DSG)
= dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,RS,WS >,LOG’),
(TID’ |-> < O’,T’,VT’,true,RS’,(KVER,WS’) >,LOG),
(DSG ; < TID’ ; TID >)) if TID =/= TID’ .
where the transaction TID reads KVER written by another transaction TID’, and thus a new
edge < TID’ ; TID > is added to the DSG.
If version VS’ written by the transaction TID’ is the next version of VS read by the
transaction TID, we add an antidependency edge < TID ; TID’ > to the DSG:
ceq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,(< X,VS >,RS),WS >,LOG’),
(TID’ |-> < O’,T’,VT’,true,RS’,(< X,VS’ >,WS’) >,LOG),DSG)
= dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,RS,WS >,LOG’),
(TID’ |-> < O’,T’,VT’,true,RS’,(< X,VS’ >,WS’) >,LOG),
(DSG ; < TID ; TID’ >))
if VS < VS’ /\ TID =/= TID’ /\ not committedBetween(X,VS,VS’,LOG) .
where the function committedBetween returns true iff (for if and only if) there is a version
committed between the two versions in the version order. It is defined as:
op committedBetween : Key Version Version Log -> Bool .
ceq committedBetween(X,VS,VS’,
(TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,RS, (< X,VS’’ >,WS) >,LOG))
= true if VS’’ < VS’ /\ VS < VS’’ .
eq committedBetween(X,VS,VS’,LOG) = false [owise] .
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If there are no more edges to be added for the current version read, we move to the next
version read:
eq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,(< X,VS >,RS),WS >,LOG’),LOG,DSG)
= dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,RS,WS >,LOG’),LOG,DSG) [owise] .
Once all versions read in the read set are handled, we continue to build up the DSG by
investigating the write set.
If the transaction TID’ writes the next version VS’ of VS written by another transaction
TID, an write-dependency edge < TID ; TID’ > is added to the DSG:
ceq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,empty,(< X,VS >,WS) >,LOG’),
(TID’ |-> < O’,T’,VT’,true,RS’,(< X,VS’ >,WS’) >,LOG),DSG)
= dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,empty,WS >,LOG’),
(TID’ |-> < O’,T’,VT’,true,RS’,(< X,VS’ >,WS’) >,LOG),
(DSG ; < TID ; TID’ >))
if VS < VS’ /\ TID =/= TID’ /\ not committedBetween(X,VS,VS’,LOG) .
If VS written by the transaction TID is the next version of VS’ read by the transaction
TID’, we add an antidependency edge < TID’ ; TID > to the DSG:
ceq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,empty,(< X,VS >,WS) >,LOG’),
(TID’ |-> < O’,T’,VT’,true,(< X,VS’ >,RS’),WS’ >,LOG),DSG)
= dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,empty,WS >,LOG’),
(TID’ |-> < O’,T’,VT’,true,(< X,VS’ >,RS’),WS’ >,LOG),
(DSG ; < TID’ ; TID >))
if VS’ < VS /\ TID =/= TID’ /\ not committedBetween(X,VS’,VS,LOG) .
If there are no more edges to be added for the current version written, we move to the
next version written:
eq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,empty,(< X,VS >,WS) >,LOG’),LOG,DSG)
= dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,empty,WS >,LOG’),LOG,DSG) [owise] .
When all dependency edges are handled for a transaction (indicated by empty for both
the read set and write set), we move to the next (committed) transaction:
eq dsg((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,empty,empty >,LOG’),LOG,DSG)
= dsg(LOG’,LOG,DSG) .
Finally, we get the resulting DSG out of the execution history:
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eq dsg(empty,LOG,DSG) = DSG .
Based on the constructed DSG, we define a predicate cycle : Dsg -> Bool that checks
whether the DSG has cycles:
op cycle : Dsg -> Bool .
eq cycle(DSG) = cycle(txnIds(DSG),DSG,empty) .
op cycle : OidSet Dsg OidSet -> Bool .
ceq cycle((TID,TIDS),DSG,TIDS’) = true if TID in TIDS’ .
ceq cycle((TID,TIDS),DSG,TIDS’) =
cycle(destNodes(TID,DSG),DSG,(TIDS’,TID))
or cycle(TIDS,DSG,TIDS’) if not (TID in TIDS’) .
eq cycle(empty,DSG,TIDS’) = false .
where the function txnIds returns a set of identifiers of all transactions in the DSG; the
function destNodes computes for some node in the DSG all nodes it directly points to by
the dependency edges:
op txnIds : Dsg -> OidSet .
eq txnIds(DSG ; < TID ; TID’ >) = TID ; TID’ ; txnIds(DSG) .
eq txnIds(emptyDsg) = empty .
op destNodes : Oid Dsg -> OidSet .
eq destNodes(TID,(< TID ; TID’ > ; DSG)) = TID’ ; destNodes(TID,DSG) .
eq destNodes(TID,DSG) = empty [owise] .
SER then holds iff there is no cycle in the constructed DSG:
op ser : Log -> Bool .
eq ser(LOG) = not cycle(dsg(LOG)) .
Strict Serializability (SSER) guarantees that all transactions can be serialized in an
order that also respects the real time order. For example, under SSER, once an update
transaction commits its writes, all later transactions (where “later” is defined by the wall-
clock time modeled by our logical global clock) should return the version of that transaction
or the version of a later update transaction.
Thus we define the following three functions to check if the read, write, or anti- dependency
does not respect the real-time order, respectively.
If a transaction reads some stale data, the read dependency violates the real-time order:
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op notRtReadDep : Log -> Bool .
ceq notRtReadDep((TID1 |-> < RID,T,VT,true,(< X,VS >,RS),WS >,
TID2 |-> < RID’,T1,(RID’ |-> T2,VT’),true,RS’,
(< X,VS >,WS’) >,LOG)) = true
if T2 < T /\ rtCommittedBetween(X,T2,T,LOG) .
where the transaction TID1 reads the stale data < X,VS > written by TID2. The data is
stale because there is some version committed between TID2’s commit and TID1’s start in
real time. This is determined by the function rtCommittedBetween:
op rtCommittedBetween : Key Time Time Log -> Bool .
ceq rtCommittedBetween(X,T1,T2,
(TID |-> < RID,T,(RID |-> T’,VT),true,RS,(< X,V >,WS) >,LOG))
= true if T1 < T’ /\ T’ < T2 .
eq rtCommittedBetween(X,T1,T2) = false [owise] .
The write dependency violates the real-time order if one version is the next version of the
other in the version order, but there is some version committed in-between in real time:
op notRtWriteDep : Log -> Bool .
ceq notRtWriteDep((
TID1 |-> < RID,T1,(RID |-> T1’,VT),true,RS,(< X,VS >,WS) >,
TID2 |-> < RID’,T2,(RID’ |-> T2’,VT’),true,RS’,
(< X,VS’ >,WS’) >,LOG)) = true
if VS < VS’ /\ not committedBetween(X,VS,VS’,LOG) /\
T1’ < T2’ /\ rtCommittedBetween(X,T1’,T2’,LOG) .
where the version VS’ is the next version of VS, but there is some version committed between
the respective commit times T1’ and T2’.
The antidependency violates the real-time order if the version written is the next version of
the version read in the version order with some version committed between the two versions
in real time:
op notRtAntiDep : Log -> Bool .
ceq notRtAntiDep((
TID1 |-> < RID1,T1,(RID1 |-> T1’,VT1),true,(< X,VS >,RS1),WS1 >,
TID2 |-> < RID2,T2,(RID2 |-> T2’,VT2),true,RS2,(< X,VS’ >,WS2) >,
LOG)) = true
if VS < VS’ /\ not committedBetween(X,VS,VS’,LOG) /\
T1’ < T2’ /\ rtCommittedBetween(X,T1’,T2’,LOG) .
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Finally, by combining the three checks we have the definition for SSER:
op sser : Log -> Bool .
eq sser(LOG) = not notRtReadDep(LOG) and
not notRtWriteDep(LOG) and not notRtAntiDep(LOG) .
3.4 FORMAL ANALYSIS OF CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES
3.4.1 Parametric Generation of Initial States
Explicit-state model checkers like Maude are typically quite expressive but only analyze
the system from a single initial configuration. To increase coverage, we would like to model
check system models for all possible configurations satisfying certain bounds, for example
having j transactions and k clients. Despite the wealth of Maude applications, we are not
aware of any work doing such comprehensive model checking in Maude. We therefore present
a general technique in Maude for model checking a system from a range of different initial
configurations.
Specifically, we introduce a new operator init so there is a one-step rewrite init(params)
−→ c0 for each possible initial configuration c0 satisfying the given parameter requirements,
and declare a sort for sets of configurations:
sort ConfigSet . subsort Configuration < ConfigSet .
op empty : -> ConfigSet .
op _;_ : ConfigSet ConfigSet -> ConfigSet [assoc comm id: empty] .
We define a function
op initAux : s1 ... sn sn+1 ... sn+m -> ConfigSet .
such that s1 ... sn are the sorts for the user-specified parameters params , and sn+1 ...
sn+m those for the auxiliary parameters params
′, and then initAux(params,params ′) gen-
erates all possible initial states for such parameters. We also add the following rewrite rule
to our model:
var C : Configuration . var CS : ConfigSet .
crl [init] : init(params) => C if C ; CS := initAux(params,params’) .
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init’s parameters specify the number of each of the following parameters: read-only, write-
only, and read-write transactions; operations for each type of transaction; clients; servers;
keys; and replicas per key.
Here we only illustrate how to generate replicas, and how to replicate keys. The entire
specification is given at https://github.com/siliunobi/cat.
We start by generating the replica table and key-variable pairs. keyVars consists of “;”-
separated key-variable pairs < k1, var1 > ; ... ; < kn, varn >, each of which has a key k
and the associated local variable var. The function kvars extracts KEYS key-variable pairs
from keyVars:
--- generate table and key-var pairs:
crl initAux(RTX,WTX,RWTX,ROP,WOP,RWOP,CLS,SVS,KEYS,RF,none)
=> $initAux(RTX,WTX,RWTX,ROP,WOP,RWOP,CLS,SVS,KVARS,genKeyVarSet(KVARS),RF,
< 0 : Table | table : initTable(KVARS) >)
if KVARS := kvars(KEYS,keyVars) .
The function initTable initializes the replica table for each key with its replicas of nil:
--- initialize table with generated keys:
op initTable : KeyVars -> ReplicaTable .
op $initTable : KeyVars ReplicaTable -> ReplicaTable .
eq initTable(KVARS) = $initTable(KVARS,[emptyTable]) .
eq $initTable((< K,VAR > ; KVARS),[KEYREPLICAS]) =
$initTable(KVARS,[sites(K,nil) ;; KEYREPLICAS]) .
eq $initTable(noKeyVar,[KEYREPLICAS]) = [KEYREPLICAS] .
We now generate replicas, assign the keys to them, and update the replica table accord-
ingly.
Example 3.12. Walter replicas are generated with the attributes in Example 3.1:
--- generate Walter replicas:
rl $initAux(RTX,WTX,RWTX,ROP,WOP,RWOP,CLS,s PARS,KVARS,KS,RF,C)
=> $initAux(RTX,WTX,RWTX,ROP,WOP,RWOP,CLS,PARS,KVARS,KS,RF,C
< s PARS : Walter-Replica | executing : none, committed : none,
aborted : none, decided : empty, store : empty, sqn : 0,
locked : empty, votes : empty, ... >) .
--- assign keys to Walter replicas and update table accordingly:
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crl $initAux(RTX,WTX,RWTX,ROP,WOP,RWOP,CLS,0,(< K,VAR > ; KVARS),KS,s RF,
< RID : Walter-Replica | store : VS >
< 0 : Table | table : [sites(K,RIDS) ;; KEYREPLICAS] > C)
=> $initAux(RTX,WTX,RWTX,ROP,WOP,RWOP,CLS,0,(< K,VAR > ; KVARS),KS,RF,
< RID : Walter-Replica | store : (VS,K |-> (< [0],version(0,0) >)) >
< 0 : Table | table : [sites(K,RIDS RID) ;; KEYREPLICAS] > C)
if not $hasMapping(VS,K) .
Note that, to assign a key to a replica, we nondeterministically add a replica RID to key K’s
replicating sites. Once the key has been assigned to replication factor replicas, we continue
to the next key by resetting the replication factor to rf:
--- next key
rl $initAux(RTX,WTX,RWTX,ROP,WOP,RWOP,CLS,0,(< K,VAR > ; KVARS),KS,0,C)
=> $initAux(RTX,WTX,RWTX,ROP,WOP,RWOP,CLS,0,KVARS,KS,rf,C) .
3.4.2 The CAT Tool
We have implemented the Consistency Analysis Tool (CAT) that automates the new
method for model checking consistency properties explained in this chapter. CAT takes as
input:
• A Maude model of the DTS specified as explained in Section 3.1.
• The desired number of each of the following initial state parameters: read-only, write-
only, and read-write transactions; operations for each type of transaction; clients;
servers; keys; and replicas per key. The tool analyzes the desired property for all
initial states having the desired number of each of these parameters.
• The consistency property to be analyzed.
Given these inputs, CAT performs the following steps:
1. adds the monitoring mechanism to the user-provided system model;
2. generates all possible initial states with the user-provided numbers of items for the
different parameters; and
3. executes the following command to search, from all generated initial states, for one
reachable final state where the consistency property does not hold:
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search [1] init =>! C:Configuration
< M:Oid : Monitor | log: LOG:Log clock: N:Nat >
such that not consistency-property(LOG:Log) .
where the underlined functions are parametric, and are instantiated by the user inputs;
e.g., consistency-property is replaced by the corresponding function rc, psi, nmsi,
. . . , or ser, depending on which property to analyze.
CAT outputs either “No solution,” meaning that all runs from all the given initial states
satisfy the desired consistency property, or a counterexample (in Maude at the moment)
showing a behavior that violates the property.
Table 3.1: Model Checking Results w.r.t. Consistency Properties. “X”, “×”, and “-” refer
to satisfying or violating the property, and “not applicable”, respectively.
Maude Model LOC Consistency Property
RC RA CS UA NMSI PSI SI SER SSER
RAMP-F [58] 330 X X × × - - × × ×
RAMP-F+1PW [57] 302 X X × × - - × × ×
RAMP-F+FC [57] 305 X X × × - - × × ×
RAMP-F¬2PC [57] 320 X × × × - - × × ×
RAMP-S [58] 255 X X × × - - × × ×
RAMP-S+1PW [57] 237 X X × × - - × × ×
RAMP-S¬2PC [57] 248 X × × × - - × × ×
Faster [57] 300 X × × × - - × × ×
ROLA [59] 411 X X X X - - × × ×
Jessy [60] 413 X X X X X × × × ×
Walter [61] 830 X X X X X X × × ×
P-Store [74] 438 X X X X X X X X ×
NO WAIT (Chapter 7) 600 X X X X - - X X ×
We have applied our tool to 13 Maude models of state-of-the-art DTSs (different variants of
RAMP and Walter, ROLA, Jessy, P-Store, and NO WAIT) against all nine properties (three
case studies, namely RAMP, Walter, and ROLA, will be presented in detail in Chapter 4,
5, and 6, respectively). Table 3.1 summarizes our experience with CAT: all model checking
results are as expected. It is worth remarking that our automatic analysis found all the
violations of properties that the respective systems should violate. There are also some
cases where model checking is not applicable (“-” in Table 3.1): some system models do not
include a mechanism for committing a transaction on remote servers (i.e., no commit time
on any remote server is recorded by the monitor). Thus, model checking NMSI or PSI is
not applicable.
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We have performed our analysis with different initial states, with up to 4 transactions, 4
operations per transaction, 2 clients, 2 servers, 2 keys, and 2 replicas per key. Each analysis
command took about 10 minutes (in the worst case) to execute on a 2.9 GHz Intel 4-Core
i7-3520M CPU with 3.6 GB of memory.
Data Availability. The system models, properties specifications, and tool implementation
are available at https://github.com/siliunobi/cat.
3.5 RELATED WORK
Formalizing Consistency Properties in a Single Framework. Adya [4] uses depen-
dencies between reads and writes to define different isolation models in database systems.
Bailis et al. [14] adopt this model to define read atomicity. Burckhardt et al. [26] and Cerone
et al. [29] propose axiomatic specifications of consistency models for transaction systems us-
ing visibility and arbitration relationships. Shapiro et al. [83] propose a classification along
three dimensions (total order, visibility, and transaction composition) for transactional con-
sistency models. Crooks et al. [37] formalize transactional consistency properties in terms of
observable states from a client’s perspective. On the non-transactional side, Burckhardt [25]
focuses on session and eventual consistency models. Viotti et al. [89] expand his work by cov-
ering more than 50 non-transactional consistency properties. Szekeres et al. [86] propose a
unified model based on result visibility to formalize both transactional and non-transactional
consistency properties.
All of these studies propose semantic models of consistency properties suitable for the-
oretical analysis. In contrast, we aim at algorithmic methods for automatically verifying
consistency properties based on executable specifications of both the systems and their con-
sistency models. Furthermore, none of the studies covered all of the transactional consistency
models considered in this work.
Model Checking Distributed Transaction Systems. There is very little work on
model checking state-of-the-art DTSs, maybe because the complexity of these systems re-
quires expressive formalisms. Engineers at Amazon Web Services successfully used TLA+ to
model check key algorithms in Amazon’s Simple Storage Systems and DynamoDB database [73];
however, they do not state which consistency properties, if any, were model checked. The
designers of the TAPIR transaction protocol have specified and model checked correctness
properties of their design using TLA+ [95]. The IronFleet framework [48] combines TLA+
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analysis and Floyd-Hoare-style imperative verification to reason about protocol-level con-
currency and implementation complexities, respectively. Their methodology requires “con-
siderable assistance from the developer” to perform the proofs. Cai [27] proposes some
basic patterns for modeling real-time transactions, and uses Timed Computation Tree Logic
(TCTL) to specify the timeliness and ACID properties. Li [54] models three multi-version
concurrency control mechanisms using the patterns in [27], and verifies transaction timeli-
ness and SER in UPPAAL. These case studies are based on timed automata, and none of
them checks state-of-the-art DTSs.
Distributed model checkers [51, 93] are used to model check implementations of distributed
systems such as Cassandra, ZooKeeper, the BerkeleyDB database and a replication protocol
implementation.
Our previous work [45, 46, 63, 55, 74, 57, 59, 61, 60, 22] specifies and model checks single
DTSs and consistency properties in different ways, as opposed to in a single framework that,
furthermore, automates the “monitoring” and analysis process.
Other Formal Reasoning about Distributed Database Systems. Cerone et al. [30]
develop a new characterization of SI and apply it to the static analysis of DTSs. Bernardi
et al. [19] propose criteria for checking the robustness of transactional programs against
consistency models. Bouajjani et al. [23] propose a formal definition of eventual consistency,
and reduce the problem of checking eventual consistency to reachability and model checking
problems. Gotsman et al. [44] propose a proof rule for reasoning about non-transactional
consistency choices.
There is also work [91, 53, 82] that focuses on specifying, implementing and verifying
distributed systems using the Coq proof assistant. Their executable Coq “implementations”
can be seen as executable high-level formal specifications, but the theorem proving requires
nontrivial user interaction.
Finally, the authors in [40] apply both model checking and meta-programming techniques
in Maude to a distributed snapshot algorithm and its reachability property, but they do not
consider either transaction systems or consistency properties.
3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we have provided an object-based framework for formally modeling dis-
tributed transaction systems (DTSs) in Maude, have explained how such models can be
automatically instrumented to record relevant events during a run, and have formally de-
fined a wide range of consistency properties on such histories of events. We have implemented
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a tool which automates the entire instrumentation and model checking process. Our frame-
work is very general: we could easily adapt previous Maude models of state-of-the-art DTSs
such as P-Store, RAMP, Walter, Jessy, ROLA, and NO WAIT to our framework. We then
model checked the DTSs w.r.t. all the consistency properties for all initial states with 4
transactions, 2 sites, and so on. This analysis was sufficient to differentiate all these DTSs
according to which consistency properties they satisfy.
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY: RAMP TRANSACTION SYSTEMS
Database systems can provide scalability by partitioning data across several database par-
titions. Multipartition transactions are often expensive due to coordination-intensive mech-
anisms, which, however, provide useful semantics for correct behaviors of such transactions.
Several efforts have recently emerged to reach an acceptable trade-off between consistency
and performance. One of the most promising is the RAMP transaction system proposed
by Bailis et al. [15, 14]. RAMP allows clients to execute transactions (like in relational
databases) in NoSQL-like storage systems. It offers a correctness property called “Read
Atomicity” (RA) which ensures that a given transaction’s updates are either all visible or
not visible at all, to other transactions. For example, if A and B become “friends” in one
transaction, then other transactions should not see that A is a friend of B but that B is not
a friend of A: either both relationships are visible or neither of them is.
The main contributions of this chapter are fourfold: (i) we instantiate the ideas of Chapter
3 by showing how we can model RAMP and its extensions in the CAT framework; (ii) we
verify the consistency properties of RAMP and its extensions by model checking in CAT; (iii)
we transform the RAMP designs specified in the CAT framework into probabilistic Maude
models; and (iv) we evaluate eight RAMP designs w.r.t. the performance and consistency
measures for different experimental parameters and workloads. Regarding (iv), our results:
(a) are consistent with the experimental results obtained by the RAMP developers for their
implemented designs; (b) confirm the conjectures made by the RAMP developers for their
other three unimplemented designs; and (c) uncover some promising new RAMP-like designs
that seem attractive for some applications.
This chapter is structured as follows. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 give some background on
RAMP, its variants, and our new RAMP design alternative. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 present the
Maude models of RAMP and its extensions in the CAT framework, and show how we can
use them to model check their consistency properties. Section 4.5 shows how we can specify
our RAMP designs as probabilistic rewrite theories. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 explain how we
can monitor the system executions, and how we can evaluate the performance of the designs
based on the recorded log for different performance parameters and workloads. Section 4.8
gives some concluding remarks.
Acknowledgements. This chapter is based on the work [58, 57, 62] supported in part by
NSF CNS 1409416, NSF CNS 1319527, NSF CCF 0964471, AFOSR/AFRL FA8750-11-2-
0084, NRL contract N00173-17-1-G002, and NSFC Project No. 61872146.
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4.1 RAMP TRANSACTIONS
To deal with large amounts of data, distributed databases partition their data across
multiple servers. However, many systems do not provide useful transactional semantics for
operations accessing multiple partitions, since the latency needed to ensure correct multi-
partition transactional access is often high. Therefore, trade-offs that combine efficiency
with weaker transactional guarantees are needed.
In [14], Bailis et al. propose a new isolation model, called read atomic (RA) isolation, and
Read Atomic Multi-Partition (RAMP) transactions, that together combine efficient multi-
partition operations and partial fault tolerance with some transactional guarantee: either
all or none of a transaction’s updates are visible to other transactions.
RAMP writers attach metadata to each write and the reads use this metadata to get
the correct version. There are three versions of RAMP: RAMP-Fast, RAMP-Small, and
RAMP-Hybrid. The write protocols in these algorithms only differ in the amount of attached
metadata. To guarantee that all partitions perform a transaction successfully or that none
do, RAMP performs two-phase writes by using the two-phase commit protocol (2PC) [20]:1
In the prepare phase, each timestamped write is sent to its partition, which adds the write
to its local database. In the commit phase, each partition updates an index which contains
the highest-timestamped committed version of each item. The RAMP algorithms described
in [14] only deal with read-only and write-only transactions. This dissertation focuses on
RAMP-Fast and RAMP-Small, which lie at the end points. Below we only detail the RAMP-
Fast algorithm, and refer to [14] for the details of the other RAMP algorithms.
RAMP-Fast (abbreviated RAMP-F). In RAMP-Fast, read transactions first fetch the
highest-timestamped committed version of each requested data item from the corresponding
partition, and then decide if they have missed any version that has been prepared but not yet
committed. The timestamp and metadata from each version read produces a mapping from
items to timestamps that represent the highest-timestamped write for each transaction,
appearing in the first-round read set. If the reader has a lower timestamp version than
indicated in the mapping for that item, a second-round read will be issued to fetch the
missing version. Once all the missing versions have been fetched, the client can return the
resulting set of versions, which include both the first-round reads as well as any missing
versions fetched in the second round of reads. The pseudo-code of RAMP-Fast in [14] is
shown in Appendix A.
12PC is an atomic commitment protocol in database systems, which coordinates all the processes that
participate in a distributed atomic transaction on whether to commit or abort the transaction.
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RAMP-Small (abbreviated RAMP-S). RAMP-Small read transactions proceed by
first fetching the highest committed timestamp of each requested data item; the readers
then send the entire set of those timestamps in a second message. The highest-timestamped
version that also exists in the received set will be returned to the reader by the corresponding
partition. RAMP-Small transactions require two round-trip times (RTTs) for reads and
writes. RAMP-Small writes only store the transaction timestamp, instead of attaching the
entire write set to each write.
Extensions of RAMP. The paper [14] briefly discusses the following extensions and
optimizations of the basic RAMP algorithms, but without giving any details:
• RAMP with one-phase writes (RAMP-F+1PW and RAMP-S+1PW), where writes
only require one prepare phase, as the client can execute the commit phase asyn-
chronously.
• RAMP with faster commit detection (RAMP-F+FC). If a server returns a version with
the timestamp fresher than the highest committed version of the item, then the server
can mark the version as committed. This allows faster updates to correct versioning
and thus fewer round trip time delays.
4.2 NEW RAMP-LIKE DESIGNS
In this section we propose two new RAMP-like designs, both of which trade consistency
off for higher performance.
RAMP without two-phase commit (RAMP¬2PC). RAMP uses 2PC to ensure that
all partitions successfully execute a transaction or that none do. Specifically, writes start to
commit only after all of them are prepared on the partitions. This results in high latency,
even “resource leak” on partitions during failures [14], since one blocked write will cause the
transaction to stall. RAMP¬2PC decouples 2PC from RAMP by committing a prepared
version directly without waiting for all of the writes to be prepared.
RAMP-Faster (abbreviated Faster). Both RAMP and RAMP¬2PC require two RTTs
to commit a write transaction. To further optimize the performance we propose the RAMP-
Faster design (based on RAMP-Fast) that also decouples two-phase commit, but commits a
write transaction in only one RTT.
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In RAMP-Fast, upon receiving a prepare message, the partition adds the timestamped
write to its local database, and upon receiving the commit message, updates an index con-
taining the highest-timestamped committed version of each item. Instead, in Faster, a
partition performs both operations upon receiving the prepare message, and hence requires
only one RTT. Note that all information required to complete the two operations is provided
by the prepare message: Faster does not need to store more data than RAMP-Fast.
Since each write in Faster needs only one RTT, it should incur lower latency per transaction
and provide higher throughput. Since writes are faster, it also seems reasonable to conjecture
that there is a higher chance that reads fetch the latest write; this means that Faster should
provide better strong consistency (i.e., reads reading the “latest writes) than other RAMP
designs. Even though Faster does not guarantee read atomicity, as the client does not ensure
that each partition has received the prepare message before issuing the commit message, it
would be interesting to check whether Faster indeed provides better performance, and a high
degree of read atomicity, for classes of transactions encountered in practice. If so, Faster
would be an attractive option for multi-partition transactions where a high degree of read
atomicity, good consistency properties, and low latency are desired.
4.3 MODELING RAMP AND ITS VARIANTS IN CAT
This section presents formal models of RAMP and its variants in the CAT framework
described in Chapter 3. We show the specification of RAMP-Fast in detail, and only show
the main differences for the other RAMP algorithms.
4.3.1 Data Types, Objects, and Messages
Data Types. A version is a timestamped version of a data item (or key) and is modeled as
a four-tuple version(key,value, timestamp,metadata) consisting of the key, its value, and
the version’s timestamp and metadata. A timestamp is modeled as a pair ts(Oid,sqn) con-
sisting of a Replica’s identifier Oid and a local sequence number sqn that together uniquely
identify a write transaction. Metadata are modeled as a set of keys, denoting, for each key,
the other keys that are written in the same transaction. For example, if a transaction writes
keys x, y, and z, then versions of x have as metadata the set {y, z}.
sorts Key Value Timestamp Version KeySet Versions
KeyTimestampEntry KeyTimestamps .
subsort Key < KeySet .
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subsort KeyTimeEntry < KeyTimestamps .
subsort Version < Versions .
op ts : Oid Nat -> Timestamp .
op version : Key Value Timestamp KeySet -> Version [ctor] .
op empty : -> KeySet [ctor] .
op _,_ : KeySet KeySet -> KeySet [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
op empty : -> KeyTimestamps [ctor] .
op _|->_ : Key Timestamp -> KeyTimestampEntry [ctor] .
op _,_ : KeyTimestamps KeyTimestamps ->
KeyTimestamps [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
op empty : -> Versions [ctor] .
op _,_ : Versions Versions -> Versions [ctor assoc id: empty] .
A set of keys of sort KeySet is built from singleton sets (identified with keys of sort Key by
means of a subsort declaration) with an associative, commutative, and idempotent union
operator , having empty as its identity element. A set of entries, or mappings from keys to
timestamps, of sort KeyTimestamps is built from singleton sets (identified with entries of sort
KeyTimestampEntry by means of a subsort declaration) with an associative, commutative,
and idempotent union operator , having empty as identity element. A set of versions of sort
Versions is built from singleton lists (identified with versions of sort Version by means of
a subsort declaration) with an associative concatenation operator , with identity empty.
The sort OperationList represents lists of read and write operations as terms such as
(x := read k1) (y := read k2) write(k1, x + y), where LocalVar denotes the “local
variable” that stores the value of the key read by the operation, and Expression is an
expression involving the transaction’s local variables:
sorts Expression LocalVar LocalVarEntry LocalVars Operation .
subsort Operation < OperationList .
subsort LocalVarEntry < LocalVars .
op write : Key Expression -> Operation [ctor] .
op _:=read_ : LocalVar Key -> Operation [ctor] .
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op nil : -> OperationList [ctor] .
op __ : OperationList OperationList -> OperationList [ctor assoc id: nil] .
op empty : -> LocalVars [ctor] .
op _|->_ : LocalVal Value -> LocalVarEntry [ctor] .
op _,_ : LocalVars LocalVars -> LocalVars [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
A list of operations of sort OperationList is built from singleton lists (identified with
operations of sort Operation by means of a subsort declaration) with an associative con-
catenation operator with identity nil. A set of entries, or mappings from local variables
to their values, of sort LocalVars is built from singleton sets (identified with entries of sort
LocalVarEntry by means of a subsort declaration) with an associative, commutative, and
idempotent union operator , with identity empty.
We define a collection of votes of sort Vote as a multiset (built with the associative
and commutative operator ; with identity noVote) of votes, where each vote, as a triple
vote(txn,part,result ), indicates the voting result by some replica for a certain transac-
tion:
sort Vote .
op noVote : -> Vote [ctor] .
op vote : Tid Oid Bool -> Vote [ctor] .
op _;_ : Vote Vote -> Vote [ctor assoc comm id: noVote] .
The data type TxnOidSet is defined for the situation when a replica is waiting for messages
such as votes from other replicas w.r.t. some transaction:
sorts OidSet TxnOidSet .
subsort Oid < OidSet .
op empty : -> OidSet [ctor] .
op _,_ : OidSet OidSet -> OidSet [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
op empty : -> TxnOidSet [ctor] .
op Oids : Tid OidSet -> TxnOidSet [ctor] .
op _;_ : TxnOidSet TxnOidSet -> TxnOidSet [ctor assoc comm id: empty] .
where OidSet is defined as a set of replicas (more precisely, each replica is represented by
its identifier of sort Oid), while TxnOidSet is a mapping (set of pairs) from transaction
identifiers (of sort Oid) to sets of replicas.
50
Transactions. RAMP transactions can be modeled as object instances of the subclass
RAMP-Txn with four new attributes:
class RAMP-Txn | operations : OperationList, localVars : LocalVars,
latest : KeyTimestamps, txnSqn : Nat .
subclass RAMP-Txn < Txn .
The operations attribute denotes the transaction’s operations. localVars maps the trans-
action’s local variables to their current values. latest stores the local view as a mapping
from keys to their respective latest committed timestamps. txnSqn stores the transaction’s
sequence number.
Replicas. A replica in our Maude model of RAMP is modeled as an object instance of the
following subclass RAMP-Replica of class Replica that adds nine new attributes:
class RAMP-Replica | datastore : Versions, sqn : Nat,
gotTxns : ObjectList, latestCommit : KeyTimestamps,
votes : Vote, voteSites : TxnOidSet,
1stGetSites : TxnOidSet, 2ndGetSites : TxnOidSet,
commitSites : TxnOidSet .
subclass RAMP-Replica < Replica .
The datastore attribute represents the replica’s local database as a set of versions for each
key stored at the replica. The attribute latestCommit maps each key to the timestamp
of its last committed version. sqn refers to the local sequence number. The attributes
gotTxns stores the transaction object(s) waiting to be executed. The attribute votes stores
the votes from the replicas which participate in the two-phase commit. The remaining
attributes voteSites, commitSites, 1stGetSites, and 2ndGetSites store, respectively,
the replicas from which the executing replica is awaiting votes, committed acks, first-round
get replies, and second-round get replies.
The state also contains a “table” object of class Table mapping each data item to the
replica storing the item:
class Table | table : ReplicaTable .
where the table (of sort ReplicaTable) stored inside a Table object is built with the as-
sociative and commutative operator ;; as a set of mappings, each of which is a pair
sites(key,part ).
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Messages travel between clients and replicas, and have the form:
msg msgContent from sender to receiver
where the message content msgContent is defined in our RAMP-Fast model as follows:
• prepare(txn,version) sends a version from a write-only transaction to its replica;
• prepare-reply(txn,vote) is the reply to the corresponding prepare message, where
vote tells whether this replica can commit the transaction;
• commit(txn,ts) marks the versions with timestamp ts as committed;
• committed(txn) is the reply to commit;
• get(txn,key,ts) asks for the highest-timestamped committed version or a missing
version for key by timestamp ts ;
• response1(txn,version) responds to first-round get request;
• response2(txn,version) responds to second-round get requests.
Initial State. The following shows an automatically generated initial state (with some
parts replaced by ‘...’) with two replicas, r1 and r2, that are coordinators for, respectively,
transactions t1 and t2. r1 stores the data items x and z, and r2 stores y. Transaction t1 is
the read-only transaction (xl :=read x) (yl :=read y), while transaction t2 is a write-
only transaction write(y, 3) write(z, 8). The states also include a table which assigns to
each data item the replica storing it. Initially, the value of each item is [0]; the version’s
timestamp is empty (eptTS), and metadata is an empty set:
eq init =
< tb : Table | table : [sites(x, r1) ;; sites(y, r2) ;; sites(z, r1)] >
< r1 : RAMP-Replica |
gotTxns : < t1 : RAMP-Txn |
operations : ((xl :=read x) (yl :=read y)), readSet : empty, writeSet : empty,
latest : empty, localVars : (xl |-> [0], yl |-> [0]), txnSqn : 0 >,
datastore : (version(x, [0], eptTS, empty) version(z, [0], eptTS, empty)),
sqn : 1, executing : none, committed : none, latestCommit : empty,
votes : noVote, voteSites : empty, 1stGetSites : empty,
2ndGetSites : empty, commitSites : empty >
< r2 : RAMP-Replica |
gotTxns : < t2 : RAMP-Txn | operations : (write(y, 3) write(z, 8)), ... >,
datastore : version(y, [0], eptTS, empty), ... >
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4.3.2 Formalizing RAMP-Fast
This section formalizes the dynamic behaviors of RAMP-Fast using rewrite rules.2 We also
refer to the corresponding lines of code in the description in Fig. A.1. The entire specification
is given at https://github.com/siliunobi/cat.
Starting a New Transaction (Lines 14–19 for writes and lines 22–26 for reads).
A replica starts executing a transaction by moving the first transaction (TID) in gotTxns
to executing. If the new transaction is a write-only transaction (write-only(OPS)), the
replica: (i) uses the function genPuts to generate all prepare messages; (ii) uses a function
prepareSites to remember the sites RIDS from which it awaits votes for transaction TID in
the voteSites attribute; and (iii) increments its local sequence number by one:
crl [start-wo-txn] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica |
gotTxns : (< TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS, localVars : VARS,
txnSqn : N > ;; TXNS),
executing : TRANSES, sqn : SQN, voteSites : VSTS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica |
gotTxns : TXNS,
executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS, localVars : VARS,
txnSqn : SQN’ > TRANSES,
sqn : SQN’, voteSites : (VSTS ; addrs(TID, RIDS)) >
genPuts(OPS,RID,TID,SQN’,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE)
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ write-only(OPS) /\
RIDS := prepareSites(OPS, RID, REPLICA-TABLE) .
The above function genPuts is defined as follows:
op genPuts : OperationList Oid Oid Nat LocalVars ReplicaTable -> Config .
op $genPuts : OperationList Oid Oid Nat LocalVars ReplicaTable
OperationList -> Config .
eq genPuts(OPS,RID,TID,SQN,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE)
= $genPuts(OPS,RID,TID,SQN,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE,OPS) .
eq $genPuts((write(K,EXPR) OPS),RID,TID,SQN,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE,
2We do not give variable declarations, but follow the convention that variables are written in (all) capital
letters.
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(OPS’ write(K,EXPR) OPS’’))
= $genPuts(OPS,RID,TID,SQN,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE,(OPS’ write(K,EXPR) OPS’’))
msg prepare(TID,version(K,eval(EXPR,VARS),ts(RID,SQN),md(OPS’ OPS’’)))
from RID to preferredSite(K,REPLICA-TABLE) .
eq $genPuts(((X :=read K) OPS),RID,TID,SQN,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE,OPS’)
= $genPuts(OPS,RID,TID,SQN,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE,OPS’) .
eq $genPuts(nil,RID,TID,SQN,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE,OPS’) = null .
Otherwise, if the first transaction in gotTxns is a read-only transaction, the replica updates
1stGetSites instead to keep track of the replicas from which it receives the versions from
the first-round gets. Similar to genPuts, the function genGets generates all get messages
for the keys concerned by TID. The expression 1stSites gives the corresponding replicas for
those keys:
crl [start-ro-txn] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | gotTxns :
(< TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS, latest: empty > ;; TXNS),
executing : TRANSES,
1stGetSites : 1STGETS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | gotTxns : TXNS,
executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | operations: OPS,
latest : vl(OPS) > TRANSES,
1stGetSites : (1STGETS ; addrs(TID,RIDS)) >
genGets(OPS,RID,TID,REPLICA-TABLE)
if (not write-only(OPS)) /\
RIDS := 1stSites(OPS,RID,REPLICA-TABLE) .
Receiving Prepare Messages (Lines 3–5). When a Replica receives a prepare message
for a write-only transaction, the replica simply adds the received version to its local datastore.
The out-going messages always consider successful preparations:
rl [receive-prepare-wo] :
msg prepare(TID,VER) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore: VS >
=>
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore: (VS, VER) >
msg prepare-reply(TID,true) from RID to RID’ .
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Receiving Prepared Messages (Lines 20–21). Upon receiving a “true” vote, the
replica first checks whether all votes have now been collected. The expression VSTS’[TID]
extracts for TID the remaining replicas from which it is awaiting votes. If all received votes
are “yes,” the replica starts to commit TID at the associated replicas by invoking genCommits
to generate all commit messages with the commit timestamp including the current sequence
number SQN. The replica also adds to commitSites the replicas from which it is awaiting
committed messages to commit the transaction:
crl [receive-prepare-reply-true-executing] :
msg prepare-reply(TID,true) from RID’ to RID
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS,
txnSqn : SQN > TRANSES,
voteSites : VSTS, commitSites : CMTS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
if VSTS’[TID] == empty --- all votes received and all yes!
then < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS,
txnSqn : SQN > TRANSES,
voteSites : VSTS’,
commitSites : (CMTS ; addrs(TID,RIDS)) >
genCommits(TID,SQN,RIDS,RID)
else < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | operations: OPS,
txnSqn : SQN > TRANSES,
voteSites : VSTS’, commitSites : CMTS >
fi
if VSTS’ := remove(TID,RID’,VSTS) /\
RIDS := commitSites(OPS,RID,REPLICA-TABLE) .
Receiving Commit Messages (Lines 6–8). Upon receiving a commit message, the
replica invokes the function cmt to commit the transaction. cmt looks up LC for the latest
committed version’s timestamp, and updates the latest committed version if TS is higher.
A committed message is then sent back to confirm the commit:
rl [receive-commit] :
msg commit(TID, TS) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
=>
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : cmt(LC,VS,TS) >
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msg committed(TID) from RID to RID’ .
Receiving Committed Message. Upon receiving a committed message, the replica first
checks if all committed messages have now been collected. The expression CMTS’[TID]
extracts for TID the remaining replicas from which it is awaiting committed messages. If
the projection is empty, the replica commits the transaction:
crl [receive-committed] :
msg committed(TID) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’, commitSites : CMTS >
=>
if CMTS’[TID] == empty --- all "committed" received
then < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
committed : < TID : RAMP-Txn | > TRANSES’,
commitSites : CMTS’ >
else < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’, commitSites : CMTS’ >
fi
if CMTS’ := remove(TID,RID’,CMTS) .
Receiving Get Messages (Lines 9–13). Upon receiving a get message, depending on
the associated timestamp TS (if TS is an empty timestamp eptTS, the incoming message
is the first-round get; otherwise, it is the second-round get), the replica replies with the
corresponding version determined by the function vmatch. For a first-round get, vmatch
looks up LC for the latest committed version; for the second-round get, vmatch returns the
matched timestamped version of TS:
rl [receive-get] :
msg get(TID,K,TS) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
=>
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
if TS == eptTS
then msg response1(TID,vmatch(K,VS,LC)) from RID to RID’
else msg response2(TID,vmatch(K,VS,TS)) from RID to RID’
fi .
Receiving Response to First-round Get Messages (Lines 25, 27–33). Upon re-
ceiving a returned version for the first-round get, the replica adds it to the read set,
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and updates localVars accordingly. When the replica has collected all replies to the
first-round gets, it determines whether a second-round get is needed. The expression
gen2ndGets(TID,VL’,RS’,RID,REPLICA-TABLE) generates possible second-round get mes-
sages based on the updated latest, VL’, and readSet, RS’:
crl [receive-response1] :
msg response1(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD)) from RID’ to RID
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn |
operations : (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet : RS, localVars : VARS, latest : VL > TRANSES,
1stGetSites : 1STGETS, 2ndGetSites : 2NDGETS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
if 1STGETS’[TID] == empty
then < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn |
operations : (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet : RS’, localVars : insert(X,V,VARS),
latest : VL’ > TRANSES,
1stGetSites : 1STGETS’,
2ndGetSites : (2NDGETS ; addrs(TID,RIDS)) >
gen2ndGets(TID,VL’,RS’,RID,REPLICA-TABLE)
else < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn |
operations : (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet : RS’, localVars : insert(X,V,VARS),
latest : VL’ > TRANSES,
1stGetSites : 1STGETS’, 2ndGetSites : 2NDGETS >
fi
if RS’ := RS, version(K,V,TS,MD) /\
VL’ := lat(VL,MD,TS) /\
1STGETS’ := remove(TID,RID’,1STGETS) /\
RIDS := 2ndSites(VL’,RS’,RID,REPLICA-TABLE) .
Receiving Response to Second-round Get Messages (Lines 32–33). Upon receiv-
ing a returned version for the second-round get, the Replica simply overwrites the version
fetched by the first-round get (the readSet is updated). It then updates the local variables
localVars and the remaining replicas from which it is awaiting second-round gets:
rl [receive-response2] :
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msg response2(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD)) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing:
< TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet : (RS, version(K,V’,TS’,MD’)),
localVars : VARS >,
2ndGetSites : 2NDGETS >
=>
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing:
< TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : (OPS (X :=read K) OPS’),
readSet : (RS, version(K,V,TS,MD)),
localVars : insert(X,V,VARS) >,
2ndGetSites : remove(TID,RID’,2NDGETS) > .
Committing Reads (Lines 18–22). If the replica has no remaining replicas from which
it is awaiting replies to either first-round gets or second-round gets (1STGETS[TID] == empty
and 2NDGETS[TID] == empty), it commits the reads by storing the TID object in committed:
crl [commit-reads] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’, 1stGetSites: 1STGETS,
2ndGetSites : 2NDGETS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
committed : (TRANSES’ < TID : RAMP-Txn | >),
1stGetSites : 1STGETS, 2ndGetSites : 2NDGETS >
if 1STGETS[TID] == empty /\ 2NDGETS[TID] == empty .
4.3.3 Formalizing RAMP-Small
Instead of attaching the entire write set to each write, RAMP-Small only stores the trans-
action timestamp. This correspond to changing the rule start-wo-txn by letting genPuts
not instantiate metadata for each outgoing write, but instead leave it as an empty set.
Apart from that, only the following two rules in RAMP-Fast need to be modified to define
RAMP-Small.
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Receiving Response to First-round Get Messages. When a replica has fetched the
(highest-timestamped) committed timestamp for the requested item in the received version,
it proceeds in a similar way as in RAMP-Fast, except that it will not update readSet or
localVars, since RAMP-Small always requires two RTTs for reads. Each outgoing get
message generated by gen2ndGets includes the entire set of timestamps:
crl [receive-response1-small] :
msg response1(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD)) from RID’ to RID
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing :
< TID : RAMP-Txn | latest : VL > TRANSES,
1stGetSites : 1STGETS, 2ndGetSites : 2NDGETS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
if 1STGETS’[TID] == empty
then < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing :
< TID : RAMP-Txn | latest : VL’ > TRANSES, 1stGetSites : 1STGETS’,
2ndGetSites : (2NDGETS ; addrs(TID,RIDS)) >
gen2ndGets(TID,VL’,RID,REPLICA-TABLE)
else < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing :
< TID : RAMP-Txn | latest : VL’ > TRANSES,
1stGetSites : 1STGETS’, 2ndGetSites : 2NDGETS >
fi
if VL’ := lat(VL,MD,TS) /\
1STGETS’ := remove(TID,RID’,1STGETS) /\
RIDS := 2ndSites(VL’,RID,REPLICA-TABLE) .
Receiving Get Messages. When a Replica receives a get message for the first time, it
proceeds in the same way as in RAMP-Fast; however, when the second get message arrives
that contains the entire set of timestamps for the requested item, it returns the highest-
timestamped version (determined by maxts) of that key that also exists in the received set
of timestamps (determined by tsmatch). Note that the incoming get message includes a
set of timestamps TSS:
rl [receive-get-small] :
msg get(TID,K,TSS) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
=>
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< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
if TSS == empty
then msg response1(TID,vmatch(K,VS,LC)) from RID to RID’
else msg response2(TID,vmatch(K,VS,maxts(tsmatch(X,VS,TSS)))) from RID to RID’
fi .
4.3.4 Formalizing RAMP Extensions
RAMP Without 2PC. We decouple 2PC from RAMP by changing the rule receive-
prepare-reply-true-executing to the following rule, in which a replica simply removes
the write from the pending set and commits it on the RAMP replica, instead of waiting for
all prepare-reply messages to arrive:
rl [receive-prepare-reply-true-executing-decouple-2pc] :
msg prepare-reply(TID,true) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | txnSqn : SQN > TRANSES,
voteSites : VSTS >
=>
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | txnSqn : SQN > TRANSES,
voteSites : remove(TID,RID’,VSTS) >
msg commit(TID,ts(RID,SQN)) from RID to RID’ .
RAMP with Faster Commit. A RAMP replica can mark as committed the version (by
sending a committed message to the replica RID’) that has a fresher timestamp than the
highest committed version of the requested item (indicated by LC[K] < TS). We model this
optimization of RAMP-Fast by replacing the rule receive-get with the following rule. The
other rules are unchanged:
rl [receive-get-faster-commit] :
msg get(TID,K,TS) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
=>
if TS == eptTS
then < RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
msg response1(TID,vmatch(K,VS,LC)) from RID to RID’
else < RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit :
(if LC[K] < TS then insert(K,TS,LC) else LC fi) >
msg response2(TID,vmatch(K,VS,TS)) from RID to RID’
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(if LC[K] < TS
then msg committed(TID) from RID to RID’
else none
fi)
fi .
RAMP with One-Phase Writes. After collecting all prepare-reply messages, a replica
commits the transaction besides invoking genCommits to generate commit messages. The
other rules are unchanged:
crl [receive-prepare-reply-true-executing-1pw] :
msg prepare-reply(TID,true) from RID’ to RID
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS,
txnSqn : SQN > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’,
voteSites : VSTS, commitSites : CMTS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
if VSTS’[TID] == empty --- all votes received and all yes!
then < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’
< TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS, txnSqn : SQN >,
voteSites : VSTS’,
commitSites : (CMTS ; addrs(TID,RIDS)) >
genCommits(TID,SQN,RIDS,RID)
else < RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | operations: OPS,
txnSqn : SQN > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’,
voteSites : VSTS’, commitSites : CMTS >
fi
if VSTS’ := remove(TID,RID’,VSTS) /\
RIDS := commitSites(OPS,RID,REPLICA-TABLE) .
RAMP-Faster. This alternative design integrates the two phases in writes: upon receiv-
ing a prepare message, the RAMP replica adds the incoming version to its local database
VS, and also updates the index containing the highest-timestamped committed version of the
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item by invoking the function cmt. The following rule replaces the rules receive-prepare-wo,
receive-prepare-reply-true-executing, and receive-commit in our RAMP-Fast model:
crl [receive-prepare-faster] :
msg prepare(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD)) from RID’ to RID
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
=>
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS’, latestCommit : cmt(LC, VS’, TS) >
msg committed(TID) from RID to RID’
if VS’ := (VS, version(K,V,TS,MD)) .
4.4 MODEL CHECKING CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES
As shown in Table 3.1, we have applied our tool CAT to model check eight RAMP designs
against nine properties. All model checking results are as expected. In particular, origi-
nal RAMP designs (i.e., RAMP-F and RAMP-S) and the proposed RAMP variants (i.e.,
RAMP-F+1PW, RAMP-F+FC, and RAMP-S+1PW) by the developers satisfy RA, as well
as RC that is weaker than RA, and violate all consistency properties stronger than RA; our
proposed new RAMP-like designs (i.e., RAMP-F¬2PC, RAMP-S¬2PC, and Faster) satisfy
only RC, and violate RA and any stronger consistency properties.
Here we focus on RA and use the same example to illustrate the impact of decoupling
two-phase commit protocol (the major difference between the developers’ RAMP designs
and our new proposals).
In our model checking experiment we provide the CAT tool with one read-only transaction,
one write-only transaction, two operations for each type of transaction, two replicas, and two
keys. Under the hood, CAT executes the following command to search, from all generated
initial states, for one reachable final state where the RA consistency property is violated:
search [1] init(1,1,0,2,2,0,0,2,2,1) =>! C:Configuration
< M:Oid : Monitor | log: LOG:Log clock: N:Nat > such that not ra(LOG:Log) .
CAT outputs “No solution,” meaning that all runs from all the given initial states satisfy
RA, for the developers’ RAMP designs, while providing a counterexample showing a behavior
that violates RA for RAMP-F¬2PC, RAMP-S¬2PC, and Faster, respectively.
Specifically, the counterexample obtained by analyzing the initial state with the two trans-
actions [write(k1, v1) write(k2, v2)] [read(k1) read(k2)] shows that the read operations
return v1, and v0 (the default version, older than v2), respectively. The reason is that our
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new proposals, despite of different mechanisms, do not wait for all prepared messages to
arrive before committing a prepared version.
4.5 PROBABILISTIC MODELING OF RAMP DESIGNS
The RAMP models specified in the CAT framework are untimed, non-probabilistic, and
nondeterministic for model checking purpose. In this section we are interested in estimating
the performance (expected latency, percentage of transactions satisfying certain properties,
etc.) of our designs. We therefore need to: (i) include time and probabilities in our models,
and (ii) eliminate any nondeterminism, so that our models become purely probabilistic and
can be subjected to statistical model checking.
The key idea to address both of these issues is to probabilistically assign to each message
a delay. The point regarding issue (ii) is that if: (a) each rewrite rule is triggered by the
arrival of a message, and (b) the delay is sampled probabilistically from a dense/continuous
time interval, then the probability that two messages have the same delay is 0, and hence
no two actions could happen at the same time, eliminating nondeterminism.
All our models are available at https://sites.google.com/site/siliunobi/ramp-smc.
4.5.1 Scheduler
To obtain a deterministic model from the corresponding nondeterministic one we imple-
ment in Maude the scheduling algorithm in the actor PMaude framework [5] for totally
ordering message-triggered rules.
The scheduler object has the form {time | msgs }, where msgs buffers a list of (unripe)
messages ordered by their delays, which need to be scheduled; time of sort Float represents
the global time in real numbers.
In transformed models there are two types of messages, unripe and ripe messages, both of
which wrap messages of sort Msg in original models with timing information (of sort Float):
sorts UnripeMsg RipeMsg .
subsorts UnripeMsg RipeMsg < Config .
op [_,_] : Float Msg -> UnripeMsg .
op {_,_} : Float Msg -> RipeMsg .
An unripe message [d, msg] contains the message delay d for the message msg to become
ripe, while a ripe message {t, msg} includes the global time when msg became ripe. The
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scheduler only enqueues unripe messages, and dequeues them once they are ripe. Whenever
the scheduler dequeues a message, it also advances the global time by d time units.
Example 4.1. Without loss of generality, let us assume that there are only two unripe
messages in the configuration, [d1, mc1 from o1 to o] and [d2, mc2 from o2 to o],
generated at the global time gt with the respective message delays d1 and d2 with d1 < d2.
The scheduler enqueues both messages for scheduling, and becomes:
{ gt | [d1, mc1 from o1 to o] [d2, mc2 from o2 to o] }
At the global time gt + d1, the scheduler dequeues the first message as a ripe one {gt +
d1, mc1 from o1 to o}, and the configuration becomes (for simplicity we do not show the
objects):
{ gt + d1 | [d2, mc2 from o2 to o] } { gt + d1, mc1 from o1 to o }
Similarly, the message mc2 is ripe and dequeued at the global time gt + d2:
{ gt + d2 | nil } { gt + d2, mc2 from o2 to o }
Note that the message mc1 has been consumed by the object o, and thus disappears from
the configuration. Eventually, the message mc2 will also be consumed. The global time has
been advanced twice by the message delays d1 and d2, respectively.
4.5.2 Wrapping Messages
The transformation decorates the messages in the original model in the following two
manners:
• An incoming messages is wrapped with the current global time.
• An outgoing message is wrapped with a delay sampled probabilistically from the user-
chosen continuous distribution of network latency.
Example 4.2. In the previous Maude model of RAMP-F, when receiving the prepare
message, the replica adds the version to its local data store and replies with a prepared
message (shown in black):
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rl [receive-prepare-wo-prob] :
{ GT, prepare(TID,VER) from RID’ to RID }
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : VS >
=>
< RID : RAMP-Replica | datastore : (VS, VER) >
[ delay, prepare-reply(TID,true) from RID to RID’ ] .
The transformed rule contains the message wrappers (in blue), indicating that the prepare
message is consumed by RID at the global time GT, and the prepare-reply message will be
consumed by RID’ after delay time units. delay of sort Float is a parameter instantiated
with a certain probability distribution, e.g., the lognormal distribution with µ = 3.0 and
σ = 2.0:
op delay : -> Float .
--- e.g., ‘delay’ is instantiated as:
eq delay = sampleLogNormal(3.0,2.0) .
4.6 MONITORING EXECUTIONS
Inspired by the monitoring mechanism of the CAT framework (Section 3.2) we also equip
the transformed model with an execution log recording the history of relevant events during
a system execution.
Specifically, we also define a “time vector” using Maude’s map data type that maps replica
identifiers (of sort Oid) to global times. The main difference is that global times here are of
sort Float:
pr MAP{Oid,Float} * (sort Map{Oid,Float} to VectorTime) .
where each entry in the mapping is of the form Oid |-> Float.
An execution log (of sort Log) maps each transaction (identifier) to a record <proxy , issueTime,
finishTime, committed , reads , writes>, with proxy its executing server (called client in RAMP),
issueTime the starting time at its proxy, finishTime the commit/abort times at each rele-
vant server, committed a flag indicating whether the transaction is committed at its proxy,
reads the key-version pairs read by the transaction, and writes the key-version pairs written:
sort Record .
op <_,_,_,_,_,_> : Oid Float VectorTime Bool KeyVersions KeyVersions -> Record .
pr MAP{Oid,Record} * (sort Map{Oid,Record} to Log) .
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We add to the configuration a Monitor object storing the current log in the log attribute:
< M : Monitor | log : Log >
Note that, thanks to the scheduler, the Monitor object here does not need to store the
current logical global time (by the attribute clock) as in the CAT framework.
The log is updated each time an interesting event happens (i.e., the start and commit of
a transaction).3 We (manually) identify those events in a Maude model, and transform the
corresponding rules by adding and updating the monitor object.
Executing. A transaction starts executing when the transaction object appears in a
replica’s executing attribute in the right-hand side, but not in the left-hand side, of a
rewrite rule. The monitor then adds a record for this transaction, with the proxy and start
time, to the log.
Example 4.3. The rewrite rule (in black) where a RAMP replica starts executing a write-
only transaction is modified by adding and updating the monitor object (in blue):
crl [start-wo-txn-monitor] :
< O@M : Monitor | log : LOG@M > { GT, start RID }
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica |
gotTxns : (< TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS, localVars : VARS,
txnSqn : N > ;; TXNS),
executing : TRANSES, sqn : SQN, voteSites : VSTS >
=>
< O@M : Monitor | log : LOG@M, (TID |-> < RID, GT, empty, false, empty, empty >) >
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : RAMP-Replica |
gotTxns : TXNS,
executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn | operations : OPS, localVars : VARS,
txnSqn : SQN’ > TRANSES,
sqn : SQN’, voteSites : (VSTS ; addrs(TID, RIDS)) >
genPuts(OPS,RID,TID,SQN’,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE)
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ write-only(OPS) /\
RIDS := prepareSites(OPS, RID, REPLICA-TABLE) .
3We do not consider replication or transaction failure in our RAMP models, and therefore interesting
events exclude the abort of a transaction, or transaction commits on remote sites.
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where the monitor O@M initializes a new record for the transaction TID in the log, with
starting time (the current global time GT) at its executing server RID, finish time (empty),
flag (false), read set (empty), and write set (empty).
Commit. A transaction commits at its executing server when the transaction object ap-
pears in the attribute committed in the right-hand side, but not in the left-hand side, of a
rewrite rule. The corresponding record is updated with commit status, versions read and
written, and commit time.
Example 4.4. The monitor object is added to the rule receive-committed for committing
a write-only transaction. The monitor updates the log entry for the transaction TID by
setting its finish time at the proxy RID to GT (insert(RID,GT,VTS@M)) provided by the
incoming message, the committed flag to true, the read set to RS, and write set to WS:
crl [receive-committed-monitor] :
< O@M : Monitor | log : LOG@M, (TID |->
< RID, T@M, VTS@M, FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M)) >
{ GT, msg committed(TID) from RID’ to RID }
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn |
writeSet : WS, readSet : RS > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’, commitSites : CMTS >
=>
if CMTS’[TID] == empty --- all "committed" received
then < O@M : Monitor | log : LOG@M, (TID |->
< RID, T@M, insert(RID,GT,VTS@M), true, RS, WS >)
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
committed : < TID : RAMP-Txn |
writeSet : WS, readSet : RS > TRANSES’,
commitSites : CMTS’ >
else < O@M : Monitor | log : LOG@M, (TID |->
< RID, T@M, VTS@M, FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M)) >
< RID : RAMP-Replica | executing : < TID : RAMP-Txn |
writeSet : WS, readSet : RS > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’, commitSites : CMTS’ >
fi
if CMTS’ := remove(TID,RID’,CMTS) .
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4.7 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF RAMP DESIGNS
The main difference between the RAMP designs in [14] and the new designs we have
proposed is that those in [14] guarantee read atomicity whereas ours do not. On the other
hand, as mentioned in Section 4.2, we conjecture that our designs—in particular, RAMP-
Faster—provide not only better performance (throughput, average latency, etc.) but also
in some ways better “consistency” in the sense of reads more often reading the latest value
written. If this is indeed the case, and, furthermore, a large fraction of transactions in
representative workloads satisfy read atomicity, then our designs should be interesting for
applications where read atomicity is highly desirable but not an absolute requirement. For
example, in a social network, read atomicity is desirable (if A befriends B in a transaction,
then another transaction should not observe a “fractured read” where A is a friend of B but
where B is not a friend of A), but a small percentage of fractured reads might be acceptable
if the performance becomes significantly better.
In this section we compare the performance—along a number of performance parameters,
including throughput, average latency, percentage of strongly consistent reads—of our own
RAMP-like designs with the original RAMP designs using statistical model checking. Be-
sides, we also intend to answer the question “Does statistical model checking of probabilistic
Maude models provide realistic performance estimates for RAMP designs?” by comparing
the performance estimates obtained by our method with the implementation-based evalua-
tions in [14].4
4.7.1 Performance Measures
We start by formalizing the performance metrics as functions of the “history log” of a
completed run. The common performance measures for DTSs are throughput and average
latency.
Throughput. The function throughput computes the number of committed transactions
per time unit. committedNumber computes the number of committed transactions in LOG,
and totalRunTime returns the time when all transactions are finished (i.e., the largest
finishTime in LOG):
op throughput : Log -> Float .
eq throughput(LOG) = committedNumber(LOG) / totalRunTime(LOG) .
4Strong consistency is not considered in [14].
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op committedNumber : Log -> Float .
op $committedNumber : Log Float -> Float .
eq committedNumber(LOG) = $committedNumber(LOG,0.0) .
eq $committedNumber((TID |-> < O,T,VT,true,RS,WS >,LOG),N)
= $committedNumber(LOG,N + 1.0) .
eq $committedNumber((TID |-> < O,T,VT,false,RS,WS >,LOG),N)
= $committedNumber(LOG,N) .
eq $committedNumber(noRecord,N) = N .
Average Latency. The function avgLatency computes the average transaction latency
by dividing the sum of the latencies of all committed transactions by the number of such
transactions:
op avgLatency : Log -> Float .
eq avgLatency(LOG) = totalLatency(LOG) / committedNumber(LOG) .
where totalLatency computes the sum of all transaction latencies (time between the start
time and the finish time of a committed transaction).
op totalLatency : Log -> Float .
op $totalLatency : Log Float -> Float .
eq totalLatency(LOG) = $totalLatency(LOG,0.0) .
eq $totalLatency((TID |-> < O,T1,(O |-> T2,VT),true,RS,WS >,LOG),T)
= $totalLatency(LOG,T + T2 - T1) .
eq $totalLatency((TID |-> < O,T1,VT,false,RS,WS >,LOG),T)
= $totalLatency(LOG,T) .
eq $totalLatency(noRecord,T) = T .
4.7.2 Consistency Measures
There is considerable interest in how well data consistency properties of interest are met
by different cloud storage systems [88, 43, 10, 64, 76]. Consistency properties include read
consistency guarantees (e.g., strong consistency, and read my writes advocated by Doug
Terry [87]) in general, and transaction isolation models (e.g., the classic read committed
isolation [18], and state-of-the-art read atomicity [14]) in particular for DTSs.
We focus on the following two in this chapter:
• Strong Consistency (SC) guarantees that each read returns the value of the last write
that occurred before that read.
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• Read Atomicity (RA) ensures that either all or none of a (distributed) transaction’s
updates are visible to other transactions.
Strong Consistency. As all transactions can be totally ordered by their issue times, we
define the function sc that computes the fraction of read transactions satisfying SC:
op sc : Log -> Float .
eq sc(LOG) = scTxns(LOG) / totalReadTxns(LOG) .
where totalReadTxns returns the total number of (committed) read transactions in LOG.
scTxns checks, for each (committed) read transaction in LOG, whether the versions read
match those of the last (committed) write transaction (indicated by WS’):
op scTxns : Log -> Float .
op $scTxns : Log Float -> Float .
eq scTxns(LOG) = $scTxns(rtx(LOG),wtx(LOG),0.0) .
ceq $scTxns((TID1 |-> < O, T, VT, true, WS’,WS >, LOG),
(TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, RS’,WS’) >, LOG’), N)
= $scTxns(LOG, (TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, RS’, WS’ >, LOG’), N + 1.0)
if T’ < T /\ noWtx(T’,T,LOG’) .
eq $scTxns(noRecord, LOG’, N) = N .
where the functions rtx and wtx return all committed read and write transactions in LOG,
indicated by the non-empty read and write set, respectively. noWtx ensures that there is no
(committed) write transaction issued between the last write transaction’s issue time T’ and
the read transaction’s issue time T.
Read Atomicity. We define the function ra computing the fraction of read transactions
that satisfy RA:
op ra : Log -> Float .
eq ra(LOG) = raTxns(LOG) / totalReadTxns(LOG) .
where raTxns checks, for each (committed) read transaction in LOG, whether it reads RA-
consistent versions.
Specifically, if there is a fractured read (indicated by the matching version V, and V’ < V’’),
then that transaction does not count; otherwise, the total number of RA-consistent trans-
actions (N) increases by one:
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op raTxns : Log -> Float .
op $raTxns : Log Float -> Float .
eq raTxns(LOG) = $raTxns(rtx(LOG),wtx(LOG),0.0) .
ceq $raTxns((TID1 |-> < O, T, VT, true, (< X,V >, < Y,V’>,RS), WS >, LOG),
(TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, RS’, (< X,V >, < Y,V’’>,WS’) >, LOG’), N)
= $raTxns(LOG, (TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, RS’,(< X,V >, < Y,V’’ >,WS’) >, LOG’),
N) if V’ < V’’ .
eq $raTxns((TID1 |-> < O, T, VT, true, RS, WS >, LOG),
(TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, RS’, WS’ >, LOG’), N)
= $raTxns(LOG, (TID2 |-> < O’, T’, VT’, true, RS’,WS’ >, LOG’),N + 1.0) [owise] .
eq $raTxns(noRecord, LOG’, N) = N .
4.7.3 Generating Initial States
We use an operator init to probabilistically generate initial states:
init(rtx,wtx, rwtx, repl, keys, rops,wops, rwops, distr)
generates an initial state with rtx read-only transactions, wtx write-only transactions, rwtx
read-write transactions, repl replicas, keys data items, rops operations per read-only trans-
action, wops operations per write-only transaction, rwops operations per read-write trans-
actions, and distr the key access distribution (the probability that an operation accesses
a certain data item). To capture the fact that some data items may be accessed more
frequently than others, we also use Zipfian distributions in our experiments.
Each PVeStA simulation starts from init(parameters), which rewrites to a different
initial state in each simulation. The reason is that this expression involves generating cer-
tain values—such as the transactions—probabilistically. The entire specification is given at
https://sites.google.com/site/siliunobi/ramp-smc.
4.7.4 Statistical Model Checking Results
This section shows the result of using statistical model checking from many initial states
to compare all eight RAMP versions w.r.t. the performance (i.e., throughput and average
latency) and consistency measures (i.e., strong consistency and read atomicity).
In our experiments we use lognormal distribution for message delay with the mean µ =
0.0 and standard deviation σ = 1.0 [17]. All properties are computed with a 99% confidence
level of size at most 0.01. Our analyses consider 2 data items, 2 operations per transaction,
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up to 50 clients (or proxies), and up to 400 transactions. We consider not only the 95% read
transaction and 5% write transaction proportion workloads in [14], but also explore how the
RAMP designs behave for different read/write rates.
Throughput. Figure 4.1 shows the resulting of analyzing throughput against the number
of concurrent clients (top) and percentage of read transactions (bottom).
For the original RAMP designs, under a 95% read proportion, as the number of clients in-
creases, both RAMP-F and RAMP-S’s throughput increases, and RAMP-F provides higher
throughput than RAMP-S. As the read proportion increases, RAMP-F’s throughput in-
creases, while RAMP-S’s throughput keeps nearly constant; and RAMP-F also outperforms
RAMP-S in throughput. These observations are consistent with the experimental results in
[14].
There are no conjectures in [14] about the throughput of the designs that were only
sketched in [14]. We observe that unlike other RAMP-F-like algorithms, whose through-
put increases as read activities increase, RAMP-F+1PW’s throughput keeps high with all
reads/writes. As the right plot shows, at the beginning, when there are more writes than
reads, RAMP-F+1PW and RAMP-Faster perform better than other RAMP-F-like designs.
This happens because RAMP-F requires two RTTs for a write, RAMP-F+1PW needs only
one RTT and RAMP-Faster, our proposed design, performs commit when the PREPARE
message is received. Hence, with all write transactions, RAMP-F+1PW and RAMP-Faster
will always provide higher throughput. However, as read activities increase, other RAMP-F-
like designs increase their throughput, as they require one RTT for all reads. Even though as
the percentage of reads increases, RAMP-F+1PW and RAMP-Faster compensate the extra
RTT incurred due to the races, with the RTT saved during the write operations.
The RAMP-S-like designs provide lower throughput than the RAMP-F-like designs, which
is consistent with the observations in [14]. As expected, as the read percentage increases,
RAMP-S+1PW’s throughput converges with those of other RAMP-S-like designs, because
all RAMP-S-like designs require more RTTs for reads compared to RAMP-F even when
there is no race between reads and writes. In the worst case, when there is a race between
read and write operations, all designs require two RTTs for reads.
Regarding our own designs, RAMP-Faster provides the highest throughput with varying
read load and with larger number of concurrent clients among all RAMP versions. One
reason is that RAMP-Faster’s writes need only one RTT. RAMP-F-2PC (or RAMP-S-2PC)
is not competitive with RAMP-F (or RAMP-S) regarding throughput. The reason is that,
although they sacrifice 2PC, they still need to commit each write operation before committing
the write transaction, which brings no apparent difference in throughput.
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Figure 4.1: Throughput under varying client and read load.
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Figure 4.2: Average transaction latency under varying client and read load.
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Average Latency. Figure 4.2 shows the average transaction latency as the number of
concurrent clients (top) and the proportion of read transactions (down) increases.
Under a 95% read proportion, as the number of concurrent clients increases, the RAMP-
F versions’ average latency increases slightly, and the RAMP-S versions are almost twice
as slow as the RAMP-F variations. And although RAMP-F+1PW and RAMP-S+1PW as
expected have lower latencies than RAMP-F and RAMP-S, respectively, the differences are
surprisingly small. In the same way, removing 2PC does not seem to help much. Although
the differences are small, RAMP-Faster is the fastest, followed by RAMP-F with one-phase
writes.
In Fig. 4.2 (bottom) we see that RAMP-F+1PW and RAMP-Faster significantly outper-
form all the other algorithms when the proportion of write transactions is between 25% and
75-80%.
Regarding our own designs, it seems that RAMP-F-2PC (resp. RAMP-S-2PC) is not
competitive with RAMP-F (resp. RAMP-S) regarding average latency. The reason is that,
although RAMP-F-2PC and RAMP-S-2PC sacrifice 2PC, they still need to commit each
write operation before committing the write transaction, which brings no noticeable differ-
ence in latency. RAMP-Faster incurs the lowest average latency among all RAMP versions
with varying client and read loads.
Strong Consistency. Figure 4.3 shows the percentage of transactions satisfying strong
consistency under varying number of clients and read/write proportions by using statistical
model checking.
In all RAMP designs, the probability of satisfying strong consistency decreases as the
number of clients increases, since there are more races between reads and writes, which
decreases the probability of reading the preceding write.
It is natural that the percentage of transactions satisfying strong consistency increases as
the reads increase: the chance of reading the latest preceding write should increase when
writes are few and far between.
We also observe that RAMP-S-like designs (i.e., RAMP-S/+1PW/-2PC) provide greater
degrees of strong consistency than their RAMP-F counterparts. The reason is that RAMP-
S-like designs always use second-round reads, which might increase the chance of reading
the latest write. The only exception seems to be that RAMP-Faster outperforms all other
RAMP designs for 25-75% read workloads. The reason is that RAMP-Faster only requires
one RTT for a write to commit, which increases a read transaction’s chance to fetch the
latest write.
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Figure 4.3: Probability of satisfying strong consistency under varying client and read load.
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Read Atomicity. Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of transactions satisfying read atomic-
ity by using statistical model checking. As it should be, all designs in [14] satisfy read atomic
isolation. Our own design alternatives provide 92-100% read atomicity under all scenarios
considered. With 95% read transactions, they all offer 97-100% read atomicity.
Summary. Our formal model-based methodology has allowed us to quickly and easily
analyze the expected performance of a large number of RAMP designs along a number
of performance parameters and with varying number of concurrent clients and read/write
transaction proportions. This allows to predict which design is the best fit for a particular
application.
Our results are consistent with the experimental results in [14]. For example: the through-
put of both RAMP-F and RAMP-S increases with the number of concurrent clients, and
RAMP-F provides higher throughput than RAMP-S; the latency also increases with the
increase of concurrent clients (very minimally for RAMP-S, however).
Our results also confirm the conjectures about the sketched designs in [14], which were
never experimentally validated by the RAMP developers. For example: RAMP-F+FC and
RAMP-F+1PW have lower latency than RAMP-F (and similarly for RAMP-S). We can
also compare RAMP-F-FC with RAMP-F+1PW, and see that RAMP-F+1PW typically
provides better performance among these two optimizations.
We can also evaluate our own designs. It turns out that RAMP without 2PC does not
improve the performance of RAMP. On the other hand, RAMP-Faster is an interesting
design, as it generally provides the smallest average latency and highest throughput among
all RAMP designs, in particular when there are a fair amount of write transactions, while
providing more than 92% read atomicity even for very write-heavy workloads. Maybe slightly
surprisingly, RAMP-Faster does not provide the highest percentage of strongly consistent
reads for read-heavy workloads, but does so for workloads with 25-75% read transactions.
Note that the actual values might differ between the experiments in [14] and our statistical
analysis, due to factors like hard-to-match experimental configurations, the inherent differ-
ence between statistical model checking and implementation-based evaluation5, processing
delay at client/replica side, and different distributions of item accesses. The important ob-
servation is that the relative performance in both sides are similar (see Appendix B for the
RAMP performance in [14]).
It is also worth remarking we only use two data items, while the experiments in [14] use
5In general, implementation-based evaluation is based on a single trace of hundreds of thousands of
transactions, while statistical model checking is based on sampling hundreds of thousands of Monte-Carlo
simulations of hundreds of transactions up to a certain statistical confidence.
78
up to thousands. This implies that we “stress” the algorithms much more, since there are
much fewer potential clashes between small transactions (typically with four operations) in
a 1000-data-object setting that between our two-operation transactions on two data objects.
The time to compute the probabilities for strong consistency is around 15 hours (in the
worst-case), and for other metrics is around 8 hours (in the worst-case) with a workload of
400 transactions on a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU with 8 GB of memory. Each point in the
plots represents the average of three statistical model checking results.
4.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, we have investigated the RAMP transaction systems from both qualitative
and quantitative perspectives.
Regarding correctness analysis, while the original RAMP paper included hand proofs only
for the basic RAMP algorithms, we have adopted a model checking approach where we have:
(i) first developed fully-executable formal models of many RAMP variants and extensions in
the CAT framework; (ii) formally analyzed these models to confirm the original correctness
properties; and (iii) used our models to analyze RAMP’s extensions and optimizations (which
the original RAMP paper did not do).
Regarding performance estimation, we have explored eight design alternatives for RAMP
transactions by using statistical model checking. Substantial knowledge about both imple-
mented and unimplemented RAMP designs has thus been gained. This knowledge can help
find the best match between a given RAMP version and a class of applications. For exam-
ple, we now know how the different designs behave not just for read-intensive workloads, but
understand their behavior across the entire spectrum from read-intensive to write-intensive
tasks. We have also identified promising new design alternatives for given classes of applica-
tions relatively easily before they are implemented. This of course does not replace the need
for implementation and experimental validation, but it allows us to focus implementation
and validation efforts where they are most likely to pay off.
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY: THE WALTER TRANSACTIONAL DATA
STORE
Walter [85] is a distributed partially replicated data store providing Parallel Snapshot
Isolation (PSI), an important consistency property that offers attractive performance while
ensuring adequate guarantees for certain kinds of applications. In this chapter we formally
model Walter’s design in the CAT framework described in Chapter 3, and formally verify
the desired consistency properties by model checking. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first formal specification, as well as the first model checking analysis, of Walter. To
also analyze Walter’s performance we extend the Maude specification of Walter to a proba-
bilistic rewrite theory and perform statistical model checking analysis to evaluate Walter’s
throughput for a wide range of workloads. Our performance results are consistent with a
previous experimental evaluation and throw new light on Walter’s performance for different
workloads not evaluated before.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 gives an overview of Walter. Section 5.2
provides a detailed formal executable specification of Walter. Section 5.3 formally analyzes
whether the Walter model satisfies PSI or SI (short for Snapshot Isolation). In Section
5.4 we transform the Maude model of Walter from the CAT framework into a probabilistic
rewrite theory, and carry out a systematic statistical model checking analysis of the key
performance metric, transaction throughput, under a wide range of workloads. Finally,
concluding remarks are given in Section 5.5.
Acknowledgements. This chapter is based on the work [61, 62] supported in part by NSF
Grant CNS 1409416, NRL contract N00173-17-1-G002, and NSFC Project No. 61872146.
5.1 WALTER DATA STORE
Walter [85] is a partially replicated geo-distributed data store that supports multi-partition
transactions and guarantees PSI. The key idea to ensure that all operations in a transaction
read a consistent “snapshot” of the distributed data store is that each site s maintains a
(local) vector timestamp {site1 7→ k1, . . . , siten 7→ kn} representing a current snapshot of
the state, as seen by site s, where sitej 7→ kj means that the snapshot includes the first
k transactions executed at site site i. Each time a transactions starts executing at s, the
transaction is assigned the current local snapshot/vector timestamp of site s. Remote reads
can then be performed consistently according to this snapshot. Another key Walter feature
is that each data item has a preferred site, so that writes at preferred sites can be committed
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fast (e.g., the sites that you usually use could be the preferred site for “your” data).
A transaction is executed as follows. When the “host” site s starts executing transaction
t, t is assigned the current snapshot of s. The site s then executes the read and write
operations in t. For writes, Walter buffers the versions written in the transaction’s write set.
For reads, Walter fetches the latest appropriate version according to t’s start snapshot, by
checking any updates in the write set and its history of previous updates. If the associated
key is not replicated locally, Walter retrieves the right version remotely from the data item’s
preferred site.
When the host site has finished executing the operations in the transaction, it starts
committing the transaction. Read-only transactions and transactions that only write data
items whose preferred site is the host site s can commit locally (fast commit). Walter then
checks whether all versions of each data item in the history of the local site are unmodified
since the start vector timestamp, and whether all data items are unlocked (i.e., not being
committed by another transaction). If either check fails, Walter aborts the transaction;
otherwise, Walter can commit the transaction. If a transaction cannot commit locally (slow
commit), the executing site s uses the two-phase commit (2PC) protocol to check whether
the transaction can be committed, by asking all the preferred sites of data items written by
t whether t can be committed. If the data items written by t are unmodified and unlocked
at such a site, the site replies with a “yes” vote and locks the corresponding data items.
Otherwise, the site votes “no.” If the executing site receives a “no” vote, the transaction is
aborted and the other preferred sites are notified and release the appropriate locks. If all
votes are “yes” votes, the transaction can be committed.
If the transaction t can be (fast or slow) committed, the site s marks t as committed,
assigns it a version (s, seqNo) (where seqNo is a local sequence number), updates the local
history with the updates, and propagates t to other sites, which update their histories and
their vector timestamps. To allow f site failures, a transaction is marked disaster-safe durable
if its writes have been logged at f+1 sites. The propagation protocol first checks whether the
transaction can be marked as disaster-safe durable by collecting acknowledgments from f+1
sites for each data item. Upon receiving the propagation of a transaction, a site acknowledges
it only after it receives all transactions that causally precede the propagated transaction (by
using the transaction’s start vector timestamp), and all transactions at the same executing
site with a smaller sequence number. The protocol then checks whether the transaction can
be marked as globally visible. This is done by committing the transaction at all sites. A
transaction can be committed at a remote site when it learns that the transaction is disaster-
safe durable, all transactions causally preceding the transaction have been committed locally,
and all transactions at the same executing site with a smaller sequence number have been
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committed locally.
The paper [85] briefly discusses failure handling, but does not give much detail. The au-
thors have implemented Walter in about 30K lines of code, and have implemented Facebook-
and Twitter-like applications on top of Walter using the Amazon EC2 cloud platform to ex-
periment with and evaluate Walter’s performance in isolation, and as a backend for social
networking, in a distributed setting (with nodes in US, Ireland, and Singapore). They use
their distributed deployment to estimate the transaction latency and throughput (committed
transactions per second) for read-only, write-only, and 90% read workloads.
The authors do not prove or justify that Walter actually guarantees PSI.
5.2 FORMAL MODELING OF WALTER
This section defines a formal executable model of Walter in the CAT framework.
5.2.1 Data Types, Classes, and Messages
We formalize Walter in an object-oriented style, where the state consists of a number of
replica (or site) objects, each modeling a local database, and a number of messages traveling
between the objects. A transaction is formalized as an object which resides inside the replica
object that executes the transaction.
Some Data Types. A version is a pair version(oid,sqn) consisting of a site oid where
the transaction is executed, and a sequence number sqn local to that site. A vector times-
tamp is a map from site identifiers to sequence numbers:
pr MAP{Oid,Nat} * (sort Map{Oid,Nat} to VectorTimestamp) .
The sort OperationList represents lists of read and write operations as terms such as
(x := read k1) (y := read k2) write(k1, x + y), where LocalVar denotes the “local
variable” that stores the value of the key read by the operation, and Expression is an
expression involving the transaction’s local variables:
op write : Key Expression -> Operation [ctor] .
op _:=read_ : LocalVar Key -> Operation [ctor] .
op waitRemote : Key LocalVar -> Operation [ctor] .
pr LIST{Operation} * (sort List{Operation} to OperationList) .
waitRemote(k, x) means that the transaction execution is awaiting the value of the key (or
data item) k from a remote site to be assigned to the local variable x.
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Classes. A Walter transaction is modeled as an object instance of the subclass Walter-Txn
of the class Txn defined in Chapter 3.1:
class Walter-Txn | operations : OperationList, localVars : LocalVars,
startVTS : VectorTimestamp, txnSQN : Nat .
subclass Walter-Txn < Txn .
The operations attribute denotes the transaction’s remaining operations. localVars maps
the transaction’s local variables to their current values. startVTS refers to the vector times-
tamp assigned to the transaction when it starts to execute, and txnSQN is the transaction’s
sequence number given upon commit.
A replica, or site, stores parts of the database, and executes the transactions for which it is
the host/server. A Walter replica is specified as an object instance of the following subclass
Walter-Replica of the class Replica defined in Chapter 3.1:
class Walter-Replica | history : Datastore, sqn : Nat, gotTxns : ObjectList,
gotVTS : VectorTimestamp, locked : Locks,
votes : Vote, voteSites : TxnSites, abortSites : TxnSites,
dsSites : PropagateSites, vsbSites : TxnSites,
dsTxns : OidSet, gvTxns : OidSet,
recPropTxns : PropagatedTxns, recDurableTxns : DurableTxns .
subclass Walter-Replica < Replica .
The history attribute represents the site’s local database, as well as propagated updates also
on data items not stored at the replica, as a map from keys to lists of updates < value, version >:
op <_,_> : Value Version -> ValueVersion [ctor] .
pr LIST{ValueVersion} * (sort List{ValueVersion} to ValueVersionList) .
pr MAP{Key,ValueVersionList} * (sort Map{Key,ValueVersionList} to Datastore) .
The sqn attribute denotes the replica’s current local sequence number. The attribute
gotTxns denotes the transaction (objects) which are waiting to be executed. gotVTS in-
dicates for each site how many transactions of that site have been received by this site. The
locked attribute denotes the locked keys and their associated transactions at this site:
op lock : Oid Key -> Lock . --- Txn Oid locks Key
pr SET{Lock} * (sort Set{Lock} to Locks) .
The votes attribute denotes a collection of votes in the two-phase commit:
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sort Vote .
op noVote : -> Vote [ctor] .
op vote : Oid Oid Bool -> Vote [ctor] . --- Txn, Participant, vote
op _;_ : Vote Vote -> Vote [ctor assoc comm id: noVote] .
The voteSites attribute refers to, for each transaction, the remaining replicas from which
the coordinator is awaiting votes:
sort TxnSites .
op noTS : -> TxnSites [ctor] .
op txnSites : Oid OidSet -> TxnSites [ctor] .
op _;_ : TxnSites TxnSites -> TxnSites [ctor assoc comm id: noTS] .
Similarly for each transaction, the attribute abortSites denotes the remaining sites from
which the coordinator is awaiting the acknowledgments to abort the transaction. (The
coordinator first notifies the corresponding sites to abort a transaction, and it will abort it
locally after it gets the replies from those sites.)
The remaining attributes refer to the transaction replication. The attribute dsSites
(resp. vsbSites) denotes the remaining sites from which each transaction is awaiting ac-
knowledgments to mark itself as disaster-safe durable (resp. as globally visible). The sort
PropagateSites contains the keys in each transaction’s write set, because for a transaction
to be disaster-safe durable each key must be replicated:
sort PropagateSites .
op noPS : -> PropagateSites [ctor] .
op propagateSites : Oid Key OidSet -> PropagateSites [ctor] .
op _;_ : PropagateSites PropagateSites ->
PropagateSites [ctor assoc comm id: noPS] .
The attributes dsTxns and gvTxns denote the set (of sort OidSet) of disaster-safe durable
and globally visible transactions, respectively. The last two attributes recPropTxns and
recDurableTxns buffer the received propagation and disaster-safe durable messages from
the coordinator.
The state also contains an object mapping each key to the sites storing the key (these
sites are also called the replicas of the key):
class Table | table : ReplicaTable .
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Elements of sort ReplicaTable are ‘;;’-separated sets of terms sites(ki,replicas i), where
the list replicas i denotes the sites replicating the key ki. The first element in such a list is
the preferred site of the corresponding key:
sort KeyReplicas .
op [_] : KeyReplicas -> ReplicaTable [ctor] .
op eptTable : -> KeyReplicas [ctor] .
op sites : Key OidList -> KeyReplicas [ctor] .
op _;;_ : KeyReplicas KeyReplicas -> KeyReplicas [ctor assoc comm id: eptTable] .
Messages between sites have the form msg content from sender to receiver . The message
content (or simply message) request(key , txn, vts) sends a read request for transaction
txn to key ’s preferred site to retrieve its state from the snapshot determined by vector
timestamp vts . The preferred site replies with a message reply(txn, key , value version),
where value version is chosen based on the incoming vector timestamp. The message
prepare(txn,keys, vts) sends the key(s) keys in transaction txn to their preferred sites
with the transaction’s start vector timestamp vts . Those preferred sites reply with a mes-
sage prepare-reply(txn, vote). The messages abort(txn) and aborted(txn) are sent out
when the coordinator distributes the “abort” decision to the participants, and when the
participants acknowledge the decision. The message propagate(txn, sqn, vts ,ws) sends a
transaction txn’s sequence number sqn, vector timestamp vts , and write set ws to all sites.
The sites reply with a message propagate-ack(txn) to acknowledge that the transaction
txn has been propagated successfully. The message ds-durable(txn) is sent to all sites once
the transaction txn has been marked as disaster-safe durable. The sites then reply with a
message visible(txn) to acknowledge the notification.
Initial State. The following shows an automatically generated initial state (with some
parts replaced by ‘...’) with three replicas, r1, r2, and r3, where r1 and r2 are the coordi-
nators for, respectively, transactions t1, and t2 and t3. Key x is replicated at r1 and r2,
key y at r2 and r3, and key z at r3 and r1, with r1, r2 and r3 the respective preferred sites.
Transaction t1 is the read-only transaction (xl :=read x) (yl :=read y), transaction t2
is a write-only transaction write(y, 3) write(z, 8), while transaction t3 is a read-write
transaction on key x. Initially, the value of each key is [0], and its version is version(0,0):
eq init =
< tb : Table | table : [sites(x, r1 r2) ;; sites(y, r2 r3) ;; sites(z, r3 r1)] >
< r1 : Walter-Replica |
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gotTxns : < t1 : Walter-Txn | operations : ((xl :=read x) (yl :=read y)),
readSet : empty, writeSet : empty, startVTS : empty,
localVars : (xl |-> [0], yl |-> [0]), txnSqn : 0 >,
history : (x |-> (< [0],version(0,0) >),
z |-> (< [0],version(0,0) >)), sqn : 0, ... >
< r2 : Walter-Replica |
gotTxns : < t2 : Walter-Txn | operations : (write(y, 3) write(z, 8)), ... >
< t3 : Walter-Txn | operations : ((xl := read x)
write(x, xl plus 1)), ... > ... >
< r3 : Walter-Replica | history : (y |-> (< [0],version(0,0) >),
z |-> (< [0],version(0,0) >)), ... > .
5.2.2 Formalizing Walter’s Behavior
This section formalizes the dynamic behavior of Walter using rewrite rules.1
Starting a transaction. A replica starts executing a transaction by moving the first
transaction TID in gotTxns to executing, and assigns its committed vector timestamp VTS
to the transaction’s start vector timestamp:
rl [start-txn] :
< RID : Walter-Replica | gotTxns :
(< TID : Walter-Txn | startVTS : empty > ;; TXNS),
executing : TRANSES, committedVTS : VTS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | gotTxns : TXNS,
executing : < TID : Walter-Txn | startVTS : VTS > TRANSES > .
Executing a transaction. We can now execute the operations of the transaction. Assume
we start with a read operation X :=read K. There are three cases to consider: (i) the
transaction has already written to key K (buffered in the write set); (ii) there is no preceding
write in the transaction but the executing site replicates K; or (iii) neither (i) nor (ii) hold.
In case (i), the local variable X is given the value V buffered in the write set:
rl [execute-read-own-write] :
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
1We do not give variable declarations, but follow the convention that variables are written in (all) capital
letters.
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< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : ((X :=read K) OPS),
writeSet : (K |-> V, WS), localVars : VARS > >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : OPS,
writeSet : (K |-> V, WS),
localVars : insert(X,V,VARS) > > .
In case (ii) (the site RID replicates K: localReplica(K,RID,REPLICA-TABLE)), the replica
chooses the last update < V,VERSION > in its local history DS that is visible to the transac-
tion’s start snapshot VTS:
crl [execute-read-local] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : ((X :=read K) OPS), writeSet : WS,
readSet : RS, localVars : VARS, startVTS : VTS >,
history : DS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : OPS, localVars : insert(X,V,VARS),
readSet : (< K,VERSION >,RS) > >
if (not $hasMapping(WS,K)) /\ localReplica(K,RID,REPLICA-TABLE) /\
< V,VERSION > := choose(VTS,DS[K]) .
In case (iii), the site sends a request message (with the transaction’s start vector times-
tamp VTS, since the remote site must choose the version consistent with the snapshot) to
K’s preferred site (preferredSite(...)) to fetch the version. The “next operation” of the
transaction changes to waitRemote(K,X):
crl [execute-read-remote] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : ((X :=read K) OPS), writeSet : WS,
startVTS : VTS > >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
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< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : (waitRemote(K,X) OPS) > >
(msg request(K,TID,VTS) from RID to preferredSite(K,REPLICA-TABLE))
if (not $hasMapping(WS,K)) /\ (not localReplica(K,RID,REPLICA-TABLE)) .
The remote (preferred) site responds to such a request by sending the snapshot-consistent
value and version (choose(VTS, DS[K])) of the requested key:
rl [receive-remote-request] :
(msg request(K, TID, VTS) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | history : DS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | >
(msg reply(TID, K, choose(VTS, DS[K])) from RID to RID’) .
The executing site then merges the fetched value and version in the local history, and
updates the read set and local variables:
rl [receive-remote-reply] :
(msg reply(TID, K, < V,VERSION >) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | history : DS, executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : (waitRemote(K, X) OPS), readSet : RS,
localVars : VARS > >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : OPS,
readSet : (< K, VERSION >, RS),
localVars : insert(X, V, VARS) >,
history : merge(K, < V,VERSION >, DS) > .
When the next transaction operation is a write operation write(K, EXPR), the expression
EXPR to be written is evaluated w.r.t. the current values of the local variables, and the
resulting value is added to the write set:
rl [execute-write] :
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : (write(K, EXPR) OPS),
localVars : VARS, writeSet : WS > >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : OPS,
writeSet : insert(K, eval(EXPR, VARS), WS) > > .
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Commit a Transaction. When all the currently executing transaction’s operations have
been performed, the site starts to commit the transaction. A read-only transaction (writeSet
is empty) is committed locally:
rl [commit-read-only-txn] :
< RID : Walter-Replica | committed : TRANSES’, executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : nil, writeSet : empty > >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | committed : TRANSES’ < TID : Walter-Txn | >,
executing : TRANSES > .
There are two cases for committing a write transaction: fast commit if the executing site is
the preferred site of all keys written by the transaction; and slow commit if the transaction’s
write sets contains keys with non-local preferred sites.
Fast Commit. To fast commit a transaction, two checks for conflicts are performed at the
site: one check for any modified key, and another check for any locked key, i.e., a key being
committed concurrently by another transaction. modified(WS, VTS, DS) checks whether
there is a key in the write set WS and a version of that key in the history DS that is not
visible to the snapshot VTS, and locked(WS, LOCKS) checks whether there is a key in WS
that also appears in LOCKS. The following rule shows the case when both checks succeed:
crl [fast-commit-success] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : nil, writeSet : WS,
startVTS : VTS, txnSQN : TXNSQN >,
committed : TRANSES’, history : DS, locked : LOCKS,
sqn : SQN, committedVTS : VTS’, dsSites : PSTS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’ < TID : Walter-Txn | txnSQN : SQN’ >,
history : update(WS, version(RID,SQN’), DS),
sqn : SQN’, committedVTS : insert(RID, SQN’, VTS’),
dsSites : PSTS ; txnPropagateSites(TID,WS) >
propagateTxn(TID, SQN’, VTS, WS, allSites(REPLICA-TABLE), RID)
if WS =/= empty /\ allLocalPreferred(WS, RID, REPLICA-TABLE) /\
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(not modified(WS, VTS, DS)) /\ (not locked(WS, LOCKS)) /\
SQN’ := SQN + 1 .
The site commits the transaction by assigning a new local sequence number SQN’, and
updating the local history (update(...)). The site then propagates the transaction to
remote sites. This is done by generating propagation messages using propagateTxn, which
produces one propagation message for each site. The site then keeps track of the sites that
have acknowledged the propagation (txnPropagateSites(...)).
If either check fails, the transaction is aborted:
crl [fast-commit-failed] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : nil, writeSet : WS, startVTS : VTS >,
aborted : TRANSES’, history : DS, locked : LOCKS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’ < TID : Walter-Txn | > >
if WS =/= empty /\ allLocalPreferred(WS, RID, REPLICA-TABLE) /\
(modified(WS, VTS, DS) or locked(WS, LOCKS)) .
Slow Commit. Slow commit uses two-phase commit among the preferred sites of the
keys in the transaction’s write set. The executing site distributes the prepare messages to
those preferred sites (allPreferredSites(...)), asking the participants to vote based on
whether the corresponding keys are unmodified and unlocked. The prepare messages are
produced by the function prepareTxn:
crl [slow-commit-prepare] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | voteSites : VSTS, executing : TRANSES
< TID : Walter-Txn | operations : nil, writeSet : WS, startVTS : VTS > >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
< RID : Walter-Replica | voteSites : (VSTS ; voteSites(TID,RIDS)),
executing : TRANSES < TID : Walter-Txn | > >
prepareTxn(TID,keys(WS),VTS,RIDS,REPLICA-TABLE,RID)
if WS =/= empty /\ (not allLocalPreferred(WS,RID,REPLICA-TABLE)) /\
RIDS := allPreferredSites(WS,REPLICA-TABLE) /\ (not (TID in VSTS)) .
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The receiver of a prepare message performs the two checks as in fast commit: if either
check fails, a false vote is sent back; otherwise, the participant locks the key(s) and sends
back a true vote:
rl [slow-commit-receive-prepare] :
(msg prepare(TID,KS,VTS) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | locked : LOCKS, history : DS >
=>
if (not locked(KS,LOCKS)) and (not modified(KS,VTS,DS))
then < RID : Walter-Replica | locked : (addLock(KS,TID),LOCKS) >
(msg prepare-reply(TID,true) from RID to RID’)
else < RID : Walter-Replica | >
(msg prepare-reply(TID,false) from RID to RID’) fi .
When the executing replica receives a vote, it first checks whether all votes have been col-
lected (VSTS’[TID] == empty), and then checks whether all votes associated to the transac-
tion are true votes (allYes(TID, VOTES’)). If so, the coordinator decides to propagate the
transaction as in the fast commit; otherwise, the coordinator aborts the transaction, and no-
tifies the participants that voted true to release the locks. This is done by producing “abort”
messages for the corresponding participants RIDS (propagateAbort(TID,RIDS,RID)). The
following rule shows the “aborted” branch:
crl [slow-commit-receive-vote-abort] :
(msg prepare-reply(TID, FLAG) from RID’ to RID)
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | votes : VOTES, voteSites : VSTS,
abortSites : ABORTS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
< RID : Walter-Replica | votes : VOTES’, voteSites : VSTS’,
abortSites : ABORTS ; voteSites(TID,RIDS) >
propagateAbort(TID, RIDS, RID)
if VSTS’ := remove(TID, RID’, VSTS) /\
VOTES’ := VOTES ; vote(TID, RID’, FLAG) /\
VSTS’[TID] == empty /\ (not allYes(TID, VOTES’)) /\
RIDS := yesSites(TID, VOTES’) .
The abort procedure is straightforward: the participant releases the lock(s) held by the
transaction TID, and the executing site aborts the transaction:
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rl [slow-commit-receive-abort] :
(msg abort(TID) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | locked : LOCKS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | locked : release(TID,LOCKS) >
(msg aborted(TID) from RID to RID’) .
crl [slow-commit-receive-aborted] :
(msg aborted(TID) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES < TID : Walter-Txn | >,
aborted : TRANSES’, abortSites : ABORTS >
=>
(if ABORTS’[TID] == empty --- all acks received; abort the txn locally
then < RID : Walter-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’ < TID : Walter-Txn | >,
abortSites : ABORTS’ >
else < RID : Replica | abortSites : ABORTS’ > fi)
if ABORTS’ := remove(TID,RID’,ABORTS) .
Transaction Propagation. After a transaction commits, the executing site propagates it
to other sites by invoking the propagation protocol. Upon receiving a propagation message
for transaction TID, the receiving site performs two checks: (i) whether it has gotten all
transactions that causally precede transaction TID, and (ii) whether all transactions from
TID’s executing site have a smaller sequence number. (i) is indicated by VTS’ gt VTS,
meaning that the latest snapshot the site got is greater than the incoming snapshot VTS, and
(ii) by s(VTS’[RID’]) == SQN, meaning that the corresponding latest sequence number the
site got is exactly one smaller than the incoming sequence number SQN. If either check fails,
the site buffers the propagated information regarding the transaction (nonPropagatedTxns),
and waits until the “missing” transactions are propagated to it; otherwise, the transaction
is considered to be propagated successfully (propagatedTxns), and the site updates its local
history (if the site is not the coordinator itself), and then sends back the acknowledgment:
crl [receive-propagate] :
(msg propagate(TID,SQN,VTS,WS) from RID’ to RID)
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | gotVTS : VTS’, history : DS, recPropTxns : PTXNS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
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(if s(VTS’[RID’]) == SQN and (VTS’ gt VTS)
then if RID =/= RID’
then < RID : Walter-Replica | gotVTS : VTS’’, history : DS’,
recPropTxns : PTXNS’ >
(msg propagate-ack(TID) from RID to RID’)
else < RID : Walter-Replica | gotVTS : VTS’’, recPropTxns : PTXNS’ >
(msg propagate-ack(TID) from RID to RID’)
fi
else < RID : Walter-Replica | recPropTxns : PTXNS’’ >
fi)
if PTXNS’ := propagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS) ; PTXNS /\
PTXNS’’ := nonPropagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS,WS,RID’) ; PTXNS /\
VTS’’ := insert(RID’,SQN,VTS’) /\
DS’ := update(locRepWS(WS,RID,REPLICA-TABLE),version(RID’,SQN),DS) .
A failed propagated transaction (nonPropagatedTxns) is acknowledged whenever those
two checks pass. The site transforms nonPropagatedTxns to propagatedTxns, and sends
back the acknowledgment:
crl [later-propagate-ack] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | gotVTS : VTS’, history : DS, recPropTxns :
(nonPropagatedTxns(TID, SQN, VTS, WS, RID’) ; PTXNS) >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
(if RID =/= RID’
then < RID : Walter-Replica | gotVTS : VTS’’, history : DS’, recPropTxns :
(propagatedTxns(TID, SQN, VTS) ; PTXNS) >
(msg propagate-ack(TID) from RID to RID’)
else < RID : Walter-Replica | gotVTS : VTS’’, history : DS, recPropTxns :
(propagatedTxns(TID, SQN, VTS) ; PTXNS) >
(msg propagate-ack(TID) from RID to RID’)
fi)
if s(VTS’[RID’]) == SQN /\ VTS’ gt VTS /\
VTS’’ := insert(RID’, SQN, VTS’) /\
DS’ := update(locRepWS(WS, RID, REPLICA-TABLE),version(RID’, SQN), DS) .
When the executing site has collected propagation acknowledgments from f + 1 sites, it
marks the transaction as disaster-safe durable. This is done by the function dsDurable,
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which counts the number of received acks in dsSites. The site also distributes the decision
to all sites by using the function dsDurableTxn to produce a ds-durable message to each
site, and records that information in vsbSites. If there is no need to distribute the decision,
the transaction is marked as globally visible directly (by adding it to gvTxns):
crl [receive-propagate-ack] :
(msg propagate-ack(TID) from RID’ to RID)
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : Walter-Replica | dsSites : PSTS, vsbSites : VSBS,
committed : TRANSES < TID : Walter-Txn | writeSet : WS,
startVTS : VTS, txnSQN : SQN > ;; TXNS’,
dsTxns : DSTXNS, gvTxns : GVTXNS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | >
(if dsDurable(TID,PSTS’)
then if RIDS =/= empty
then < RID : Walter-Replica | dsSites : PSTS’, vsbSites : VSBS’,
dsTxns : (TID, DSTXNS) >
dsDurableTxn(TID,RIDS,RID)
else < RID : Walter-Replica | dsSites : PSTS’, vsbSites : VSBS’,
dsTxns : (TID, DSTXNS),
gvTxns : (TID, GVTXNS) >
fi
else < RID : Walter-Replica | dsSites : PSTS’ >
fi)
if PSTS’ := add(TID,keys(WS),RID’,REPLICA-TABLE,PSTS) /\
(not TID in DSTXNS) /\ RIDS := allServers(REPLICA-TABLE) \ RID /\
VSBS’ := VSBS ; voteSites(TID,RIDS) .
A propagation acknowledgment that arrives after the transaction has been marked as
disaster-safe durable is ignored:
rl [receive-propagate-ack-after-ds-durable-mark] :
(msg propagate-ack(TID) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | dsTxns : TID , DSTXNS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | > .
Upon receiving the “disaster-safe durable” decision, the site tries to commit the transaction
locally:
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crl [receive-ds-durable-visible] :
(msg ds-durable(TID) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | recPropTxns : (propagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS) ; PTXNS),
recDurableTxns : DTXNS, committedVTS : VTS’,
locked : LOCKS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | recPropTxns : (propagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS) ; PTXNS),
recDurableTxns : (durableTxns(TID) ; DTXNS),
committedVTS : insert(RID’,SQN,VTS’),
locked : release(TID,LOCKS) >
(msg visible(TID) from RID to RID’)
if VTS’ gt VTS /\ s(VTS’[RID’]) == SQN .
To commit transaction TID, the site must pass three checks: (i) the propagation message
has been received and acknowledged (propagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS) shown in recPropTxns),
(ii) VTS’ is greater than VTS, and (iii) all transactions from TID’s executing site with a smaller
sequence number have been received (s(VTS’[RID’]) == SQN). A visible message is then
sent back, and all corresponding locks are released.
The site fails to commit the transaction immediately after receiving the decision if any
check fails. The following rule shows the case when the site has not yet acknowledged the
propagation:
rl [receive-ds-durable-not-visible-not-ack-propagated] :
(msg ds-durable(TID) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | recPropTxns : (nonPropagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS,WS,RID’)
; PTXNS), recDurableTxns : DTXNS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | recPropTxns : (nonPropagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS,WS,RID’)
; PTXNS), recDurableTxns : (nonDurableTxns(TID,RID’)
; DTXNS) > .
The site commits any failed committed transaction (nonDurableTxns) whenever those
checks succeed, by changing nonDurableTxns to durableTxns. It also sends back a visible
message, updates the committed vector timestamp, and releases all corresponding locks:
crl [later-visible] :
< RID : Walter-Replica | recPropTxns : (propagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS) ; PTXNS),
recDurableTxns : (nonDurableTxns(TID,RID’) ; DTXNS),
committedVTS : VTS’, locked : LOCKS >
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=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | recPropTxns : (propagatedTxns(TID,SQN,VTS) ; PTXNS),
recDurableTxns : (durableTxns(TID) ; DTXNS),
committedVTS : insert(RID’,SQN,VTS’),
locked : release(TID,LOCKS) >
(msg visible(TID) from RID to RID’)
if VTS’ gt VTS /\ s(VTS’[RID’]) == SQN .
Finally, after receiving visible messages from all sites, the executing site marks the
transaction as globally visible:
crl [receive-visible] :
(msg visible(TID) from RID’ to RID)
< RID : Walter-Replica | vsbSites : VSBS, gvTxns : GVTXNS >
=>
(if VSBS’[TID] == empty
then < RID : Walter-Replica | vsbSites : VSBS’, gvTxns : (TID , GVTXNS) >
else < RID : Walter-Replica | vsbSites : VSBS’ >
fi)
if VSBS’ := remove(TID, RID’, VSBS) .
5.3 MODEL CHECKING SI AND PSI
As shown in Table 3.1, we have applied our tool CAT to modeling check the Maude model
of Walter against nine properties. All model checking results are as expected. In particular,
the Walter model satisfies consistency properties weaker than or equal to PSI, and violates
SI and any stronger consistency property.
Here we focus on PSI and SI, and investigate in detail whether or not each sub-property
(defined in Section 3.3) of them is satisfied by our Walter model. We have extended the tool
CAT with the associated five sub-properties: snapshot read (SI-1), no write-write conflicts
(SI-2), site snapshot read (PSI-1), no write-write conflicts (PSI-2), and commit causality
across sites (PSI-3). For example, CAT executes the following command to search, from
all generated initial states (with one read-only transaction, two read-write transaction, two
operations per each type of transaction, two sites, two keys, and two replicas per key), for
one reachable final state where the consistency property PSI-1 does not hold:
search [1] init(1,0,2,2,0,2,0,2,2,2) =>! C:Configuration
< M:Oid : Monitor | log: LOG:Log clock: N:Nat >
such that notSiteSnapshotRead(LOG:Log) .
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Similarly, either of the two results is output: “No solution,” meaning that all runs from
all the given initial states satisfy the desired consistency property, or a counterexample (in
Maude at the moment) showing a behavior that violates the property.
Table 5.1: Model Checking Results w.r.t. SI and PSI. “X” and “×” refer to satisfying or
violating the property, respectively.
SI-1 SI-2 PSI-1 PSI-2 PSI-3
1 read-only, 2 read-write × × X X X
1 read-only, 1 write-only, 1 read-write × × X X X
3 read-write × × X X X
2 read-only, 1 read-write × X X X X
2 read-only, 1 write-only × X X X X
Table 5.1 summarizes our analysis results with the initial states generated with different
combinations of three transactions (all cases share two operations per each type of transac-
tion, two sites, two keys, and two replicas per key). In particular, SI-1 is violated in all the
cases, despite of SI-2 being satisfied in some cases.
5.4 STATISTICAL MODEL CHECKING OF WALTER
To estimate the performance of Walter we adapt its model specified in the CAT framework
into the actor-based framework [5] for statistical model checking using PVeStA.2
5.4.1 A Probabilistic Model of Walter
Following the approach in Section 4.5 we eliminate nondeterminism in our Walter model by
probabilistically assigning to each message a delay. Specifically, the (manual) transformation
wraps the messages in the original Walter model in two ways: (i) an incoming messages is
wrapped with the current global time, and (ii) an outgoing message is wrapped with a delay
sampled probabilistically from a certain distribution of network latency (e.g., the lognormal
distribution [17]).
Example 5.1. In the transformed rule below (the original rule is in black), the incoming
message request is equipped with the current global time GT, and the outgoing message
reply is equipped with a delay:
rl [receive-remote-request-prob] :
2The entire probabilistic model is available at https://sites.google.com/site/siliunobi/walter.
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Figure 5.1: Throughput with fast commit under different workloads.
{GT, msg request(K, TID, VTS) from RID’ to RID}
< RID : Walter-Replica | history : DS >
=>
< RID : Walter-Replica | >
[delay, msg reply(TID, K, choose(VTS, DS[K])) from RID to RID’] .
where the request message is consumed by RID at the global time GT, and the reply message
will be consumed by RID’ after delay time units. delay of sort Float is a parameter
instantiated with a certain probability distribution (see Section 4.5).
5.4.2 Statistical Model Checking Results
Experimental Setup. We performed our experiments with 100 (read-only and/or write-
only) transactions, 1 or 5 operations per transaction, 100 keys, and up to 4 sites (the number
of sites and the transaction size are the same as in the experiments in [85]). All initial states
98
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
1 2 3 4
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (tx
n/t
im
e u
nit
)
Number of Sites
Write−Only Workload with Zipf
FC write−tx size=1
FC & SC write−tx size=1
FC write−tx size=5
FC & SC write−tx size=5
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
1 2 3 4
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (tx
n/t
im
e u
nit
)
Number of Sites
90% Read−Txns Workload with Uniform
read−tx size=1, write−tx size=1
read−tx size=1, write−tx size=5
read−tx size=5, write−tx size=1
read−tx size=5, write−tx size=5
Figure 5.2: Throughput with fast commit (FC) and slow commit (SC).
are generated in the same manner as in Section 4.7. To capture the fact that some keys may
be accessed more frequently than others, we use Zipfian distributions in our experiments.
We also use lognormal message delay distributions with parameters µ = 3 and σ = 1 for
local delays, and µ = 1 and σ = 2 for remote delays.
The plots in Fig. 5.1 show the throughput with only fast commit as a function of the
number of sites, with read-only, write-only or 90% reads workload, and with uniform and
Zipfian distributions. The plots show that read throughput scales nearly linearly with the
number of sites; write throughput also grows with the number of sites, but not linearly.
With a mixed workload, throughput is mostly determined by the transaction size. Our
statistical model checking results are consistent with the system evaluation results in [85]
(see Appendix C). For uniform distribution we only plot the results with a mixed workload.
The plots in Fig. 5.2 show the throughput with mixed (both fast and slow) commit pro-
tocols under the same experimental settings as in Fig. 5.1. As shown in the left plot,
throughput is mostly determined by the transaction size in the mixed workload; the trends
of, and the differences among, various transaction sizes are consistent with those in Fig. 5.1.
We only plot the results with Zipfian distribution, which are consistent with those with
uniform distribution.
Our probabilistic model of Walter, including the infrastructure for statistical model check-
ing, is around 1.8K LOC. Computing the probabilities took a couple of minutes on 30 servers,
each with a 64-bit Intel Quad Core Xeon E5530 CPU with 12 GB memory. Each point in
the plots represents the average of 3 statistical model checking results. The confidence level
for all our statistical experiments is 95%.
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5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have formally analyzed and verified in Maude the design of Walter [85], a partially
replicated distributed data store providing multi-partition transactions and guaranteeing
parallel snapshot isolation (PSI), an important consistency property that offers attractive
performance while providing adequate guarantees for certain kinds of applications. No formal
specification of Walter existed before this work. Furthermore, PSI was only informally
described by pseudo-code in [85] and no formal verification existed. This work has used
model checking and systematic generation of initial states to verify that Walter satisfies PSI
for all such states. We have also extended the Maude specification of Walter to model time
and probabilistic communication delays as a probabilistic rewrite theory, and have then used
statistical model checking analysis to study Walter’s latency and throughput performance
for a wide range of workloads. The results of the statistical model checking analysis are
consistent with the experimental results in [85] but offer also new insights about Walter’s
performance for a wider range of workloads than those evaluated experimentally in [85].
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY: THE ROLA TRANSACTIONAL PROTOCOL
Distributed transaction protocols are complex distributed systems whose design is quite
challenging because: (i) as for other distributed systems, validating correctness is very hard
to achieve by testing alone; (ii) the high performance requirements needed in many applica-
tions are hard to measure before implementation and expensive to compare across different
implementations; and (iii) there is an unavoidable tension between the degree of consistency
needed for the intended applications and the high performance required of the transaction
protocol for such applications: balancing well these two requirements is essential.
In this chapter,1 we present our results on how to use formal modeling and analysis as early
as possible in the design process to arrive at a mature design of a new distributed transaction
protocol, called ROLA (“Read atOmicity and prevention of Lost updAtes”), meeting specific
correctness and performance requirements before such a protocol is implemented. In this
way, the above-mentioned design challenges (i)–(iii) can be adequately met. We also show
how using this formal design approach it is relatively easy to compare ROLA with other
existing transaction protocols. This is also part of meeting design challenge (iii), since the
key comparisons focus on how well each protocol balances the consistency vs. performance
trade-offs for the intended applications.
ROLA in a Nutshell. Different applications require negotiating the consistency vs. per-
formance trade-offs in different ways. The key issue is the application’s required degree of
consistency, and how to meet such requirements with high performance. Cerone et al. [29]
survey a hierarchy of consistency models for distributed transaction protocols. Three of the
weakest consistency models in [29] are: read atomicity (RA), causal consistency (CC),2 and
parallel snapshot isolation (PSI).
A key property of transaction protocols is the prevention of lost updates (PLU). The
weakest consistency model in [29] satisfying both RA and PLU is PSI. However, PSI, and
the well-known protocol Walter [85] implementing PSI, also guarantee CC. Furthermore,
in [9], Ardekani et al. propose a consistency model called non-monotonic snapshot isolation
(NMSI)—and a distributed transaction protocol called Jessy that implements NMSI—that
is weaker than PSI, but still satisfies RA, CC, and PLU. To the best of our knowledge, up
to now NMSI has in fact been the weakest consistency model satisfying both RA and PLU,
1This chapter is based on the work [59, 60, 62] supported in part by NSF CNS 1409416, NSF CNS 1319527,
AFOSR/AFRL FA8750-11-2-0084, NRL contract N00173-17-1-G002, and NSFC Project No. 61872146.
2CC strengthens RA as follows: If transaction T2 is causally dependent on transaction T1, then if another
transaction sees the updates by T2, it must also see the updates of T1 (e.g., if A posts something on a social
media, and C sees B’s comment on A’s post, then C must also see A’s original post).
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Figure 6.1: ROLA’s update atomic (UA) consistency model added to the hierarchy of con-
sistency models of Cerone et al. [29]
which means that all current such models also satisfy CC. However, Cerone et al. conjecture
in [29] that a system guaranteeing RA and PLU without guaranteeing CC should be useful:
“existing consistency models do not include a counterpart of Read Atomic ob-
tained by adding the NoConflict axiom [preventing lost updates]. Such an
‘Update Atomic’ consistency model would prevent lost update anomalies without
having to enforce causal consistency [...]. Update Atomic could be particularly
useful [...].”
There was until now no distributed database design supporting such “update atomicity”
without also providing CC. Filling this gap, that is, presenting a design, ROLA, that does
exactly this for multi-partition transactions, is what we do in this chapter. As shown in
Fig. 6.1, where we have added ROLA’s update atomic (UA) consistency model to the hier-
archy of consistency models in [29], UA is strictly stronger than RA, incomparable with CC,
and strictly weaker than PSI (and NMSI).
The main idea of the ROLA algorithm is to extend the RAMP algorithm of Bailis et al.
[14], that ensures read atomicity for partitioned data stores (i.e., data are partitioned across
widely distributed data centers, but are not replicated) where a transaction can read and/or
write data stored at different partitions, by adding mechanisms for preventing lost updates.
Therefore, unlike Jessy and Walter, which support partially replicated data stores, ROLA,
like RAMP, at the moment only targets partitioned data stores.
Two key questions about ROLA’s design are:
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1. Are there natural applications needing high performance where RA plus PLU provide
a sufficient degree of consistency?
2. Can the new ROLA design meeting RA plus PLU outperform existing designs, like
Walter and Jessy, that also guarantee RA and PLU?
Regarding question (a), an example of a transaction that requires RA and PLU but not CC
is the “becoming friends” transaction on social media. Bailis et al. [14] point out that RA
is crucial for this operation: If Edinson and Neymar become friends, then Thomas should
not see a fractured read where Edinson is a friend of Neymar, but Neymar is not a friend of
Edinson. An implementation of “becoming friends” must obviously guarantee PLU: the new
friendship between Edinson and Neymar must not be lost. Finally, CC could be sacrificed for
the sake of performance: Assume that Dani is a friend of Neymar. When Edinson becomes
Neymar’s friend, he sees that Dani is Neymar’s friend, and therefore also becomes friend
with Dani. The second friendship therefore causally depends on the first one. However, it
does not seem crucial that others are aware of this causality: If Thomas sees that Edinson
and Dani are friends, then it is not necessary that he knows that (this happened because)
Edinson and Neymar are friends.
Regarding question (b), Section 6.5 shows that ROLA clearly outperforms both Walter
and Jessy in all performance requirements for all read/write transaction rates. For a fair
comparison, we have compared the performance of ROLA with those of Jessy and Walter
without their replication features.
Main Contributions include: (1) the design, formal modeling, and model checking anal-
ysis of ROLA, a new transaction protocol having useful applications and meeting RA and
PLU consistency properties with competitive performance; (2) a detailed performance com-
parison by statistical model checking between ROLA and the Walter and Jessy protocols
showing that ROLA outperforms both Walter and Jessy in all such comparisons, includ-
ing higher throughput and lower average latency; (3) to the best of our knowledge the first
demonstration that, by a suitable use of formal methods, a completely new distributed trans-
action protocol can be designed and thoroughly analyzed, as well as be compared with other
designs, very early on, before its implementation.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.1 presents an informal overview of ROLA.
Section 6.2 gives an informal correctness argument that ROLA satisfies RA and PLU. Sec-
tion 6.3 presents our executable specification of ROLA in the CAT framework (Chapter
3). Section 6.4 explains how we can use Maude reachability analysis to automatically check
whether ROLA satisfies the desired properties. Section 6.5 shows how we can estimate
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the performance of ROLA, Walter, and Jessy by using statistical model checking. Finally,
Section 6.6 ends this chapter with some concluding remarks.
6.1 ROLA TRANSACTIONS
This section gives an informal overview of ROLA (Algorithm 6.1) that guarantees both
RA and PLU, but not CC, for transactions accessing multiple partitions in a setting where
the data are partitioned (but not replicated) across a number of widely distributed sites.
ROLA extends RAMP-Fast (see Chapter 4 and Fig.A.1 in Appendix A) to also ensure
PLU. RAMP-Fast guarantees RA, but not PLU, since it allows a write to overwrite conflict-
ing writes: When a partition commits a write, it only compares the write’s timestamp t1
with the local latest-committed timestamp t2, and updates the latest-committed timestamp
with t1 or t2. If the two timestamps are from two conflicting writes, then one of the writes
is lost.
ROLA’s key idea to prevent lost updates is to sequentially order writes on the same key
from a partition’s perspective by adding to each partition a map which maps each incoming
version to an incremental sequence number. For example, suppose the transactions T1 and
T2 both read version x0 (with mapped sequence number 0, or the version 0) of the key x,
and both try to write the respective versions x1 and x2; then if T1 manages to write x1
first (with mapped sequence number 1), T2 is not allowed to overwrite x1, since the local
sequence number has increased by the time T2 tries to write x2. For write-only transactions
the mapping can always be built; for a read-write transaction the mapping can only be built
if there has not been a mapping built since the transaction fetched the value. This can
be checked by comparing the last prepared version’s timestamp’s mapping on the partition
with the fetched version’s timestamp’s mapping. In this way, ROLA prevents lost updates
by allowing versions to be prepared only if no conflicting prepares occur concurrently.
More specifically, ROLA adds two partition-side data structures (Lines 3-4, Algorithm
6.1): sqn, denoting the local sequence number counter, and seq [ts ], that maps a timestamp
to a local sequence number. ROLA also changes the data structure of versions in RAMP from
a set to a list (Line 1, Algorithm 6.1). ROLA then adds two methods to the existing RAMP-
F functionality: the coordinator-side3 method update (Lines 17-28, Algorithm 6.1) and the
partition-side method prepare update (Lines 5-10, Algorithm 6.1) for read-write transac-
tions. Furthermore, ROLA modifies two partition-side methods in RAMP: prepare (Lines
11-12, Algorithm 6.1), besides adding the version to the local store, maps its timestamp
3The coordinator, or client, is the partition executing the transaction.
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Algorithm 6.1 ROLA
Server-side Data Structures
1: versions : list of versions 〈item, value, timestamp tsv, metadata md〉
2: latestCommit [i]: last committed timestamp for item i
3: seq [ts]: local sequence number mapped to timestamp ts
4: sqn: local sequence counter
Server-side Methods
get same as in RAMP-Fast (see Appendix A)
5: procedure prepare update(v : version, tsprev : timestamp)
6: latest← last w ∈ versions : w.item = v.item
7: if latest = null or tsprev = latest.tsv then
8: sqn← sqn+ 1; seq [v.tsv]← sqn; versions .add(v)
9: return ack
10: else return latest
11: procedure prepare(v : version)
12: sqn ← sqn + 1; seq [v.tsv]← sqn; versions .add(v)
13: procedure commit(tsc : timestamp)
14: Its ← {w.item | w ∈ versions ∧ w.tsv = tsc}
15: for i ∈ Its do
16: if seq[tsc] > seq[latestCommit[i]] then latestCommit[i]← tsc
Coordinator-side Methods
put all, get all same as in RAMP-Fast (see Appendix A)
17: procedure update(I : set of items, OP : set of operations)
18: ret ← get all(I); tstx ← generate new timestamp
19: parallel-for i ∈ I do
20: tsprev ← ret [i].tsv; v ← ret [i].value
21: w ← 〈item = i, value = opi(v), tsv = ts tx,md = (I − {i})〉
22: p← prepare update(w,tsprev)
23: if p = latest then
24: invoke application logic to, e.g., abort and/or retry the transaction
25: end parallel-for
26: parallel-for server s : s contains an item in I do
27: invoke commit(tstx) on s
28: end parallel-for
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to the increased local sequence number; and commit (Lines 13-16, Algorithm 6.1) marks
versions as committed and updates an index containing the highest-sequenced-timestamped
committed version of each item. These two partition-side methods apply to both write-
only and read-write transactions. ROLA invokes RAMP-Fast’s put all, get all and get
methods to deal with read-only and write-only transactions (see Fig.A.1 in Appendix A).
ROLA starts a read-write transaction with the update procedure. It invokes RAMP-
Fast’s get all method to retrieve the values of the items the client wants to update,
as well as their corresponding timestamps (Line 18, Algorithm 6.1). ROLA writes then
proceed in two phases: a first round of communication places each timestamped write on its
respective partition. The timestamp of each version obtained previously from the get all
call is also packaged in this prepare message (Lines 19-25, Algorithm 6.1). A second round
of communication marks versions as committed (Lines 26-28, Algorithm 6.1).
At the partition’s side, the partition begins the prepare update routine by retrieving
the last version in its versions list with the same item as the received version (Line 6,
Algorithm 6.1). If such a version is not found, or if the version’s timestamp tsv matches the
passed-in timestamp tsprev (Line 7, Algorithm 6.1), then the version is deemed prepared. The
partition keeps a record of this locally by incrementing a local sequence counter and mapping
the received version’s timestamp tsv to the current value of the sequence counter (Line 8,
Algorithm 6.1). Finally, the partition returns an ack to the client (Line 9, Algorithm 6.1).
If tsprev does not match the timestamp of the last version in versions with the same item,
then this latest timestamp is simply returned to the coordinator (Line 10, Algorithm 6.1).
If the coordinator receives an ack from prepare update, it immediately commits the
version with the generated timestamp tstx (Line 27, Algorithm 6.1). If the returned value is
instead a timestamp, the transaction is aborted (Lines 23-24, Algorithm 6.1).
Example 6.1. Assume that we have two data items, x and y, and two partitions, Px and
Py, storing x and y, respectively. As depicted in Figure 6.2, two read-write transactions
T1 : r(y);w(x1);w(y1) and T2 : r(y);w(y2) are attempting concurrent writes, and a read-only
transaction T3 : r(x); r(y) proceeds while T1 is writing. T1 and T2 read the same version
y0. Both T1 and T2 perform the two-phase commit protocol on two partitions, Px and Py.
However, T2 fails to prepare y2 after T1 has prepared y1, because when T2’s prepare arrives
at Py, the timestamp of the last version store on Py is 1, which is not equal to tsprev = 0 in
T2’s prepare. T2, upon receiving the returned version y1, could abort the transaction or retry
with a new transaction on y1. Either way, the lost update problem is avoided. Regarding
the case with T1 and T3, T3 reads from Px after Px has committed T1’s write to x, but T3
reads from Py before Py has committed T1’s write to y. Thus, T3’s first-round reads would
106
Figure 6.2: ROLA execution with three transactions in Example 6.1. For simplicity, we
assume that T1 and T2 have fetched the same version y0 (i.e., tsprev = 0), when the sequence
chart starts.
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violate RA if it returns them. Using the metadata attached to its first-round reads, T3
determines to issue a second-round read to fetch the missing data from Py. After completing
the second-round read, T3 can safely return T1’s writes, not violating RA. Note that in this
example RAMP would allow T2 to commit, thus overwriting T1’s writes, which are then lost.
6.2 CORRECTNESS ARGUMENT FOR ROLA
In this section we give a somewhat informal correctness argument or proof sketch for
ROLA. Since Section 6.3 defines a formal model of ROLA, we could—and should in the
future—formally prove that our formal model of ROLA satisfies RA and PLU.4
6.2.1 Why ROLA Works
ROLA uses a two-phase commit protocol in order to detect concurrent writes. The first
phase declares an intent to commit a write at the partition. Concurrent writes race to the
partition without coordinating with each other. The partition can accept a preparation
if there is no other prepared version after the latest commit associated with the incoming
preparation. This in effect imposes a total order on the preparations, and thus on the
commits, from the partition’s perspective. In other words, the partition sees no logically
concurrent updates. Our algorithm therefore provides read atomicity, and prevents updates
from being lost, as concurrent updates are a necessary condition for lost updates.
By leveraging the partition-side sequence counter to commit, ROLA not only prevents lost
updates, but also makes writes progress at the partition-side, and thus more recent prepared
version can be reflected (we refer to this as ROLA’s progress property). This is different from
RAMP-Fast, where later prepared writes may never be fetched by reads as latestCommit
only updates by simply comparing the coordinator-side timestamps.
6.2.2 Formalizing Consistency Models
We consider transactions to be ordered sequences of reads and writes to arbitrary sets
of data items. Each data item has a single logical copy. We call the set of data items a
transaction respectively reads or writes its read set, resp. write set. Each write creates a
version of a data item. We identify versions of items by a timestamp from a totally ordered
4A fully mechanized proof of the correctness of ROLA (e.g., by using a theorem prover such as Coq
[21], or the constructor-based reachability logic tool [84]) would be needed to claim that ROLA satisfies its
correctness requirements, which is an important next step.
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set (e.g., natural numbers) which is unique across all versions of each item. Thus, timestamps
induce a total order on versions of each item. We denote version i of item x as xi. Given
two versions xi and xj, we write xi < xj if xj appears later than xi in the version order,
and write xi <next xj if xj is xi’s next version. Each item x has an initial version x0. Each
transaction finishes with being either committed or aborted. A history consists of a set of
transactions, together with the versions the transactions read and/or wrote.
Our correctness argument for ROLA, like that for RAMP in [14], is based on Adya’s
formalization of consistency models [4]. Following the formal reasoning about RAMP in
[14], we also use Adya’s formalization in the context of the above system model. We recall
here the definitions from [4, 14] characterizing the various properties that ROLA (as well as
RAMP [14]) should satisfy.
Between two transactions there may be three types of dependencies: read-dependencies,
write-dependencies and anti-dependencies.
Definition 6.1. (Read-Dependency). Transaction Tj directly read-depends on Ti if trans-
action Tj reads the version xi that Ti has written.
Definition 6.2. (Write-Dependency). Transaction Tj directly write-depends on Ti if trans-
action Ti writes a version xi and Tj writes xi’s next version xj.
Definition 6.3. (Anti-dependency). Transaction Tj directly anti-depends on Ti if transac-
tion Ti reads some version xh, and Tj writes xh’s next version xj.
Definition 6.4. (Direct Serialization Graph). A direct serialization graph (DSG) w.r.t. a
history H, denoted by DSG(H), is defined as a directed graph such that:
• each node in the graph corresponds to a committed transaction;
• each directed edge corresponds to a type of direct dependency: there is a read-/write-
/anti-dependency edge from Ti to Tj if Tj directly read-/write-/anti-depends on Ti.
In our model a transaction could also be a read-write transaction, in addition to read-only
and write-only transactions, which are the only ones considered in [14].
We can formalize various anomalies for distributed transactions in terms of DSGs. These
anomalies are then used to define consistency models.
Definition 6.5. (G0: Write Cycles). A history H exhibits phenomenon G0 if DSG(H)
contains a directed cycle consisting entirely of write-dependency edges.
109
Definition 6.6. (G1a: Aborted Reads). A historyH exhibits phenomenon G1a ifH contains
an aborted transaction Ta and a committed transaction Tc such that Tc reads a version
written by Ta.
Definition 6.7. (G1b: Intermediate Reads). A history H exhibits phenomenon G1b if H
contains a committed transaction Ti that reads a version xj written by Tj, and Tj also wrote
a version xk such that j < k.
Definition 6.8. (G1c: Circular Information Flow). A history H exhibits phenomenon G1c
if DSG(H) contains a directed cycle that consists entirely of read-dependency and write-
dependency edges.
Besides the above criteria, we need the definition of fractured reads to define RA.
Definition 6.9. (Fractured Reads). A transaction Tj exhibits the fractured reads phe-
nomenon if some transaction Ti writes versions xa and yb (in any order, where x and y may
or may not be distinct items), and some transactions Tj reads versions xa and yc, and c < b.
As defined in [14]: RA isolation prevents fractured reads, and transactions from reading
uncommitted, aborted, or intermediate versions:
Definition 6.10. (Read Atomicity). A system provides RA isolation if it prevents the
phenomena G0, G1a, G1b, G1c, and fractured reads.
Lost updates (LU) happen when two transactions simultaneously make conditional modi-
fications to the same data item(s).
Definition 6.11. (Lost Updates). A history H exhibits the phenomenon LU if DSG(H)
contains a directed cycle that consists of one or more anti-dependency edges and all edges
are by the same data item.
6.2.3 Proof Sketch of ROLA’s RA and PLU Properties
We base our proof of ROLA satisfying RA and PLU on Definitions 6.10 and 6.11.
To prove that ROLA provides RA we must, according to Definition 6.10, prove that ROLA
prevents the phenomena G0, G1a, G1b, G1c, and fractured reads. The proof is in general
quite similar to that of RAMP providing RA (Appendix B in [14]), since ROLA reads are the
same as RAMP reads, and ROLA writes are more restricted than RAMP’s, thus decreasing
the possibility of violating RA.
Lemma 6.1. ROLA prevents the phenomenon G0.
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Proof Sketch. Each partition has a local sequence number that increases once a version is
prepared; the increased sequence number is mapped to that version. Thus, versions (whether
or not for the same item) on a partition are totally ordered. That is, there is no directed
cycle consisting entirely of write-dependency edges.
Lemma 6.2. ROLA prevents the phenomenon G1a.
Proof Sketch. ROLA first-round reads access lastCommit, so each version fetched by a first-
round read is written by a committed transaction. ROLA second-round reads only access
the versions in the same transaction as for the versions fetched by the first-round reads,
which are also committed. Thus, ROLA never reads aborted writes.
Lemma 6.3. ROLA prevents the phenomenon G1b.
Proof Sketch. The proof follows directly from Lemma 6.2.
Lemma 6.4. ROLA prevents the phenomenon G1c.
Proof Sketch. Writes (on possibly different data items) in a transaction are assigned the
same timestamp, which prevents read-dependency and write-dependency cycles.
To prove ROLA preventing fractured reads, we first introduce the notions of sibling ver-
sions, sibling item, companion version, and companion sets.
Definition 6.12. (Sibling Versions). The set of versions produced by a transaction are
called sibling versions.
Definition 6.13. (Sibling Item). Data item x is called a sibling item to a version yj if there
exists a version xk written in the same transaction as yj.
Definition 6.14. (Companion Version). Version xi is a companion version of yj if xi is a
sibling version of yj or if the transaction that wrote yj also wrote xk and i > k.
Definition 6.15. (Companion Sets). A set of versions V is a companion set if, for every
pair (xi, yj) of versions in V where x is a sibling item of yj, xi is a companion version of yj.
Lemma 6.5. (Atomicity of Companion Sets). In the absense of G1c phenomena, if the
set of versions read by a transaction is a companion set, the transaction does not exhibit
fractured reads.
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Proof Sketch. If V is a companion set, then every version xi in V is a companion version of
every other version yj in V that includes x in yj’s sibling items. Suppose V has fractured
reads. According to Definition 6.9, there are two versions xi and yj such that the transaction
that wrote yj also wrote a version xk with i < k. However, in this case xi is not a companion
version of yj according to Definition 6.14. Therefore we reach a contradiction.
Lemma 6.6. ROLA reads assemble a companion set.
Proof Sketch. Without loss of generality, suppose a transaction reads two versions xi and
yj, and x is yj’s sibling item. The following continues the proof by comparing i and j:
• Case 1. If i ≥ j, then xi is already a companion version of yj, and the set is therefore
a companion set.
• Case 2. If i < j, then ROLA invokes RAMP-Fast’s get all method to issue a second-
round read to fetch the companion version xj. Whether xj has been committed or not
by the time the second-round read reaches the partition, the ROLA partition invokes
RAMP-Fast’s get method to return the prepared version xj in versions.
Therefore, the resulting set of versions is a companion set.
Theorem 6.7. ROLA guarantees RA.
Proof Sketch. The proof follows directly from Lemmas 6.1–6.6.
To prove ROLA preventing LU (Definition 6.11), we must first prove some lemmas.
Lemma 6.8. Versions are ordered by the arrival order of the corresponding prepare mes-
sages.
Proof Sketch. The proof follows directly from Lemma 6.1.
Lemma 6.9. Given a history H that is valid under ROLA, then each node in DSG(H)
directly read-depends on at most one other node with the same data item.
Proof Sketch. Suppose we have a transaction Ti in DSG(H) that directly read-depends on
two different transactions Tj and Tk with item x, namely Tj
r−→ Ti and Tk r−→ Ti. By Lemma
6.8, xj < xk or xk < xj. In either case Ti exhibits fractured reads and H is not valid under
RA (and thus under ROLA), a contradiction.
Lemma 6.10. If a (read-write) transaction reads version xi, and then writes version xj,
then xi <next xj.
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Proof Sketch. Since xj has been prepared, it means that there was no prepared versions
between xi and xj; otherwise the condition cannot be satisfied. Thus xi <next xj.
Lemma 6.11. Given a history H that is valid under ROLA, each node in DSG(H) is then
directly write-dependent on at most one other node with the same data item.
Proof Sketch. Suppose we have a transaction Ti in DSG(H) that is directly write-dependent
on two different transactions Tj and Tk with item x, namely, Ti
w−→ Tj and Ti w−→ Tk. We
then have the following cases:
• Case 1. Tj and Tk are both write-only transactions. Say Tj prepares first, and we have
seq[xj] < seq[xk] because when prepared, the sequence number increases.
– Case 1.1. If Tj also commits first, Tj overwrites Ti and we have Ti
w−→ Tj. Cur-
rently, latestCommit[x] = tsj. When Tk commits later, latestCommit[x] is
mapped to tsk because seq[tsk] > seq[tsj]. Then we have Tj
w−→ Tk, a contra-
diction.
– Case 1.2. If Tk commits first, Tk overwrites Ti and we have Ti
w−→ Tk. Currently,
latestCommit[x] = tsk. When Tj commits later, latestCommit[x] is not updated
because seq[tsj] < seq[tsk]. Then we only have Ti
w−→ Tk, a contradiction.
• Case 2. Tj is a read-write transaction, while Tk is a write-only transaction. According
to Lemma 6.10, Tj reads Ti. Thus Tk cannot prepare first because in that case Tj
aborts. The proof then follows directly from the above Case 1.1.
• Case 3. Tj and Tk are both read-write transactions. According to Lemma 6.10, both
Tj and Tk read Ti. Either of them prepares first, and then the other one has to abort
(the later prepare’s tsprev does not match the latest version’s, i.e., the other prepare’s,
timestamp).
Lemma 6.12. For any history H that is valid under ROLA, DSG(H) does not contain a
sequence Th
anti−−→ Ti anti−−→ Tj.
Proof Sketch. There is a transaction Ti′ whose version written xi′ is read by Ti, namely
Ti′
r−→ Ti. Tj writes xi′ ’s next version xj, namely Ti′ w−→ Tj. According to Lemma 6.10 and
Lemma 6.11, we have Ti′ 6= Th. From Th anti−−→ Ti we can build another two dependencies
Th′
r−→ Th and Th′ w−→ Ti. We now have xi′ <next xi and xh′ <next xi. According to Lemma
6.8 we must have xi′ = xh′ , and then we have Ti′
w−→ Ti. Since we already have Ti′ w−→ Tj, we
reach a contradiction (Lemma 6.11).
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Lemma 6.13. For any history H that is valid under ROLA, DSG(H) does not contain a
sequence Th
w−→ Ti anti−−→ Tj.
Proof Sketch. There is a transaction Ti′ whose version written xi′ is read by Ti, namely
Ti′
r−→ Ti. Tj writes xi′ ’s next version xj, namely Ti′ w−→ Tj. According to Lemma 6.11,
Th 6= Ti′ . Now we have xh <next xi and xi′ <next xj. The following continues the proof by
comparing the version order of xh and xi′ :
• Case 1. If xh < xi′ , we have xi < xi′ since xh’s next version is xi. According to Lemma
6.10, we have xi′ <next xi. Therefore we reach a contradiction.
• Case 2. If xi′ < xh, because of xi′ <next xj, we have xi′ <next xj < xh <next xi.
According to Lemma 6.10, we have xi′ <next xi. Therefore we reach a contradiction.
Theorem 6.14. ROLA prevents LU.
Proof Sketch. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Suppose there is a history H that
is valid under ROLA, but DSG(H) contains a directed cycle having one or more anti-
dependency edges and all edges are labeled by the same data item x.
• Case 1. Suppose DSG(H) contain a directed cycle having only one anti-dependency
edge Ta
l1−→ ... l2−→ Th lhi−→ Ti lij−→ Tj l3−→ ... l4−→ Ta. Let lij be the anti-dependency
edge. Thus, there is a transaction Ti′ whose version written xi′ is read by Ti, namely
Ti′
r−→ Ti; the transaction Tj writes xi′ ’s next version xj, namely Ti′ w−→ Tj. According
to Lemmas 6.13 and 6.9, we have Ti′ = Th. Thus, we have another directed cycle
Ta
l1−→ ... l2−→ Th w−→ Tj l3−→ ... l4−→ Ta consisting entirely of read-dependency and write-
dependency edges (G1c), which contradicts Theorem 6.7.
• Case 2. Suppose DSG(H) contain a directed cycle having at least two anti-dependency
edges. According to Lemma 6.12, these anti-dependency edges are not consecutive. For
each anti-dependency we directly follow Case 1, and eventually we are able to construct
a directed cycle consisting entirely of read-dependency and write-dependency edges
(G1c), which contradicts Theorem 6.7.
114
6.3 A FORMAL EXECUTABLE SPECIFICATION OF ROLA
This section presents an executable formal specification of ROLA in the CAT framework
(Chapter 3). Since ROLA extends RAMP-Fast, we only show the basic common building
blocks and major extensions, and refer to Chapter 4 for RAMP-Fast’s formal specification.
6.3.1 Data Types, Classes, and Messages
We model ROLA in an object-oriented style: the state comprises a number of replica (or
site) objects (each modeling a replica of the data store), and a number of messages (traveling
between the objects). A transaction is defined as an object residing inside the replica object
that executes it.
Some Data Types. Like in RAMP (Section 4.3.1), a version is a timestamped version of a
data item (or key) and is modeled as a four-tuple version(key,value, timestamp,metadata)
consisting of the key, its value, and the version’s timestamp and metadata. A timestamp is
modeled as a pair ts(Oid,sqn) consisting of a replica’s identifier Oid and a local sequence
number sqn that together uniquely identify a write transaction. Metadata are modeled as a
set of keys, denoting, for each key, the other keys that are written in the same transaction.
Unlike RAMP (Section 4.3.1), a list, instead of a set, of versions of sort Versions is
built from singleton lists (identified with versions of sort Version by means of a subsort
declaration) with an associative concatenation operator with identity nil:
sorts Version Versions .
subsort Version < Versions .
op nil : -> Versions [ctor] .
op __ : Versions Versions -> Versions [ctor assoc id: nil] .
A list of read and write operations of sort OperationList is built from singleton lists
(identified with operations of sort Operation by means of a subsort declaration) with an
associative concatenation operator with identity element nil:
sorts Operation OperationList .
subsort Operation < OperationList .
op nil : -> OperationList [ctor] .
op __ : OperationList OperationList -> OperationList [ctor assoc id: nil] .
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We also define a collection of votes of sort Vote, and the data type TxnOidSet for the
situation when a replica is waiting for messages such as votes from other replicas w.r.t. some
transaction, in the same way as in RAMP (Section 4.3.1).
Classes. ROLA transactions can be modeled as object instances of the subclass ROLA-Txn
with four new attributes:
class ROLA-Txn | operations : OperationList, localVars : LocalVars,
latest : KeyTimestamps, txnSqn : Nat .
subclass ROLA-Txn < Txn .
The operations attribute denotes the transaction’s operations. localVars maps the trans-
action’s local variables to their current values. latest stores the local view as a mapping
from keys to their respective latest committed timestamps. txnSqn stores the transaction’s
sequence number.
A ROLA replica (storing parts of the database) is modeled as an object instance of the
following subclass ROLA-Replica of class Replica that adds ten new attributes:
class ROLA-Replica | datastore : Versions, sqn : Nat,
gotTxns : ObjectList, tsSqn : TimestampSqn,
latestCommit : KeyTimestamps, votes : Vote,
voteSites : TxnOidSet, 1stGetSites : TxnOidSet,
2ndGetSites : TxnOidSet, commitSites : TxnOidSet .
subclass ROLA-Replica < Replica .
All attributes are defined in the same way as in the RAMP model (Section 4.3.1) except:
(i) the datastore attribute represents the replica’s local database as a list, instead of a set,
of versions for each key stored at the replica; and (ii) the new attribute tsSqn maps each
version’s timestamp to a local sequence number sqn.
Like in the RAMP model, the state also contains a “table” object of class Table mapping
each data item to the replica storing the item. Each mapping is a pair sites(key,part ).
Messages travel between replicas, and have the form:
msg msgContent from sender to receiver
where the message content msgContent is defined in our ROLA models as follows:
• prepare(txn,version) sends a version from a write-only transaction to its Replica;
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• prepare(txn,version, ts) does the same thing for other transactions, with ts the
timestamp of the version it has read;
• prepare-reply(txn,vote) is the reply to the corresponding prepare message, where
vote tells whether this Replica can commit the transaction;
• commit(txn,ts) marks the versions with timestamp ts as committed;
• get(txn,key,ts) asks for the highest-timestamped committed version or a missing
version for key by timestamp ts ;
• response1(txn,version) responds to first-round get request;
• response2(txn,version) responds to second-round get requests.
Initial State. The following shows an automatically generated initial state (with some
parts replaced by ‘...’) with two replicas, r1 and r2, that are coordinators for, respectively,
transactions t1, t2 and t3. r1 stores the data items x and z, and r2 stores y. Transaction t1
is the read-only transaction (xl :=read x) (yl :=read y), transaction t2 is a write-only
transaction write(y, 3) write(z, 8), while transaction t3 is a read-write transaction on
data item x. The states also include a table which assigns to each data item the replica
storing it. Initially, the value of each item is [0]; the version’s timestamp is empty (eptTS),
and metadata is an empty set:
eq init =
< tb : Table | table : [sites(x, r1) ;; sites(y, r2) ;; sites(z, r1)] >
< r1 : ROLA-Replica |
gotTxns : < t1 : ROLA-Txn |
operations : ((xl :=read x) (yl :=read y)), readSet : empty, writeSet : empty,
latest : empty, localVars : (xl |-> [0], yl |-> [0]), txnSqn : 0 >,
datastore : (version(x, [0], eptTS, empty) version(z, [0], eptTS, empty)),
sqn : 1, executing : none, committed : none, aborted : none, tsSqn : empty,
latestCommit : empty, votes : noVote, voteSites : empty, 1stGetSites : empty,
2ndGetSites : empty, commitSites : empty >
< r2 : ROLA-Replica | gotTxns :
< t2 : ROLA-Txn | operations : (write(y, 3) write(z, 8)), ... >
< t3 : ROLA-Txn | operations : ((xl := read x) write(x, xl plus 1)), ... >
datastore : version(y, [0], eptTS, empty), ... >
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6.3.2 Formalizing ROLA’s Behaviors
This section formalizes the dynamic behaviors of ROLA using rewrite rules, referring to
the corresponding lines in Algorithm 6.1 in Section 6.1.5 Since ROLA reads are the same
with RAMP-Fast reads (Chapter 4.3.2), here we only illustrate ROLA writes. The entire
specification is given at https://github.com/siliunobi/cat.
Starting a Transaction (Lines 17 – 22). A replica starts to execute a transaction
by moving the first transaction (TID) in gotTxns to executing. If the new transaction
is a write-only transaction (write-only(OPS)), the replica: (i) uses the function genPuts
(defined in Section 4.3.2) to generate all prepare messages; (ii) uses a function prepareSites
to remember the sites RIDS from which it awaits votes for transaction TID in the voteSites
attribute; and (iii) increments its local sequence number by one:
crl [start-wo-txn] :
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : ROLA-Replica |
gotTxns : (< TID : ROLA-Txn | operations : OPS, localVars : VARS,
txnSqn : N > ;; TXNS),
executing : TRANSES, sqn : SQN, voteSites : VSTS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : REPLICA-TABLE >
< RID : ROLA-Replica |
gotTxns : TXNS,
executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | operations : OPS, localVars : VARS,
txnSqn : SQN’ > TRANSES,
sqn : SQN’, voteSites : (VSTS ; addrs(TID, RIDS)) >
genPuts(OPS,RID,TID,SQN’,VARS,REPLICA-TABLE)
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ write-only(OPS) /\
RIDS := prepareSites(OPS, RID, REPLICA-TABLE) .
Otherwise, if the first transaction in gotTxns is a read-only or read-write transaction, the
replica updates 1stGetSites instead to keep track of the replicas from which it receives the
versions from the first-round gets. The function genGets generates all get messages for the
keys concerned by TID (see the executable specification available online for the definition of
this, and other, functions). The expression 1stSites gives the corresponding replicas for
those keys:
5We do not give variable declarations, but follow the convention that variables are written in (all) capital
letters.
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crl [start-ro-or-rw-txn] :
< TABLE : Table | table : Replica-TABLE >
< RID : ROLA-Replica | gotTxns :
(< TID : ROLA-Txn | operations : OPS, latest : empty > ;; TXNS),
executing : TRANSES, 1stGetSites : 1STGETS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : Replica-TABLE >
< RID : ROLA-Replica | gotTxns : TXNS,
executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | operations : OPS,
latest : vl(OPS) > TRANSES,
1stGetSites : (1STGETS ; addrs(TID,RIDS)) >
genGets(OPS,RID,TID,Replica-TABLE)
if (not write-only(OPS)) /\
RIDS := 1stSites(OPS,RID,Replica-TABLE) .
Receiving prepare Messages (Lines 5–10). When a replica receives a prepare message
for a read-write transaction, the replica first determines whether the timestamp of the last
version (VERSION) in its local version list VS matches the incoming timestamp TS’ (which is
the timestamp of the version read by the transaction). If so, the incoming version is added
to the local store, the map tsSqn is updated, and a positive reply (true) to the prepare
message is sent (“return ack” in our pseudo-code); otherwise, a negative reply (false, or
“return latest” in the pseudo-code) is sent:
crl [receive-prepare-rw] :
msg prepare(TID, version(K, V, TS, MD), TS’) from RID’ to RID
< RID : ROLA-Replica | datastore : VS, sqn: SQN, tsSqn : TSSQN >
=>
if VERSION == eptVersion or tstamp(VERSION) == TS’
then < RID : ROLA-Replica | datastore : (VS version(K,V,TS,MD)), sqn : SQN’,
tsSqn : insert(TS,SQN’,TSSQN) >
msg prepare-reply(TID, true) from RID to RID’
else < RID : ROLA-Replica | datastore : VS, sqn : SQN, tsSqn : TSSQN >
msg prepare-reply(TID, false) from RID to RID’
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ VERSION := latestPrepared(K,VS) .
If instead the received prepare message was for a write-only transaction, the replica simply
adds the received version to its local datastore, and maps the associated timestamp to the
incremented sequence number (insert(TS,SQN’,TSSQN)):
crl [receive-prepare-wo] :
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msg prepare(TID,version(K,V,TS,MD)) from RID’ to RID
< RID : ROLA-Replica | datastore : VS, sqn : SQN, tsSqn : TSSQN >
=>
< RID : ROLA-Replica | datastore : (VS version(K,V,TS,MD)),
sqn : SQN’, tsSqn : insert(TS,SQN’,TSSQN) >
msg prepare-reply(TID,true) from RID to RID’
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 .
Receiving Negative Replies (Lines 23–24). When a replica receives a prepare-reply
message with false vote, it aborts the transaction by moving it to aborted, and removes
RID’ from the “vote waiting list” for this transaction. If the transaction has been aborted,
the incoming prepare-reply message is simply consumed by the replica:
rl [receive-prepare-reply-false-executing] :
msg prepare-reply(TID, false) from RID’ to RID
< RID : ROLA-Replica | executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | > TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’,
voteSites : VSTS addrs(TID, (RID’ , RIDS)) >
=>
< RID : ROLA-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’ < TID : ROLA-Txn | >,
voteSites : VSTS addrs(TID, RIDS) > .
rl [receive-prepare-reply-aborted] :
msg prepare-reply(TID,FLAG) from RID’ to RID
< RID : ROLA-Replica | aborted : TRANSES < TID : ROLA-Txn | >,
voteSites : VSTS >
=>
< RID : ROLA-Replica | aborted : TRANSES < TID : ROLA-Txn | >,
voteSites : remove(TID,RID’,VSTS) > .
Receiving Acks (Lines 26–28). Upon receiving a “true” vote, the replica first checks
whether all votes have now been collected. The expression VSTS’[TID] extracts for TID
the remaining replicas from which it is awaiting votes. If all received votes are “yes,” the
replica starts to commit TID at the associated replicas by invoking genCommits to generate
all commit messages with the commit timestamp including the current sequence number
SQN. The replica also adds to commitSites the replicas from which it is awaiting committed
messages to commit the transaction:
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crl [receive-prepare-reply-true-executing] :
msg prepare-reply(TID,true) from RID’ to RID
< TABLE : Table | table : Replica-TABLE >
< RID : ROLA-Replica |
executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | operations : OPS > TRANSES,
voteSites : VSTS, sqn : SQN, commitSites : CMTS >
=>
< TABLE : Table | table : Replica-TABLE >
if VSTS’[TID] == empty --- all votes received and all yes!
then < RID : ROLA-Replica |
executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | operations : OPS > TRANSES,
voteSites : VSTS’, sqn : SQN,
commitSites : (CMTS ; addrs(TID,RIDS)) >
genCommits(TID,SQN,RIDS,RID)
else < RID : ROLA-Replica |
executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | operations : OPS > TRANSES,
voteSites : VSTS’, sqn : SQN, commitSites : CMTS >
fi
if VSTS’ := remove(TID,RID’,VSTS) /\
RIDS := commitSites(OPS,RID,Replica-TABLE) .
Receiving commit Messages (Lines 13–16). Upon receiving a commit message, the
Replica invokes the function cmt to commit the transaction. cmt looks up tsSqn for the
commit timestamp TS and the latest committed version’s timestamp in LC, and updates the
latest committed version if TS’s local sequence number is higher. A committed message is
then sent back to confirm the commit:
rl [receive-commit] :
msg commit(TID, TS) from RID’ to RID
< RID : ROLA-Replica | tsSqn : TSSQN, datastore : VS, latestCommit : LC >
=>
< RID : ROLA-Replica | tsSqn : TSSQN, datastore : VS,
latestCommit : cmt(LC, VS, TSSQN, TS) >
msg committed(TID) from RID to RID’ .
Receiving committed Messages. (For replicas to commit transactions locally). Upon
receiving a committed message, the replica first checks if all committed messages have now
been collected. The expression CMTS’[TID] projects for TID the remaining replicas from
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which it is awaiting committed messages. If the extraction is empty, the replica commits
the transaction:
crl [receive-committed] :
msg committed(TID) from RID’ to RID
< RID : ROLA-Replica | executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’, commitSites : CMTS >
=>
if CMTS’[TID] == empty --- all "committed" received
then < RID : ROLA-Replica | executing : TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’ < TID : ROLA-Txn | >,
commitSites : CMTS’ >
else < RID : ROLA-Replica | executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | > TRANSES,
committed : TRANSES’, commitSites : CMTS’ >
fi
if CMTS’ := remove(TID,RID’,CMTS) .
6.4 MODEL CHECKING CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES OF ROLA
Section 6.2 gave a proof sketch that ROLA guarantees RA and PLU, i.e., update atomicity
(UA). However, it is well known that hand proofs may be erroneous or may make crucial
assumptions that may not have been made explicit in a formal model. Indeed, we have
experienced that Maude model checking can uncover nontrivial errors as well as both missing
and unclear assumption in a supposedly verified distributed transaction system that is less
complex than ROLA [74].
We therefore have used the CAT tool (Chapter 3) to model check the correctness of
ROLA’s formal model. As shown in Table 3.1, all model checking results are as expected.
In particular, the ROLA model satisfies consistency properties weaker than or equal to UA,
and violates SI and any stronger consistency properties.
Below we show an example model checking experiment, where we provide the tool CAT
with one read-only transaction (of two operations), two read-write transactions (four oper-
ations per each), two replicas, and two keys. Under the hood, CAT executes the following
command to search, from all generated initial states, for one reachable final state where UA
does not hold:
search [1] init(2,0,1,2,0,4,0,2,2,1) =>! C:Configuration
< M:Oid : Monitor | log: LOG:Log clock: N:Nat > such that not ua(LOG:Log) .
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CAT outputs “No solution,” meaning that all runs from all the given initial states satisfy
UA, for our ROLA model.
6.5 STATISTICAL PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
The weakest consistency models in [29, 9] guaranteeing RA and PLU are PSI and NMSI,
and the main systems providing PSI and NMSI are, respectively, Walter [85] and Jessy [9]. To
be an attractive design option, ROLA should outperform both Walter and Jessy. To quickly
check whether ROLA indeed does so, we have also modeled Walter and Jessy—without
their data replication features—in Maude (see https://github.com/siliunobi/cat), and
have used statistical model checking with PVeStA to compare the performance of ROLA,
Walter, and Jessy in terms of throughput and average transaction latency.
6.5.1 A Probabilistic Model of ROLA
Following the approach in Section 4.5, to introduce both time and probabilities for perfor-
mance estimation, each message gets assigned a message delay that is sampled probabilisti-
cally from a dense time interval according to a certain probability distribution.
Example 6.2. In the transformed rule below (the original rule is in black), the incoming
message prepare is equipped with the current global time GT, and the outgoing message
prepare-reply is equipped with a delay:
crl [receive-prepare-rw-prob] :
{ GT, msg prepare(TID, version(K, V, TS, MD), TS’) from RID’ to RID }
< RID : ROLA-Replica | datastore : VS, sqn: SQN, tsSqn : TSSQN >
=>
if VERSION == eptVersion or tstamp(VERSION) == TS’
then < RID : ROLA-Replica | datastore : (VS version(K,V,TS,MD)), sqn : SQN’,
tsSqn : insert(TS,SQN’,TSSQN) >
[ delay, msg prepare-reply(TID, true) from RID to RID’ ]
else < RID : ROLA-Replica | datastore : VS, sqn : SQN, tsSqn : TSSQN >
[ delay, msg prepare-reply(TID, false) from RID to RID’ ]
if SQN’ := SQN + 1 /\ VERSION := latestPrepared(K,VS) .
where the prepare message is consumed by RID at the global time GT, and the prepare-reply
message will be consumed by RID’ after delay time units. delay of sort Float is a parameter
instantiated with a certain probability distribution (see Section 4.5).
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6.5.2 Recording Executions
Following the monitoring mechanism in Section 4.6, we also equip the transformed proba-
bilistic model with an execution log recording the history of relevant events during a system
execution. The log is updated each time an interesting event happens (i.e., the start, com-
mit, and abort of a transaction).6 We (manually) identify those events in the model, and
transform the corresponding rules by adding and updating the monitor object.
Example 6.3. Abort a Transaction. When the replica receives a false vote, it aborts the
transaction. The monitor records the abort/finish time GT for that transaction (and the
“committed” flag remains false):
rl [receive-prepare-reply-false-executing-monitor] :
< O@M : Monitor | log : LOG@M, (TID |->
< RID, T@M, VTS@M, FLAG@M, READS@M, WRITES@M)) >
{ GT, msg prepare-reply(TID, false) from RID’ to RID }
< RID : ROLA-Replica |
executing : < TID : ROLA-Txn | writeSet : WS, readSet : RS > TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’,
voteSites : VSTS addrs(TID, (RID’ , RIDS)) >
=>
< O@M : Monitor | log : LOG@M, (TID |->
< RID, T@M, insert(RID,GT,VTS@M), false, RS, WS >)
< RID : ROLA-Replica |
executing : TRANSES,
aborted : TRANSES’ < TID : ROLA-Txn | writeSet : WS, readSet : RS >,
voteSites : VSTS addrs(TID, RIDS) > .
6.5.3 Performance Comparison
Experimental Setup. We performed our PVeStA experiments with many different
probabilistically generated configurations.7 Each configuration had, 200 transactions, 2 or 4
operations per read-only or read-write transaction, up to 150 data items and up to 50 par-
titions, with lognormal message delay distributions (obtained by characterizing real-world
6We do not consider replication in our ROLA model, and therefore interesting events exclude transaction
commits on remote sites.
7The number of probabilistically generated configuration for analyzing a given performance property
depends on the chosen level of statistical confidence (in our case 95%), and is determined by the PVeStA
tool, which stops performing more simulations when such a confidence level is reached. Computing the
probabilities took a day (in the worst case) on 20 servers, each with a 64-bit Intel Quad Core Xeon E5530
CPU with 12 GB of memory.
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data centers [17]), and with uniform and Zipfian data item access distributions (used by
Yahoo! Cloud Serving Benchmark (YCSB) [36], the open standard for comparative perfor-
mance evaluation of data stores). Regarding lognormal’s parameters, local delays use µ = 0
and σ = 1, while remote delays use µ = 3 and σ = 2.
The plots in Fig. 6.3 show the throughput as a function of the percentage of read-only
transactions, and number of keys (data items), sometimes with both uniform and Zipfian
distributions. The plots show that ROLA outperforms Jessy, which itself outperforms Wal-
ter, for all parameter combinations. As the number of keys increases, the throughput of
all three protocols increases. In particular, with 100 or more keys, ROLA with uniform
distribution has significantly higher throughput than Walter and Jessy. We also learn from
the plots that more reads give higher throughput, since read-only transactions in all three
protocols can commit locally without certification. We only plot the results under uniform
key access distribution for the top plot; these results are consistent with the results using
Zipfian distributions.
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Figure 6.3: Throughput comparison under different workload conditions.
The plots in Fig. 6.4 show the average transaction latency as a function of the same
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Figure 6.4: Average latency comparison across varying workload conditions.
parameters as the plots for throughput. Again, we see that ROLA outperforms Jessy and
Walter in all settings. In particular, the difference between ROLA/Jessy and Walter is
quite large for write-heavy workloads; the reason is that Walter incurs a high overhead for
ensuring causal consistency, which requires background propagation to advance the vector
timestamp. The latency tends to converge under read-heavy workload (because reads in
all three protocols can commit locally without certification), but ROLA still has noticeably
lower latency than the other two protocols.
The plots in Fig. 6.5 present the transaction commit rate as a function of the same param-
eters as for the other two properties. The plots show that Walter has overall higher commit
rate than ROLA, which itself has higher commit rate than Jessy, because Walter trades
latency for more committed transactions. As the number of keys increases, the commit rate
of all three protocols increases. In particular, with 100 or more keys, ROLA has significantly
higher commit rate than Jessy. We also learn from the plots that more reads give higher
commit rate, as read-only transactions in all three protocols can commit directly. We only
plot the results under uniform key access distribution for some parameter combinations,
which are consistent with the results using Zipfian distributions.
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Figure 6.5: Transaction commit rate comparison across varying workload conditions.
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6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented the formal design and analysis of ROLA, a distributed transaction
protocol that supports a new consistency model not present in the survey by Cerone et
al. [29]. Using formal modeling and both standard and statistical model checking analyses
we have: (i) validated ROLA’s RA and PLU consistency requirements; and (ii) analyzed
its performance requirements, showing that ROLA outperforms Walter and Jessy in all
performance measures.
This work has shown, to the best of our knowledge for the first time, that the design and
validation of the consistency and performance properties of a new distributed transaction
protocol can be achieved relatively quickly before its implementation by the use of formal
methods. It also shows that, if Maude specifications of other system designs are available,
it is possible to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the new design w.r.t. those
alternative designs also before their implementations. This of course does not exclude the
additional information and improvements that will be gained by implementing ROLA; but
it substantially reduces the effort required in reaching a mature design.
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CHAPTER 7: AUTOMATIC TRANSFORMATION OF MAUDE DESIGNS
INTO CORRECT-BY-CONSTRUCTION DISTRIBUTED
IMPLEMENTATIONS
Developing a highly reliable distributed system meeting desired performance requirements
is at present a hard and very labor-intensive task. As shown in the previous chapters in this
dissertation, formal specification of a system design and formal verification and analysis
can yield formally verified designs as well as reliable performance predictions about their
behaviors. But there is still a formality gap between verified designs and distributed im-
plementations. Suppose that a given property has been verified for a given system design.
Does the property still hold true for its distributed implementation?
In this chapter we bridge this formality gap by presenting a correct-by-construction auto-
matic transformation (called the D transformation) mapping a verified formal specification
of a system design in Maude to a distributed implementation with the same safety and live-
ness properties as the formal design. Two case studies, namely the NO WAIT transaction
protocol [47] and the ROLA transaction system (Chapter 6), applying this transformation
to state-of-the-art distributed transaction systems show that high-quality implementations
with acceptable performance and meeting performance predictions can be obtained in this
way. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that formal models of distributed
systems analyzed within the same formal framework for both logical and performance prop-
erties are automatically transformed into logically correct-by-construction implementations
in the same programming language for which similar performance trends can be shown.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.1 describes the formal definition of the D
transformation. Section 7.2 shows the proof that the obtained distributed implementation
of a Maude specification is correct by construction. Section 7.3 presents a Maude prototype
automation of the D transformation, and two case studies using state-of-the-art distributed
transaction systems evaluating the implementations obtained by the D transformation. Fi-
nally, Section 7.4 discusses related work and Section 7.5 gives some concluding remarks.
7.1 THE D TRANSFORMATION
We define the transformation M 7→ D(M), mapping a Maude formal design M of a
distributed system to a distributed Maude program D(M) deployed on different machines.
We allow multiple concurrent Maude sessions to run on the same machine.
The transformation D takes as input:
• an object-oriented Maude module M defining an actor system as explained below;
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• an initial state init of sort Configuration, which is a set of objects
< o1 : C1 | atts1 > ... < on : Cn | attsn >
in TM,Configuration, with distinct object names oi;
• a distribution information function
di : {o1, . . . , on} → String× N
assigning to each “top-level” object1 oj in init a pair (ip, i), where ip is the IP address
(given as a string) of the machine in which the object should reside, and i denotes the
ith Maude session on that machine.
The transformation D then gives us:
• A Maude program MDdi that runs on each distributed Maude session; and
• an initial state initDdi (ip, i) for each Maude session (ip, i).
The transformation D is then a function
λM ∈ OModule . λinit ∈ TM,Configuration .
λdi ∈ [oids(init)→ String× N)] . D(M, init, di) ∈ OModule.
Notation. We write MDdi for D(M, init, di).
The object-oriented module M should model an “actor” system, so that its rewrite rules
must have the form
(to o from o′ : mc) < o :C | ... > => < o :C | ... > msgs [if ...] (†)
or
< o :C | ... > => < o :C | ... > msgs [if ...] (‡)
where msgs is a term of sort Configuration which, applying the equations in the module,
reduces to a multiset of messages
(to o1 from oθ : mc1) ... (to ok from oθ : mck)
1Such “top-level” objects may be hierarchical; i.e., they may have attributes whose values contain other
objects or entire configurations. Such “inner” objects often represent structured data rather than computa-
tional actors.
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Figure 7.1: Visualization of the D Transformation
for k ≥ 0, where θ is the substitution used when applying the rule. In such a message, mci
is the message content (or payload) of the message being sent to the object named oi from
the object named oθ. Although no “top-level” objects are created or deleted by the (†), (‡)
rules, object-creating rules can also be added.2
7.1.1 The M 7→MDdi Transformation
The main idea for defining the distributed Maude program MDdi is to add middleware for
communication between Maude sessions and with external objects. This is done by adding
to each Maude session a communication mediator object that takes care of communication
with objects that are not local, as illustrated in Fig. 7.1.
This mediator object opens and maintains sockets for communication between pairs of
objects; there is in general one socket for each pair of objects that communicate remotely
(across machine/session boundaries). Objects in the same Maude session communicate with
each other without going through the mediator object.
The only modification of the rewrite rules in M is that a message addressed to a remote
object is “redirected” to the local mediator, which:
2Our framework also allows us to have rules that create new “top-level” objects in their right-hand sides.
A new “child” object will run in the same Maude session as its parent. Furthermore, the name of the child
object must be chosen such that the di function can determine its Maude session. This can, e.g., be achieved
by letting the child’s identifier be a string of which the parent’s is a prefix.
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• establishes the required socket between the pair of objects if not already established;
• transforms the original message into a string with an “end-of-message” marker; and
• sends the resulting string through the appropriate socket.
For receiving, the mediator object receives external messages through sockets associated to
“its” objects. Since TCP sockets do not preserve message boundaries, the mediator has to
buffer the messages received in each socket. When the buffered string contains the “end-of-
message” string, the mediator extracts the string representing the message, transforms it to
a message, and leaves the message (having a local addressee) in the local configuration.
The distributed program MDdi consists of:
• A constant di of sort Map{Oid,Pair{String,Nat}} which specifies di in Maude as a
map from Oid to Pair{String,Nat} using an equation eq di = ....
• The module filter(M), which transforms M with only a minor change in its rules as
described below.
• Declarations and rewrite rules defining the mediator objects and their behaviors (which
import the SOCKET module).
Example 7.1. If the objects in state init in Example 2.1 (Chapter 2.1) are executed on
different machines, say, ip1, ip2, ip3, and ip4, respectively, then the map di can be given in
Maude as follows:
eq di = c1 |-> < "ip1" ; 1 >, c2 |-> < "ip2" ; 1 >,
db1 |-> < "ip3" ; 1 >, db2 |-> < "ip4" ; 1 > .
The module filter(M). The only change made by filter(M) to the rewrite rules in M is
that any message (to o′ from o : mc) generated by a rule in M is replaced by a message
(to di(o′) transfer mc from o to o′)
if o′ and o reside in different Maude sessions. Formally, this is done by adding a subsort
declaration
subsort Pair{String,Nat} < Oid .
stating that a < ip ; session > pair is an object identifier (for the mediator objects), adding
a message constructor
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op to_transfer_from_to_ : Oid MsgContent Oid Oid -> Msg [ctor] .
and changing each rewrite rule in M of the form (†) to
(to o from o′ :mc) < o :C | ... > => < o :C | ... > filter(msgs) [if ...]
(and similar with rewrite rules of the form (‡)), where filter redirects the messages going
to remote objects to the mediator and leaves the other (internal) messages unchanged3:
op filter : Configuration -> Configuration .
eq filter(none) = none .
eq filter((to O from O’ : MC) CONF)
= if di[O] =/= di[O’] then
(to di[O’] transfer MC from O’ to O) filter(CONF)
else (to O from O’ : MC) filter(CONF) fi .
Specifying the Mediator Each mediator is defined as an object instance of the class
class Med | sockets : Sockets,
contacts : Contacts,
bufferedMsgs : Configuration .
where:
• sockets values are terms [socket1, str1] ... [socketk, strk], denoting that the string
str j has been received through socket socket j (and then buffered) since the last time
a message was extracted from this buffer;
• contacts is a set of triples < localObjId,socket,remoteObjId >, denoting the socket used
to communicate between two objects; and
• bufferedMsgs contains the outgoing messages when the appropriate sockets have not
yet been established.
We refer to https://github.com/anonymous-yokai/fse19 for a complete executable
specification of the mediator object, where most of the rewrite rules deal with establishing
Maude sockets along the lines explained in [32, Chapter 11]. In this chapter we just show
the following three rewrite rules for the mediator.
3We do not show variable declarations in the rest of this chapter, but follow the convention that variables
are written in (all) capital letters.
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rl [sendRemote] :
(to O transfer MC from O’ to O’’)
< O : Med | contacts : CONTACTS ; < O’, SOCKET, O’’ > >
=>
< O : Med | >
send(SOCKET,O’,
msg2string(to O’’ from O’ : MC) + "[msep]") .
In this rule, the mediator is tasked with transferring the message content MC from the local
object O’ to the remote object O’’. The rule uses Maude’s built-in message send to send the
message through the socket SOCKET, which has already been established between O’ and O’’.
Since sockets transport strings, the function msg2string is used to transform the message
into a string; the end-of-message separator "[msep]" is then appended to the string.
The following rule shows the case when a configuration receives a message received(S,
SKT, DATA). This message denotes that the string DATA has been received through socket
SKT. The mediator object just adds this string DATA to the string STR that it has already
buffered for socket SKT:
rl [receive-data] :
received(S, SKT, DATA)
< O : Med | sockets : SKTS [SKT, STR] >
=>
< O : Med | sockets : SKTS [SKT, STR + DATA] >
receive(SKT, S) .
Finally, when enough data has been received through a socket SKT so that a message MSG
can be extracted from it, the message is extracted from the string, converted into a message
which is added to the configuration to be consumed by a local object, and the remaining
string (after the message and the end-of-message separator have been removed) is buffered
with SKT:
crl [extractRemoteMsg] :
< O : Med | sockets : SKTS [SKT,STR] >
=>
< O : Med | sockets : SKTS [SKT,
substr(STR,find(STR, "[msep]", 0) + 6,length(STR))] >
MSG
if MSG := string2msg(substr(STR,0,find(STR,"[msep]",0))) .
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Communication between objects in the same Maude session takes place without going
through sockets or mediators. MDdi also adds functions string2msg and msg2string, con-
verting between messages and strings and satisfying string2msg(msg2string(M)) = M.
The Module MDdi . To summarize, the distributed Maude program MDdi executed at
each local host consists of the definition of di and the union of the module filter(M) and
the mediator specification:
mod MDdi is
including filter(M) + MEDIATOR .
eq di = ... .
endm
7.1.2 Distributed Initial States
The initial state initDdi (ip, n) at Maude session (ip, n) is a configuration containing:
• the objects in init mapped to (ip, n) by di;
• one mediator object
< < ip ;n > : Med | sockets : empty, contacts : empty,
bufferedMsgs : none >
• one occurrence of the built-in “portal” object <> denoting that we rewrite with external
objects, such as Maude’s built-in socket manager (see Chapter 11 in [32] for more details
about the portal object and external rewriting); and
• one message
createServerTcpSocket(socketManager, o, port#, 5)
for each top-level (non-mediator) object o in the configuration.
7.1.3 Adding Foreign Objects
A distributed Maude object-based system can be easily extended to interact with objects
foreign to it with no changes to the existing rewrite rules: only the new messages and rules
defining the interaction with new foreign objects —databases, web sites, display devices, and
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so on— need to be specified. This is easy to achieve thanks to the message-passing abstrac-
tion: an object of some class needs no information at all about the internal representation
of objects of other classes which with it communicates. Only the interfaces specifying the
messages are needed.
Within Maude itself, two kinds of objects are supported: (i) standard Maude objects,
which are terms in an object-based rewrite theory, and (ii) external Maude objects. In this
chapter it suffices to focus on socket external Maude objects already described in Section 2.
If the only objects involved in our distributed Maude system are standard Maude objects,
only socket external Maude objects, opened and closed by the communication mediator
objects described in Section 7.1.1, are needed. But how can such a distributed Maude
system communicate with foreign objects, that is, objects such as a display or a database
completely outside Maude? The simple answer has been already hinted at above. Suppose
Cl1 is a class of Maude objects that needs to communicate with, say, database foreign
objects. All we need are three things: (a) a signature of messages sent by objects in Cl1 to
such foreign objects and by foreign objects to objects in Cl1; (b) rewrite rules for the objects
of class Cl1 specifying how messages to foreign objects are generated and how objects of
class Cl1 react to messages sent to them by foreign objects; and (c) a wrapper encapsulating
a foreign object that can transform the string representation of a message from a Cl1 object
into an internal command to the foreign object, and a reply from the foreign object into
the string representation of a message to a Cl1 object. Once items (a)—(c) are specified,
socket-based communication can proceed as before: messages represented as strings will
travel though the sockets communicating Maude standard objects with foreign objects and
vice versa. As explained in Section 7.3, in this chapter we have used some of the steps (a)–(c)
to allow communication of a YCSB [36] foreign object with standard Maude objects to carry
out system evaluations in the two case studies we present. The same methodology can be
used to allow communication of distributed Maude objects with any other foreign objects.
Furthermore, the D transformation explained in Section 7.1.4 can be easily extended to
initial configurations where some of their objects are foreign objects.
7.1.4 Deployment
We have built a simple Python-based prototype that automates the process of deploying
and running the distributed Maude model on distributed machines. The tool takes as input
the IP addresses of the distributed machines and the number of Maude sessions on each
machine.
We have run distributed Maude deployments to perform large-scale experiments on dis-
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tributed transaction systems. To experiment with realistic workloads, we have connected our
distributed implementation to the well-known YCSB workload generator [36] as explained
in Section 7.1.3. Our deployment tool also invokes the workload generator (e.g., YCSB) to
initialize and to load data into the database, and then invokes the workload generator to
generate transactions for the different Maude instances to execute.
To measure the performance of our distributed implementation, we have added a “log”
attribute to each mediator object that records relevant data during the distributed execution.
A Python script then inspects and aggregates these logs after execution to compute the
overall performance metric of the system.
7.2 CORRECTNESS PRESERVATION
Our goal is to obtain a distributed implementation of a Maude specification that is correct
by construction: If the original Maude model M , with intial state init, satisfies a CTL∗
temporal logic property φ that does not contain the “next” operator ©, then φ should also
hold in the distributed implementation MDdi when started with corresponding distributed
initial state(s), and vice versa.
Since MDdi uses Maude external TCP/IP socket objects for communication between dif-
ferent Maude sessions, a full proof of correctness of the M 7→ MDdi transformation would
require modeling the TCP/IP protocol and its associated network failure model. This is
possible, but is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we adopt here the approach fol-
lowed in other proofs of correctness of distributed systems obtained by transformation from
formal specifications, e.g., [91, 82], where network communication is delegated to a trusted
shim and is abstracted away in correctness proofs. In our case, the Maude TCP/IP socket
objects invoked by the communication mediator objects play the role of such a trusted shim.
Therefore, we present below a proof of correctness, in the form of a stuttering bisimulation,
which uses an intermediate formal model D0(M, init, di) which abstracts away the network
communication details by providing a high-level abstraction of it.
7.2.1 The Model D0(M, init, di)
The rewrite theory D0(M, init, di) is essentially as MDdi , except that it abstracts away
the establishment of the appropriate sockets, and models the effect of socket communication
in rewriting logic at a higher level of abstraction. The model D0(M, init, di) therefore
simplifies MDdi as follows.
Concerning the mediator class:
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• Since we no longer have explicit sockets, the contacts attribute of Med is no longer
needed.
• Since we assume that the sockets have been successfully established, the attribute
bufferedMsgs, used to buffer outgoing messages that could not yet be transmitted
since the appropriate socket was not established, is no longer needed.
• Since we abstract away the fact that TCP sockets do not preserve message boundaries,
we do not need to buffer messages at the receiving end, and therefore the attribute
sockets is no longer needed.
The mediator class therefore no longer needs any attributes, and is declared as follows in
D0(M, init, di):
class Med .
The rewrite rules in D0(M, init, di) differ from the rewrite rules in MDdi as follows:
• Since we abstract from the establishment of sockets, the rewrite rules in MDdi dealing
with this issue (not shown in this chapter) are omitted from D0(M, init, di).
• The rule sendRemote in MDdi is replaced by the rule
rl [sendRemote] :
(to O transfer MC from O’ to O’’)
< O : Med | >
=>
< O : Med | >
transfer(di[O’’], O, msg2string(to O’’ from O’ : MC)) .
op transfer : Oid Oid String -> Msg [ctor] .
where a “transfer” message models socket communication.
• When a mediator receives such a transfer message (modeling socket communication),
it transforms the received string into a message, which is then released into the configu-
ration. The rewrite rules receive-data and extractRemoteMsg in MDdi are therefore
replaced by the following rewrite rule in D0(M, init, di):
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crl [receiveRemoteMsg] :
transfer(O, O’, STRING)
< O : Med | >
=>
< O : Med | >
string2msg(STRING) .
Initial States The initial state in D0(M, init, di) corresponding to the state init in M
is just init with an additional mediator object < < ip ;n > : Med | > for each (ip, n) ∈
image(di). We call this initial state initD0 . (Compared to the distributed initial states in
MDdi , initD0 is the multiset union of all those distributed states, minus <>, where the Med
objects no longer have attributes, and without the messages used to establish sockets.)
It is worth remarking that, although the distributed state is represented as a single flat
configuration of objects in initD0 , “direct” message communication between two objects
assigned to different Maude sessions in di cannot take place due to the “filtering” of generated
messages in MDdi (and hence also in D0(M, init, di)).
7.2.2 D0(M, init, di) and M are Stuttering Bisimilar
We show that the Kripke structures K(D0(M, init, di), initD0) and K(M, init) are stut-
tering bisimilar for the labeling functions L inK(M, init) and L◦h inK(D0(M, init, di), initD0).
We define the map h : Reach(initD0)→ Reach(init) as follows:
eq h(none) = none .
eq h(< O : Med | > CONF) = h(CONF) .
ceq h(< O : C | > CONF) = < O : C | > h(CONF) if C =/= Med .
eq h((to O transfer MC from O’ to O’’) CONF)
= (to O’’ from O’ : MC) h(CONF) .
eq h((transfer(O,O’,STRING)) CONF)
= string2msg(STRING) h(CONF) .
eq h((to O from O’ : MC) CONF) = (to O from O’ : MC) h(CONF) .
That is, h maps a configuration in D0(M, init, di) to a similar configuration in M with the
following modifications: (i) the mediator objects are forgotten, and (ii) the three intermediate
messages involved in transferring a message content mc from o to a remote o′ are all mapped
to the message (to o′ from o : mc).
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Theorem 7.1. h is a stuttering bisimulation map
h : K(D0(M, init, di), initD0)→ K(M, init)
with corresponding labeling functions L ◦ h and L.
Proof. According to Theorem 2.2, h is such a stuttering bisimulation map if there is a well-
founded domain (W,>) and a function µ : Reach(initD0)× Reach(init)→ W so that:
1. h(initD0) = init.
2. If h(t) = u and t −→ t′ then either u −→ u′ for some u′ = h(t′), or h(t′) = u and
µ(t, u) > µ(t′, u).
3. If h(t) = u and u −→ u′, then there is a sequence of transitions t −→ t1 −→ · · · −→ tn,
with n ≥ 1, such that h(tn) = u′ and h(t1) = · · · = h(tn−1) = u.
4. h(t) and t satisfy the same atomic propositions, which holds since L ◦ h is
K(D0(M, init, di), initD0)’s labeling function.
(In this proof, terms t, t′, t1, . . . and rewrites between such terms denote states and transitions
in K(D0(M, init, di), initD0), and the u’s denote states and transitions in K(M, init).)
1. As explained in Section 7.2.1, the initial state initD0 just adds a number of Med objects to
the initial state init of M . Since h forgets all Med objects, we have the desired h(initD0) =
init.
2. Assume that t −→ t′ is a rewrite in D0(M, init, di) and h(t) = u.
• If the rule used in the rewrite above is of the form (†):
m < o :C | atts > => < o :C | atts ′ > filter(msgs) [if ...]
(the case with rules of the form (‡) is easier), then there is a substitution θ such that
t = c0 mθ (< o C | atts >)θ and t
′ = c0 (< o :C | atts ′ >)θ) filter(msgsθ). Since
h(filter(msgsθ)) = msgsθ, and h(t) = h(c0) mθ (< o :C | atts >)θ, it follows that
h(t) −→ h(t′) with the rule
m < o :C | atts > => < o :C | atts ′ > msgs [if ...].
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• For the additional rewrite rules inD0(M, init, di), we use (MsgConf , >mul) as the well-
founded order, where MsgConf denotes finite multisets of D0(M, init, di)-messages,
and >mul is the multiset extension induced by the order > given by (to o transfer
mc from o′ to o′′) > transfer(o′′′,o, msg2string(to o′′ from o′ : mc)) > (to
o′′ from o′ : mc). We define µ(t, u) to be the multisets of messages in t.
Since the rules sendRemote and receiveRemoteMsg only replace a message with the
corresponding h-equivalent and >-decreasing message, t −→ t′ using one of these rules
means that h(t) = h(t′) and µ(t, u) >mul µ(t′, u) (for any u).
3. Any step in M can be simulated by a sequence of steps in D0(M, init, di). Suppose
that u −→ u′ in M and h(t) = u. Then either a rule of the form (†), say,
m < o :C | atts > => < o :C | atts ′ > msgs [if ...],
or of the form (‡) is used. We show the case for rule (†); the (‡) case is trivial. For a
(†) rule, u must have the form u = h(c0) h(m′) (< o : C | atts >)θ with h(m′) = mθ and
u′ = h(c0) (< o : C | atts ′ >)θ msgsθ. We can distinguish two cases: (i) if m′ = mθ then t =
c0 mθ (< o : C | atts >)θ and can be rewritten to t
′ = c0 (< o : C | atts ′ >)θ filter(msgsθ),
so that h(t′) = u′, as desired. Otherwise, mθ must be of the form (to b from a : x), with
oθ = b, and m′ is either (i) (to di(a) transfer x from a to b), or (ii) transfer(di(b),di(a),
msg2string(to b from a : x)). We do case (i) and leave case (ii) (requiring fewer steps)
to the reader. The c0 has the form c0 = < di(a) : Med | > < di(b) : Med | > c
′
0 and we have
rewrites t −→ t1 = < di(a) : Med | > transfer(di(b), di(a), msg2string(to b from a : x))
< di(b) : Med | > < b :C | attsθ > c′0 −→ t2 = < di(a) : Med | > (to b from a : x) < di(b) : Med | >
< b :C | attsθ > c′0 −→ t3 = < di(a) : Med | > < di(b) : Med | > < b :C | atts ′θ > filter(msgsθ) c′0.
But then h(t) = h(t1) = h(t2) = t, and h(t3) = u
′, as desired.
The main result immediately follows from Theorems 2.1 and 7.1:
Theorem 7.2. Given a rewrite theory M specifying a distributed system and an initial
state init as described in Section 7.1, a distribution information function di mapping the
top-level objects in init to different machines/Maude sessions, a labeling function L over a
set AP of atomic propositions, and a CTL∗ formula ϕ over AP not containing the “next”
operator, then
K(M, init) |= ϕ if and only if K(D0(M, init, di), initD0) |= ϕ
for the labeling function L ◦ h in K(D0(M, init, di), initD0).
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7.3 PROTOTYPE AND EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented, in around 300 LOC, a prototype of the D transformation that
automatically transforms a Maude model of a distributed system into a distributed Maude
implementation. We have applied our prototype to the Maude specification of: (i) a well-
known lock-based distributed transaction protocol which has been implemented in C++
and evaluated in [47]; and (ii) the ROLA transaction system design (Chapter 6), whose
correctness and performance have been analyzed using Maude and PVeStA, but which has
never been implemented. Using our prototype and the Maude specification of ROLA we
obtain the first distributed implementation of ROLA for free.
We have subjected our two distributed Maude implementations so obtained to realistic
workloads generated by YCSB to answer to the following questions:
Q1: Are the performance evaluations obtained for the distributed Maude implementations
consistent with the performance predictions obtained by statistical model checking for
the original Maude designs? If a conventional distributed implementation of the design
is also available, is its performance consistent with the distributed Maude one and with
the model-based predictions?
Q2: How does the performance of a distributed Maude implementationD(M) automatically
generated by the unoptimized prototype transformation D from a Maude design M
compare with that of an available state-of-the-art distributed implementation in C++
of such a design?
Note that answers to Q1 cannot take the form of an exact or approximate agreement between
the performance values predicted by statistical model checking a Maude model and the
values measured in an experimental evaluation. This is impossible because: (i) measured
values depend on the experimental platform used; (ii) the probability distributions used in
statistical model checking are only approximations of the expected behavior; and (iii) the
sizes (e.g., number of objects) of initial states used in statistical model checking and in
experimental evaluations are typically quite different, due to feasibility restrictions placed
by statistical model checking.
For the above reasons (i)-(iii), the consistency to be expected between the performance
predicted by statistical model checking a model and those obtained by experimentally eval-
uating an implementation is not an agreement between predicted and measured values, but
between predicted and measured trends. For example, if throughput increases as a function
of the proportion of read and write transactions, then consistency means that it should do
so along curves that are similar up to some change of scale.
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7.3.1 Experimental Setup
Implementation-Based Evaluation. We have evaluated the two case studies using the
Yahoo! Cloud Serving Benchmark (YCSB) [36], which is the open standard for comparative
performance evaluation of data stores. We used the built-in C++ implementation of YCSB in
[47] in our first case study. For ROLA, we used a variant of the original Java implementation
of YCSB adapted to transaction systems [14]. We deployed the two case studies on a cluster
of d430 Emulab machines [90], each with two 2.4 GHz 8-Core Intel Xeon processors and 64
GB RAM. The ping time between machines is approximately 0.13 ms. We also set the same
system and workload configuration. In both cases, we considered 5 partitions (of the entire
database) on 5 machines, and all client processes split across another 5 separate machines;
we considered the same mixture of read-only, write-only, and read-write transactions, with
each transaction accessing up to 8 keys; and we used Zipfian distribution for key accesses
with the parametric skew factor theta.
Statistical Model Checking (SMC). By running Monte-Carlo simulations from a given
initial state, SMC verifies a property (or estimates the expected value of an expression)
up to a user-specified level of confidence. We probabilistically generated initial states so
that each PVeStA simulation starts from a different initial state. To mimic the real-world
network environment, we used the lognormal distribution for message delays [17]. We used
10 machines of the above type to perform statistical model checking with PVeStA. The
confidence level for all our statistical experiments is 95%.
Standard Model Checking. We used our Maude models of NO WAIT and ROLA spec-
ified in the CAT framework (Chapter 3) for model checking consistency properties of dis-
tributed transaction systems. The analysis was performed with exhaustively generated initial
states for a size bound.
Trusted Code Base. Our trusted code base includes the Maude implementation (includ-
ing the implementation of TCP/IP external socket objects) as well as the Python-based tool
used for deploying and initializing the D-transformed distributed Maude system.
7.3.2 Lock-Based Distributed Transactions
This case study considers the protocol NO WAIT implemented in the Deneva framework
[47] using C++. NO WAIT is a strict two-phase locking (strict 2PL)-based distributed
transaction system with two-phase commit (2PC) as its atomic commitment protocol.
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Figure 7.2: NO WAIT: Throughput comparison between statistical model checking (top),
distributed Maude implementation (middle), and C++ implementation (bottom). Experi-
ments Lock A (left) and Lock B (right) measure throughput of different ratios of updates
and transaction sizes when varying skew factors and ratios of reads, respectively.
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We formally specified NO WAIT in Maude, and then automatically D-transformed the
Maude specification to its corresponding distributed Maude implementation. We used the
C++ implementation in [47] in our experiments with NO WAIT in [47]. Our Maude model of
NO WAIT is around 600 LOC, whereas the C++ implementation in [47] has approximately
12K LOC.
We performed two sets of experiments (Lock A and Lock B in Fig. 7.2), focusing on
the effect of varying amounts of contention in the system. For each set of experiments
we plot the experimental results of statistical model checking of our Maude model, and
show the corresponding plots for the measurements of the distributed Maude and C++
implementations.
In Lock A we vary the contention by tuning the skew theta, and compare two workloads
with 50% and 100% update transactions, respectively. In Lock B we analyze the throughput
as a function of the percentage of read-only transactions with skew theta = 0.5, and focus on
the impact of transaction sizes (i.e., number of operations in a transaction). Regarding Q1,
all three plots in each experiment show similar trends for the model- and implementation-
based evaluations. That is, our distributed Maude implementation-based evaluation not only
confirms the statistical predictions, but also agrees with the state-of-the-art implementation-
based results.
Regarding Q2, our correct-by-construction lock-based distributed transaction system achieves
lower peak throughput, but only by a factor of 6, than the corresponding C++ implemen-
tation. Some reasons for this lower performance are: (i) the M 7→ D(M) transformation is
an unoptimized prototype; instead, the C++ implementation of NO WAIT is optimized for
high performance (e.g., the socket library nanomsg provides a fast and scalable networking
layer); and (ii) the M 7→ D(M) transformation allows adding any benchmarking tool as a
foreign object, wich is very flexible but adds an extra layer of communication; instead, in the
C++ implementation YCSB and the protocol clients are directly integrated.
Model Checking Consistency Properties. We have used the tool CAT (Chapter 3) to
model check our Maude model of NO WAIT against 6 consistency properties (read commit-
ted, read atomicity, cursor stability, update atomicity, snapshot isolation, and serializability),
without finding a violation of any of them. Under the assumption that our trusted code
base executes correctly, Theorem 7.2 ensures that our distributed Maude implementation of
NO WAIT satisfies the same consistency properties for the corresponding initial states.
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Figure 7.3: ROLA: Comparison between statistical model checking (top) and distributed
Maude implementation (bottom). Experiments ROLA A (left) and ROLA B (right) measure
throughput for different number of partitions and different ratios of reads when varying ratios
of reads and concurrent clients, respectively.
7.3.3 The ROLA Transaction System
ROLA is a recent distributed transaction protocol design that guarantees read atomicity
(RA) and prevents lost updates (PLU). As shown in Chapter 6, ROLA has been formalized in
the CAT framework, and model checked against the above consistency properties. Statistical
model checking performance estimation has also showed that ROLA outperforms well-known
distributed transaction system designs guaranteeing RA and PLU (Chapter 6). However, up
to now there was no distributed implementation of ROLA. Using our tool and the Maude
specification of ROLA in the CAT framework (which consists of approximately 850 LOC),
we obtain such a correct-by-construction distributed implementation for free.
We have performed statistical model checking of the Maude specification, and have run
our distributed Maude implementation on YCSB-generated workloads, on two groups of
experiments (see Fig. 7.3). In ROLA A we increase the amount of reads, and compare
throughput with various partitions of the entire database (5 partitions against 3 partitions).
In ROLA B we plot throughput as a function of the number of concurrent clients, and focus
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on the effect of increasing the amount of contention (95% reads against 50% reads). Both
plots in each experiment agree reasonably well.
All ROLA’s consistency properties model checked in Chapters 3 and 6 are preserved
(Theorem 7.2) assuming correct execution of the trusted code base.
7.4 RELATED WORK
Our work is related to various formal frameworks for specification, verification, and im-
plementation of distributed systems that try to reduce the formality gap [92] between the
formal specification of a distributed system’s design and its implementation. They can be
roughly classified in three categories (only some example frameworks in each category are
discussed):
1. Specification, Verification, and Compilation to Imperative Implementation.
The IOA formal framework [65, 42] formalizes distributed system designs as IO-automata,
provides a toolset for both model checking and theorem proving verification of IOA designs,
and offers also the possibility of generating Java distributed implementations of IO designs
by compilation.
2. Specification, Verification, and Proof of Imperative Implementation. A good
example of state-of-the art recent work in this category is the IronFleet framework [48].
Distributed systems are specified in a mixture of Lamport’s TLA and Hoare logic assertions
for imperative sequential code in Leino’s Dafny language [52]. They are then formally verified
with various tools, including Z3 [39] and the Dafny prover. Dafny code is then complied into
C# code.
3. Specification, Verification, and Transformation into Correct Distributed Im-
plementation. Work in this category has for the most part been based on constructive
logical frameworks such as those of Nuprl [35] and Coq [21] and has been shown effective
in generating sophisticated system implementations. In particular: (i) the Event-ML frame-
work begins with an Event-ML specification and the desired properties both expressed in
Nuprl and extracts a GPM program implementation; (ii) theVerdi framework [91] begins
with a distributed system design and a set of safety properties, both specified in Coq; it
offers the important advantage of allowing the specifier to ignore various network failures
and replication issues: they are delegated to so-called verified system transformers which
automatically transform the design and ensure correct execution of the transformed design
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under such failure scenarios. After desired properties are verified in Coq, the OCaml code
of a correct implementation is extracted and deployed using a trusted shim; (iii) the Chapar
framework [53] is specialized to extract correct-by-construction implementations of key-value
stores in OCaml from formal specifications of such stores and of their consistency properties
expressed and verified in Coq; and (iv) the Disel modular framework [82] specifies both
distributed system designs and their desired properties in separation logic, it expresses both
the system and property specifications in Coq, uses Coq to prove the desired properties, and
extracts correct-by construction OCaml code, which is then deployed using a trusted shim.
Discussion and Comparison with the Maude Framework. To the best of our knowl-
edge, none of the above frameworks provide support for prediction of performance properties
by statistical model checking,4 whereas Maude does so through the PVeSta tool [7]. Regard-
ing work in category (1), the Maude framework shares the use of executable specifications
and the availability of a formal environment of model checking and theorem proving tools
with IOA; but in comparison with IOA’s automatic generation of Java distributed implemen-
tations from IOA specifications, the Maude approach substantially reduces the “formality
gap” by avoiding compilation into a complex imperative language. The main difference with
the IronFleet framework in category (2) is that imperative programs are a problematic, low
level choice for expressing formal design specifications. Furthermore, system properties can
be considerably harder to prove at that level. Regarding frameworks in category (3), the
present work within the Maude framework shares with them the possibility of generating
correct-by-construction distributed implementations from designs; but adds to them the fol-
lowing additional possibilities: (i) rapid exploration of different design alternatives by testing
and by automatic breadth first search, LTL and statistical model checking analysis of such
designs; (ii) prediction of system performance properties before implementation; and (iii)
flexible range of properties that can be verified of a design: theorem proving verification of
both invariants [77] and reachability logic properties [84] is supported but is not required :
LTL and statistical model checking verification can already yield systems with considerably
higher quality than those developed by conventional methods. The main point is that, for an
entirely new system never specified or built before, beginning with a human-intensive the-
orem proving verification effort may be both premature and costly. Instead, in the Maude
framework designs can be thoroughly analyzed and improved by fully automated methods
before a mature design is fully verified using theorem proving tools.
4Probabilistic system behaviors can be specified using probabilistic IOA [28]. However, we are not aware
of tools supporting statistical model checking analysis of performance properties for distributed system
designs in the IOA framework.
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7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we have presented the M 7→ D(M) transformation and proved that M and
a model D0(M) of D(M) abstracting network communication details are stuttering bisimilar
and therefore satisfy the same safety and liveness properties. We have also presented two
case studies evaluating the performance of D(M) for designs M of two state-of-the-art dis-
tributed transaction systems, and that of a high-perfomance conventional implementation.
These case studies have also confirmed that the statistical-model-checking-based performance
predictions obtained from a design M before implementation are similar to the performance
measures forD(M) and a conventional implementation. This work shows that it is possible to
automatically generate reasonable, but not yet optimal, correct-by-construction distributed
implementations from very high level and easy to understand executable formal specifica-
tions of state-of-the-art system designs which are much shorter (a factor of 20 for the C++
implementation of NO WAIT) than conventional implementations.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter presents the conclusions of this dissertation, followed by a discussion on
future research directions.
8.1 CONCLUSIONS
Designing, verifying, and implementing highly reliable high-performance distributed sys-
tems is at present a hard and very labor-intensive task. Cloud-based systems have further
increased this complexity due to the desired consistency, availability, scalability, and disas-
ter tolerance. This dissertation has addressed this challenge in the context of distributed
transaction systems (DTSs) from two complementary perspectives: (i) designing cloud stor-
age systems with high assurance such that they satisfy desired correctness and performance
requirements; and (ii) transforming verified system designs into correct-by-construction dis-
tributed implementations.
Regarding the correctness requirements mentioned in (i), we have provided an object-
based framework (called CAT) for formally modeling DTSs in Maude, have explained how
such models can be automatically instrumented to record relevant events during a run, and
have formally defined a wide range of consistency properties on such histories of events.
We have implemented a tool which automates the entire specification instrumentation and
model checking process.
Regarding the performance requirements mentioned in (i), we have proposed a general,
though not yet automated, method that transforms the untimed, non-probabilistic, and non-
deterministic formal Maude models of DTSs in the CAT framework into probabilistic rewrite
theories, have explained how we can monitor the system executions of such probabilistic the-
ories, and have showed how we can evaluate the performance of the DTS designs based on
the recorded log for different performance parameters and workloads using the PVeStA
statistical model checker.
Three DTS case studies, namely, RAMP, Walter, and ROLA, have been presented in
detail to demonstrate the applicability of the above two methodologies. We have shown new
and promising results for each of the three case studies. In particular, we have identified
promising new design alternatives for given classes of applications relatively easily before
they are implemented:
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RAMP. We have used our models to analyze RAMP’s extensions against a wide range
of consistency properties, which the original RAMP paper did not do. Besides, we have
explored various design alternatives for RAMP transactions, and have been able to make
rigorous comparisons between them in terms of their consistency and performance properties
by means of logical and statistical model checking. In this way, we have gained substantial
knowledge that can help find the best match between a RAMP version and a given class of
applications.
Walter. Our statistical model checking analysis has offered new insights about Walter’s
performance for a wider range of workloads than those evaluated experimentally by the
developers [85], while at the same time showing agreement between the performance pre-
dictions obtained from a Maude model of Walter by statistical model checking, and the
experimental performance evaluations in [85].
ROLA. Our work on ROLA has shown, to the best of our knowledge for the first time,
that the design and validation of a new distributed transaction protocol can be achieved
relatively quickly before its implementation by the use of formal methods.
Regarding challenge (ii), to bridge the formality gap between verified designs of actor-like
distributed systems and their distributed implementations we have presented a correct-by-
construction automatic transformation mapping a verified formal specification of an actor-
based distributed system design in Maude to a distributed implementation enjoying the same
safety and liveness properties as the original formal design. Two case studies, applying this
automatic transformation to state-of-the-art distributed transaction systems analyzed within
the same formal framework for both logical and performance properties, show that high-
quality implementations with acceptable performance and meeting performance predictions
can be automatically generated in this way.
8.2 FUTURE WORK
Extending and Optimizing the CAT framework. We have formalized 9 transactional
consistency properties in the CAT framework, and modeled checked whether they are sat-
isfied or not for 13 DTS models. In future work we should verify the correctness of our
formalization of those consistency properties by formally relating our definitions in Maude
to other (non-executable) formalizations (e.g., Adya’s formalization of transactional consis-
tency models [4]).
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Although the model checking verification has been made systematic by generating all
possible initial states with certain bounds, there is still room for obtaining higher coverage
and assurance in the future to arrive at stronger claims for our model checking analysis. In
particular, we should (automatically) explore all possible combinations of the user-provided
parameters, instead of (manually) choosing some of them. For example, in Section 5.3 we
have model checked our Walter model against SI & PSI for only 5 (out of 10) combinations
with 3 types of transactions, but of course a full coverage of all combinations would provide
fuller assurance.
The CAT framework focuses only on distributed transaction systems and their transac-
tional consistency properties (read atomiciy, serializability, etc.). In future work we should
extend the CAT framework to formalizing and model checking NoSQL key-value stores1
(e.g., Cassandra [2] and Riak [1]) and their non-transactional consistency properties [89]
(e.g., eventual consistency and strong consistency). Previous work [63, 56, 55] on formal
modeling of Cassandra and formal analysis of its consistency models can be a good basis for
this future research direction.
Automatic Performance Estimation of DTSs. Regarding design and verification of
DTSs, the CAT framework currently focuses only on correctness requirements (i.e., model
checking consistency properties). To meet performance requirements, an automated ap-
proach to performance estimation by statistical model checking is also highly needed. We
plan to integrate the consistency and performance measures formally defined in Chapter 4
into the CAT framework, and to automate the transformation (manually done for RAMP,
Walter, and ROLA in Chapter 4, 5, and 6, respectively) from nondeterministic models into
probabilistic ones that can be subjected to statistical model checking analysis using a tool
such as PVeStA [7].
Toolkit for Automatic Analysis of Cloud Storage Systems. The transformation
in the CAT framework is from nondeterministic models to probabilistic rewrite theories.
Alternatively, we can design a new tool P2ND based on exploring the opposite transformation
direction (from a probabilistic model into a nondeterministic one), which, together with the
CAT tool, provides users with flexible choices in formal design and analysis of DTSs in
Maude. For example, if a user’s first attempt at a formal model is a probabilistic one (resp.
a nondeterministic one), he can choose P2ND (resp. CAT) to perform automatic analysis of
both correctness and performance properties. Both tools should be integrated into a toolkit,
1We classify cloud storage systems into two categories: distributed transactional systems and NoSQL
key-value stores.
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along with the above feature of also supporting NoSQL data stores, which offers users a
generic framework for modeling and analysis of cloud storage systems.
Infinite-State Model Checking. CAT uses explicit-state model checking to explore the
system behaviors from many initial states generated with user-provided bounds, and there-
fore cannot be used to verify that an algorithm is correct for all possible initial system
configurations, which can be infinite. One promising technique to addressing this limitation
is symbolic model checking, where a possibly infinite number of initial states is described
symbolically by formulas in a theory whose satisfiability is decidable by an SMT solver. In
the Maude context, this form of symbolic model checking is supported by rewriting modulo
SMT [78], which has already been applied to various distributed real-time systems, and by
narrowing-based symbolic model checking [11, 12]. An obvious next step is to verify prop-
erties of cloud storage systems for possibly infinite sets of initial states using this kind of
symbolic model checking.
Deductive Verification in Reachability Logic. In the correct-by-construction trans-
formation from distributed system designs to distributed implementations, the stronger the
properties that have been verified of the design, the stronger the correctness guarantees that
can be claimed for the implementation. Since symbolic model checking does not always
terminate in general, it may not be possible to verify some properties this way. Abstraction
methods may sometimes make a symbolic state space finite, but finding such an abstraction
may not always be possible. A natural next step after infinite-state symbolic model checking
verification is deductive verification. A promising approach available for Maude-based spec-
ification is the constructor-based reachability logic and tool reported in [84] and currently
under active development and experimentation.
Modular Design and Analysis of Cloud Storage Systems. Our work in this disser-
tation is part of a long-term research effort in which we have been using Maude to both
meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities of modular design and analysis for cloud
storage systems (see [22, 70] for surveys). As part of this effort, we have formally specified
13 Maude models of state-of-the-art DTSs in the CAT framework, as well as Cassandra in
[63, 56, 55], and have formally analyzed both the consistency and the performance properties
of these systems. From the analysis of all these systems, which span different points in the
consistency vs. performance spectrum for cloud storage systems, a better, more modular
understanding of the different algorithms that need to be combined to achieve the different
designs and their relationships has been gained. An important next step in the near future
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is to develop a library of formally specified components and show how system designs such
as those for RAMP, Walter, ROLA, Cassandra, and other future systems can be obtained
as modular compositions out of such a library of components.
Optimizing the D Transformation. Despite of the promising results (i.e., our unop-
timized prototype is only six times slower than a high-performance implementation), there
is still ample room for improvement in the future to arrive at a mature and highly opti-
mized Maude implementation of the D transformation. Extensive experimentation is also
needed to more fully demonstrate the effectiveness and performance of the D transformation
methodology and to optimize the transformation itself.
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APPENDIX A: THE RAMP-FAST ALGORITHM
Figure A.1 shows the RAMP-Fast algorithm as it is described in [14].
Figure A.1: The RAMP-Fast algorithm as described in [14].
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APPENDIX B: THE ORIGINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
RESULTS FOR RAMP
Figures B.1 and B.2 show the RAMP performance w.r.t. throughput and average latency
as plotted in [14]. The relative performance for RAMP-Fast and RAMP-Small is indeed
similar to the predictions by our statistical model checking analysis in Chapter 4.7.
Figure B.1: Throughput and latency under varying client load as shown in [14]. Blue and
green curves refer to RAMP-Fast and RAMP-Small, respectively.
Figure B.2: Throughput under varying percentage reads as shown in [14]. Blue and green
curves refer to RAMP-Fast and RAMP-Small, respectively.
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APPENDIX C: THE ORIGINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
RESULTS FOR WALTER
Figure C.1 shows the Walter throughput under varying workload as plotted in [85], which
is consistent with our statistical model checking results in Chapter 5.4.
Figure C.1: Throughput under varying workload as shown in [85]
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